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ATTEMPTS AND MONOPOLIZATION:
A MILDLY EXPANSIONARY ANSWER TO
THE PROPHYLACTIC RIDDLE OF
SECTION TWO
Edward H. Cooper*

T

HE efforts of activist antitrust lawyers to redefine the contours
of attempted monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman
Act1 have again forced the courts to wrestle with the classic antitrust
dilemma: How far must single-firm competitive behavior be restrained to make competition free?
The answer given by the majority of current decisions is that,
absent some other established offense, single-firm behavior should
be prohibited as an attempt to monopolize only when there is a specific intent to monopolize and the firm has come dangerously near to
unlawful monopolization.
A contemporary challenge to this orthodox answer is rapidly
gaining force. The challenge is based on two premises: First, greater
regulation of single-firm behavior is necessary even in the absence of
high levels of market power or intent to monopolize; second, creative
judicial lawmaking is the best available means of achieving this goal.
The legal vehicle for creating such judicial regulatory authority is
found in the effort to make attempt doctrine into a self-contained
principle, divorced from its present marriage to monopolization.
Section 2, replete with its criminal and treble damages penalties,
would reach any sort of competitive behavior that is, found to be
unfair or coercive in its total market setting.
Five examples illustrate the situations that are typically used to
justify such an expansion of the attempt offense.
The first is an example of deliberate price predation. An industry
that manufactures a distinctive product is populated by four firms:
Two widely diversified industrial giants hold fifty-five per cent and
twenty-five per cent shares of the market, a small family-owned firm
devoted entirely to this product holds fifteen per cent, and a diversi* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1961, Dartmouth College; LL.B.
1964, Harvard University.Ed.
The author wishes to express deep appreciation to his colleagues, Professors Peter
0. Steiner and Charles Donahue, Jr., who reviewed drafts of this Article and made
several helpful suggestions.
1. "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor ....
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).

[ 375]
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fled new entrant, far larger in assets than the fifteen per cent firm but
considerably smaller than the Big Two, holds five per cent of the
market. The five per cent firm cuts prices sharply, to a level far below
costs. The large firms do not follow the price cut; they simply continue their prior pricing practices, absorbing such losses of sales as
occur for the duration of the price war. After a brief struggle, the
fifteen per cent firm is eliminated from the market, its assets are sold
for other uses, and its market share is evenly distributed among the
three survivors, who emerge with shares of sixty per cent, thirty per
cent, and ten per cent. Discovery in the subsequent antitrust suit
conveniently produces a resolution of the board of directors of the
five per cent firm that prices be reduced "for the sole purpose of
destroying [the fifteen per cent firm] so that we might secure a portion
of [its] business and thereby increase" our profits. 2 There is no danger
that the five per cent firm will acquire a distinctive "monopoly"
power of its own. Accordingly, under the orthodox approach there
would not be an attempt to monopolize. The proponent of the illustration, however, concludes with the query, "[I]n these enlightened
times, could anyone imagine that [the fifteen per cent firm] would
recovery because it could not prove 'dangerous probabe denied
3
bility'?"
The second example is found in the recent attack mounted by the
Department of Justice against the two largest sellers of replacement
tires. Goodyear and Firestone are each charged, without any claim of
conspiracy, with independently attempting to monopolize the same
market.- Although the twenty-eight per cent and twenty-five per cent
market shares respectively alleged might, standing alone, seem to
invite a charge that a "dangerous" approach to single-firm monopoly
power exists, 5 it is nearly impossible to find in either position any
approach to such power in a setting where two firms are so nearly
equal, each growing and neither enjoying any apparent prospect of
eliminating the other. If reprehensible competitive behavior can be
2. The basic situation is taken from Blecher, Attempt'To Monopolize Under Section

2 of the Sherman Act: "Dangerous Probability" of Monopolization Within the "Relevant Market", 38 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 215, 221 (1969). The major modification has
been to add the passive reaction of the largest firms, so that there can be no possibility
of finding a contract or combination between them and the predator.
8. Id. at 221-22.
4. United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Civil No. C-73-885 (N.D. Ohio,
filed Aug. 9, 1973); United States v. Firestone Tire Co., Civ. No. C-73-886 (N.D. Ohio,
filed Aug. 9, 1973). Both are summarized in 5 TRADE Rae. RP. 1 45,073 (nos. 2335,
2336). The complete text of the Goodyear complaint is reproduced in BNA ArmvsRusr
& TRADE RE. REP., Aug. 14, 1973, at D-1.
5. See text accompanying notes 39-43 infra.

HeinOnline -- 72 Mich. L. Rev. 376 1973-1974

January 1974]

Attempts and Monopolization

shown, should courts not be able to invoke antitrust sanctions notwithstanding the lack of a "contract, combination... or conspiracy"

subject to control under section 1 of the Sherman Act?6
The third example is that of fraudulently procured patents. If a
patentee has sought to enforce a patent procured by deliberate fraud
on the Patent Office, is there any reason why liability should not be
found without regard to any independent showing either of a dan-

gerous probability that monopoly power will be acquired in some
7
relevant market or of a specific intent to acquire such power?

The fourth example is drawn from the misfortunes created by
direct competition between a supplier and its distributor customers.

Chrysler sells Dodge automobiles to independent dealers in Pittsburgh. It provides heavy subsidies to a new dealership created by it,
enabling the new dealership to undersell the established dealers at

loss-creating prices. Is not an antitrust remedy appropriate? Should
it matter that elimination of the established dealers, so that Chrysler

should become the sole Dodge seller in Allegheny County, would
8
not give Chrysler monopoly power in any relevant market?
Finally, the Department of Justice has provided a host of examples

by including attempt charges in its all-out war on reciprocity practices.9 This line of attack has clearly departed from any reference

to monopoly power as such. Attempt charges have been leveled
against firms whose total market shares are small. 10 More important,
the Department has focused on a "market" comprised only of pur-

chases by actual and potential suppliers to the firm involved.1
In the face of these examples, it must seem churlish indeed to ar6. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or'othervise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce... is hereby declared to be illegal. . . . Every person
who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ....
.. 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1970).
7. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965).
8. See Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa.
1968), affd., 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969).
9. Reciprocity pressures arise when a firm makes it known, in some more or less
coercive manner, that it prefers to buy from suppliers who patronize it as customers.
10. See A. NFALE, THE ANrusr LAWs oF THE U.S.A. 125 n.2 (2d ed. 1970) for the
notation that the defendant (General Tire & Rubber Co.) in the prominent complaint
that opened up this theory enjoyed less than a five per cent share of its over-all market.
11. E.g., United States v. Crane Co., 5 TRADE RE. REP.
45,073 (case no. 2204)
(summary of complaint); United States v. Crane Co., 1973-i Trade Cas.
74,329
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (consent decree). An explicit defense of this position was offered in an
interview with Professor Turner while he was Assistant Attorney General. See An Interview with the Honorable Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General in Charge
of the Antitrust Division, 34 A.B.A. ANzrrrrJsr L.J. 113, 122-23 (1967) [hereinafter Interview].
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gue that it would be better to continue to confine attempts to monopolize to their orthodox relationship to completed monopolization.
Such, however, is the argument advanced here, subject to the possibly
redeeming contention that the offense of monopolization might be
found in each of the first three examples. Elaboration of the argument
will require a detailed examination of the strengths and weaknesses
of present attempt doctrine and of the efforts to substitute a much
broader doctrine of unfair competition. Nevertheless, the core of the
argument may be simply stated, at least for introductory purposes.
Judicial competence to evaluate competitive behavior is limited. The
predominant lines of present law confine judicial intrusion to areas
in which the dangers of anticompetitive behavior are enhanced by
substantial elements of market power, in which there is a correspondingly increased probability that a judicial decision to intervene will
not upset desirable competitive arrangements, and in which mistakenly depriving a major firm of desirable competitive freedom may
not be as grave as imposing the same limitations on a lesser firm.
Once the invitation to intrude into areas of lesser market power is
accepted, it is difficult to resist the seductive temptation to pass adverse
judgment on neutral or even desirable forms of competitive behavior.
If the attempt offense is given an independent life of its own, free
from any requirement of a close approach to completed monopolization, the dangers of mistaken judgment seem too great to be borne.
Absent legislative action, it would be far better to achieve such
additional control of single-firm behavior as may be needed by
carefully developing the substantive monopolization offense, retaining attempts in their present role as an oft-invoked but seldom
employed shield against a contagion that has not quite attained the
epidemic proportions of monopoly. Indeed, the only reason for assigning even that narrow role to attempts is the ancient desire to
accord at least a superficial function to every portion of a statute.
I.

TmE

A.

Attempt in Its Natural Role of Analogy to Completed
Monopolization

SLOVENLY VIRTUES OF PRESENT ATTEMPT DOCTRINE

The wellspring of most current efforts to define attempts to

monopolize is the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Swift & Co. v.
United States.12 Although decision could easily have been placed on
other grounds even then and many per se violations appear readily to
the modern eye, the opinion is devoted to an explanation of attempts
12. 196 US. 375 (1905).
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to monopolize in terms drawn directly from ordinary doctrines of
criminal attempt. To Holmes, attempted monopolization consisted
of conduct that closely approaches, without quite attaining, completed monopolization, coupled with a wrongful intent to monopolize. 13
It was virtually inevitable that this particular criminal attempt
offense should be treated as other criminal attempts and that its
content would be found by analogy to the completed offense through
a process of determining whether conduct that, for some reason, falls
short of the completed offense is yet so like it as to fall within the
same proscriptive policies. As will be discussed below, the major
difficulties resulting from this approach spring not from the approach
itself but from the nature of monopolization as a judicially developed
offense that really should not support a cognate attempt offense at
all.14
Just as it was not surprising that the Court should have treated
attempts to monopolize as a close approach to completed monopolization, so it is not surprising that the large majority of current decisions
continue to employ the same approach:' 5 Conduct amounts to an
attempt to monopolize if there is a "specific intent" to monopolize
and a "dangerous probability" that, if left unchecked, it will ripen
into monopolization. If there has been any change, it has been the
continued development of the monopolization offense itself; whatever
may have been the situation in 1905, when Swift was decided, 8 monopolization now includes significant elements of economic diagnosis.
The same elements have perforce been incorporated into orthodox
13. The Court ruled that the alleged scheme as a whole constituted a violation,
noting that the statute gives a cause of action against combinations in restraint of
commerce and against attempts to monopolize, and that
Intent is almost essential to such a combination and is essential to such an attempt. Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the
law seeks to prevent-for instance, the monopoly-but require further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring
it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that it will
happen.... But when that intent and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this statute, like many others and like the common law in some cases, directs
itself against that dangerous probability as well as against the completed result.
196 U.S. at 396. Although this passage suggests that "dangerous probability" may be
found simply as a consequence of the intent to bring monopoly to pass, later parts
of the opinion make it clear that intent alone will no more suffice for an attempt to
monopolize than for any other attempt: "Not every act that may be done with intent
to produce an unlawful result is unlawful, or constitutes an attempt. It is a question
of proximity and degree. The distinction between mere preparation and attempt is
well known in the criminal law.... The same distinction is recognized in cases like
the present." 196 U.S. at 402.
14. See Parts I(D), II(D), IV(D) & VI infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 34-37 infra.
16. See Part IV(B) infra.
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attempt doctrine.17 It is accordingly fitting to begin the detailed
exposition of current orthodoxy with the market power dimension
of attempts before turning to the dimensions of intent and conduct.
B. Market Power Approaching Monopoly Power
I. Monopoly Power
"Monopoly power" for purposes of the Sherman Act is the
structural attribute that must be found before addressing the separate
behavioral questions that will determine the existence or absence of
unlawful monopolization.' 8 Although the Supreme Court has vaguely
defined monopoly power as the power "to control prices or exclude
competition,"' 9 the cases that undertake to measure monopoly power
focus on the power of the suspect firm to control prices. 20 The essential question appears to be not whether the firm has some degree
of freedom to control prices, but whether it has such a large degree
of freedom as to call for corrective action. Along the infinitely
variable scale of market power there is a forbidden point called "monopoly power." The forbidden point may well shift, either because
of the impossibility of measuring market power in precise degrees or
because of ad hoc judgments that more market power may be tolerable in some circumstances than in others. Nonetheless, it is probably
reasonable to think of the legal category of monopoly power as a
level of market power, persisting over prolonged periods of time, that
enables its possessor to charge prices substantially greater than average total costs.
Acceptable levels of market power are differentiated from the
levels of monopoly power that trigger the further behavioral questions of monopolization through a two-step process of identifying a
17. See Part I(B)(2) infra.
18. "The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1)
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
19. E.g., United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours S. Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
20. See, e.g., notes 23-24 infra. The expressed concern with exclusion of competition
reflects a longstanding democratic tradition of fear that "big" business will ruthlessly
exterminate "small" business by underhanded means. Ruthless competition may, of
course, be supported by large aggregations of wealth, regardless of "market power"
in the economic sense. Measurement of "monopoly power," correspondingly, might
include an accounting of the assets available to the suspect firm and to its potential
victims, but no such effort is to be found in the opinions dealing with measurement of
monopoly power.
I
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"relevant market" and inferring power from the percentage share
that the challenged firm holds in that market. 21
The first step, identifying the relevant product2 2 market, is directed to the determination of whether physically distinguishable products should be included in the market because their characteristics
and going prices constrain pricing freedom in a manner somehow
comparable to the constraint resulting from the production of indistinguishable products. This determination is expressed in terms of
cross-elasticity of demand between products. For example, in the
famous Cellophanecase,23 the Supreme Court determined that there
was sufficient cross-elasticity of demand to require that other flexible
packaging materials be included with cellophane in a single market
in order to determine whether du Pont's seventy-five per cent share
24
of cellophane sales gave rise to monopoly power.
This part of the market definition process involves two wellknown difficulties. First, it requires a projection of customer response
to changes in price relationships that have not actually occurred. Second, it operates on the assumption that substitute goods are either
wholly in or wholly out of the market and ignores the probability that
competition from such cellophane substitutes as glassine is less effective than would be competition from an equivalent value or volume
of cellophane.2 5 Although real, these difficulties might not impede a
21. E.g., "The existence of (monopoly] power ordinarily may be inferred from the

predominant share of the market." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571
(1966). At the same time, it has been recognized that "market share is no holy talisman
that alone determines whether a defendant has monopolized an industry." United
States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 1973-2 Trade Cas.
74,613, at 94,715
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
22. Geographic markets, too, must be measured. For present purposes, however, it
is sufficient to concentrate on the difficulties arising along the "product" or "service"
dimensions of market definition.
23. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 379, 394-404
(1956).
24. The Court found the basic test to be the extent to which a "slight decrease in
the price of cellophane causes a considerable number of customers of other flexible
wrappings to switch to cellophane." 351 U.S. at 400. Later the Court switched perspective to state that substitute products must be included in the market "as customers
may turn to them if there is a slight increase in the price of the main product." United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). Although there may well be differences in consumer reaction to price decreases and to price increases from current levels,
and although the possibility of decreases has meaning only against an appraisal of costs,
it does not seem likely that the Court has meant to require anything more than consideration of broad guesses of substitutability.
25. The shortcomings of market share analysis, noted briefly here, are set out
cogently in Turner, Antitrust "Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 IIARv. L. Rxv. 281
(1956).
The problem of excluding substitute goods is posed in particularly poignant terms
by the frequently asserted claim that there is sufficient competition along a broad
"spectrum" of goods to constrain any pricing freedom that the putative monopolist
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reasonable approximation of market power if an honest and diligent
effort were made to utilize the market definition with a recognition of
its weaknesses.
More formidable difficulties are encountered at the stage of inferring that the legal conclusion of monopoly power can be drawn
from a firm's share of the defined relevant market. Many theoretical
reasons 26 suggest that a large share of even a carefully defined market
might otherwise enjoy. An illustration is suggested by Judge Wyzanski's observation
that "customers regard a change from proprietary alarms to [central station protective
service] as an entry into what is qualitatively and monetarily a new class, as when one
changes from a Volkswagen to a chauffeur-driven Rolls Royce ....
" United States
v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 253 (D.R.I. 1964), affd. on market definition and
remanded, 384 U.S. 563 (1966). Although there may be relatively little immediate impact on Rolls-Royce prices when there is a change in Volkswagen prices, it is quite
possible that the influence of subcompact economy car prices on compact economy
car prices, luxury compact car prices, economy full-sized car prices, ordinary luxury
full-sized car prices, and so on, means that there really is a sufficient degree of constraint to require rejection of any conclusions about market power that might be
drawn from occupancy of a $35,000-and-up luxury car "market." This possibility is
implicitly recognized, and distorted, in decisions that suggest that a merger between
Rolls-Royce and Volkswagen would be tested against its impact on a "market" of
low-priced cars with rear air-cooled engines and extremely high-priced cars. Cf., e.g.,
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
26. In brief summary, the most commonly noted reasons are these:
(1) The character of demand for the product as a whole may be such that, in relation to the costs of production, there is no room for prices greater than costs.
(2) A firm with a large market share may have higher costs than another firm
that is capable of expanding its own market share at constant cost. In such circumstances, the firm with a smaller present market share may actually have greater market
power. Illustration may be provided by an example drawn from the realms of physically distinct substitute products. There might, for instance, be a great many users
who prefer glassine to cellophane, despite the latter's physical superiority, so long as
cellophane sells at a fourteen-cent higher price. If virtually all of those users would
switch to cellophane at a price differential of twelve cents and the cost difference in
manufacture is only ten cents, any firm that could control the price of cellophane free
from other competition could control not only the price but also the very availability
of glassine. A slightly different perspective on the same point is that a firm that has
power to control prices may choose to exercise it (whether or not for profit-maximiz.
ing motives) by raising prices to a level at which many users in fact find substitutes
highly attractive. Inferences that the substitutes are part of the same market because
relatively small price changes over the current pattern of price relationships may lead
to relatively large switches of purchases, and that since the firm has a small share of
the "market" it accordingly lacks the market power of pricing freedom, would of
course be entirely misleading. See Brooks, Does Low Market Occupancy Indicate the
Absence of Monopoly Power, 4 ANT urI-RBuLL. 579 (1959); Turner, supra note 25, at
282.
(3) Barriers to entry by new firms may be so low that any sustained effort to
charge prices above long-run total costs will be met by new entry at lower prices. This
possibility is particularly important with respect to the special case presented by pro.
ducers of distinguishable products who are easily capable of shifting existing production capacity and distribution channels to the product involved in the market definition.
The Supreme Court has, on occasion, suggested that production interchangeability
should be considered in examining the question of market power. See Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 n.42 (1962); United States v. Columbia Steel
Co., 334 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1948). And the Court has also ignored the matter in the
face of a highly pointed dissent. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377
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might not give rise to an ability to charge prices substantially in excess of costs. Whether these theoretical objections have practical significance is essentially an empirical question, to be answered by determining whether, in the long run, supracompetitive profits, the
apparent object of judicial concern, are earned in industries showing
high concentration of market shares. Although accumulating evidence indicates that monopoly profits are earned even in industries
characterized by a concentrated oligopoly structure whose firms collectively hold a large market share, the evidence is by no means con-

clusive.

27

The difficulties with diagnosing the legal category of monopoly
power may not be easily overcome; at the least, it will take economic
science a long while to develop a process more easily workable and
more certain of result.
An alternative resolution of the measurement difficulties is simply to discard any concern with confining the application of the monopolization offense to situations of high market power. As discussed
below,2 8 there is substantial support for reading any concern with refined measurement of market power out of the legal category of monopolization. The Supreme Court may very well have started along
this road in stating that the market tests under section 2 of the Sherman Act are the same as those employed in measuring mergers against
section 7 of the Clayton Act.29 The Merger Guidelines of the Depart-.
U.S. 271 (1964). In earlier times, the Court expressed a much more general belief that,
absent improper conduct by an initially dominant firm, potential competition--"the
centrifugal and centripetal forces resulting from the right freely to contract"--would

prevent any position of monopoly from enduring. Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911). A perhaps unintentional illustration of the great difficulties of
measuring the impact of potential entry is provided by the method of measurement
suggested in Schlade, Proposed Objective Relevant Product Market Criteria Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 35 U. CN.L. Rzv. 376
(1966).
27. The major studies finding a correlation between concentration and profitability are listed and rejected in Brozen, Concentration and Structural and Market Disequilibria, 16 ANTrrmusr BuLL.241 (1971). See also, e.g., Mann & Meehan, Concentration
and Profitability:An Examination of a Recent Study, 14 ANarmusr BuLr. 385 (1969);
Singer, Industrial Organization:Price Models and Public Policy, 60 AM. ECON. REv. 90

(1970).
28. See Part IV infra.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 573 (1966).
This suggestion has been accepted by a number of subsequent decisions. E.g., L.G.
Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1971); Woods Exploration & Producing
Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1804-07 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding, in
addition, that actual power to exclude competition obviates need for market share
analysis), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.,
869 F.2d 449, 454-55 (9th Cir. 1966), revd. on other grounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967);
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 851 F. Supp.
462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 865 F.
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ment of Justice30 illustrate how far a highly adept distillation of the
decisions under section 7 can narrow3 1 the market concept in product

and geographic terms, so that very small levels of market power can
be reached. 82 Full-scale absorption of similar standards into monopolization doctrine would reduce the required element of monopoly
power to a very low level of market power indeed. Obviously, any
such dilution of the power required for monopolization will, in turn,
expand considerably the reach of the attempt offense.
2. DangerousProbability of Monopoly Power
in a Relevant Market in Attempt Cases
A measure, of proximity to completed monopolization is clearly
involved in the dangerous probability requirement of the Swift opin-

ion,33 and cases continue to invoke the requirement in these terms.3 4
Supp. 285 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F.
Supp. 780 (S.D. Tex. 1971), affd. on other grounds, 476 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1978); Mar78,761 (N.D. Cal. 1971);
nell v. United Parcel Serv. of America, 1971 Trade Cas.
Denver Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969).
The Supreme Court had already analogized a section 2 case to a section 7 case in
International Boxing Club v. United States, 858 U.S. 242, 252 n.8 (1959).
50. Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice (May 80, 1968), as amended, Merger
4510.
Guidelines of Department of Justice, 5 TRAnE Re. REP.
81. The Guidelines are also adept in demonstrating the possibilities of broadening
the relevant market to include remotely competing products, where that avenue affords the most plausible attack on a merger. In monopolization cases, this reach of
market definition does not seem to be important.
4510, at 6882, defines
82. Paragraph 3(i) of the Guidelines, 5 TRADE Rw. REP.
product markets as limited to "any product or service which is distinguishable as a
matter of commercial practice from other products or services"; 8(ii), 5 TRADE REc.
REP. 4510, at 6888, defines geographic markets as limited to "any commercially significant section of the country (even as small as a single community), or aggregate of
if firms engaged in selling the product make significant sales of the
such sections ....
product to purchasers in the section or sections. The market need not be enlarged
beyond any section meeting the foregoing test unless it dearly appears that there is
no economic barrier... that hinders the sale from outside the section to purchasers
within the section."
83. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 875, 896, 402 (1905). The position of Justice Holmes is restated in his opinion for the Court in United States v. Winslow, 227
U.S. 202, 217-18 (1918), as well as in his dissenting opinions in Hyde v. United States,
225 U.S. 847, 887-88 (1912), and Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 198 U.S. 197, 40910 (1904). See generally Smith, Attempt To Monopolize: Its Elements and Their Definition, 27 GFO. WASH. L. REV. 227, 285, 287-88 (1958).
34. E.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 828 US. 781, 785 (1946) (opinion
here quotes from the trial court's jury charge; although it is difficult to read it so, many
courts have found the quotation to be an approval of the charge); TV Signal Co. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F.2d 1256, 1261 (8th Cir. 1972); Panotex Pipe Line Co.
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 457 F.2d 1279, 1288 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845
(1972); Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269
F.2d 882, 889 (4th Cir. 1959); Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 648, 668
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 854 US. 927 (1957).
As might be expected, the effort to translate the dangerous probability requirement
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Since the modem judicial model of completed monopolization includes measurement of monopoly power by assessment of shares in a
relevant market, it has naturally followed that the heavy majority of
current decisions require that an attempt involve a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power in a relevant market.8 5 A few
opinions, to be examined later, have explicitly rejected any requirement that a relevant market be shown; 6 these decisions have been as
explicitly rejected by many others. 87
into jury instructions has given rise to the substitution of varying phrases for the
original words. See charges set out in ABA ANTrrgusr SECTION, ANTrRUST CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCLTONS 81-86 (1972) ("reasonable probability," "actual knowledge that actions ...
would tend to cause monopolization," "would be likely to accomplish monopolization").
Also see Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 663 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
554 U.S. 927 (1957), upholding a charge requiring acts "'which, if successful, would
be likely to accomplish such monopolization.'"
35. Many of the cases requiring demonstration of the relevant market expressly
relate the requirement to the dangerous probability of attaining monopoly power. E.g.,
Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas.
74,590 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Southeastern Hose, Inc. v. Imperial-Eastman Corp., 197-1 Trade Cas.
74,479 (N.D. Ga.
1973); H.F. & S. Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 110, 124 (D. Kan. 1972).
Other cases announce the requirement in more general terms. E.g., Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912
(1970); Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 69 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 920 (1970); Periodical Distribs., Inc., v. American News
Co., 290 F. Supp. 896, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afd. per curiam, 416 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1969).
Many of the cases in this area involve claims by terminated distributors that their
supplier has attempted to monopolize distribution of its own products. Confining illustrative citation to some of the cases dealing with automotive products, typical decisions requiring measurement of the asserted attempt against a broader market include:
Nelligan v. Ford Motor Co., 262 F.2d 556, 557 (4th Cir. 1959); Madsen v. Chrysler
Corp., 261 F. Supp. 488, 506-07 (N.D. Ill. 1966), vacated as moot, 375 F.2d 773 (7th
Cir. 1967); Kemwell Automotive Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 1966 Trade Cas.
71,882
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Miller Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 149 F. Supp. 790, 811 (M.D.N.C.
1957), affd. on other grounds, 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958). Other cases in this line are
discussed with the problem of refusals to deal in Part V(A)(2) infra.
By way of brief anticipation of the deviant lines of authority examined in Part
III infra, it may be noted that there are cases that purport to require a "dangerous
probability" but that explicitly reject the need for proof of a relevant market, Moore
v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 473 F.2d 228, 332 (9th Cir. 1972), or that reject the need
for evaluation of the likelihood that, absent intervention, monopoly power woulcl
have been achieved in fact, Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings ic Lewis, Inc., 452
F.2d 579, 598 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972). This approih may
have strong support in the old cases. See Part IV(B) infra.
36. The opinion on which others focus is Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d
459, 474-75, 478 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). See Part III infra.
37. The considerable disarray of cases in the Ninth Circuit is examined below. See
text accompanying notes 168-70 infra. Other cases explicitly rejecting the doctrine announced in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474-75 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 US. 933 (1964), include Acme Precision Prods., Inc. v. American Alloys Corp., 484
F.2d 1237, 1240 (8th Cir. 1973); Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prods. Co., 479 F.2d 269
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3290-91 (U.S., Nov. 13, 1973); Radzik v. Chicagoland Recreational Vehicle Dealers Assn., 1972 Trade Cas.
74,167 (N.D. Ill.
1972); Brewer Sewing Supplies Co. v. Fritz Gegauf, Ltd., 1970 Trade Cas.
73,139
(N.D. I11.1970); Diamond Intl. Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289 F. Supp. 550, 576-77 (D. Md.
1968); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440, 451-52 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
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The differences between present and potential competition suggest that greater care should be taken in attempt cases to include all
significant substitutes in the relevant market. In a case of completed
monopolization, the fact that no substantial competitor has appeared
may be some indication that the force of potential competition does
not destroy the supposed monopoly power. When the admitted lack
of present monopoly power has pushed analysis back into the attempt
area, however, the existence of presently viable competitors suggests
that potential competition may exert sufficient additional force to
check any possibility of monopoly power (or monopolistic behavior).S8
If monopoly power is inferred from a firm's large share of a relevant market, it is natural to seek to identify a dangerously probable
approach to monopoly power in terms of a proximately reduced market share. Several cases have considered the question of the required
market share; examination of judicial reactions to a variety of share
figures demonstrates that repeated scrutiny has failed to produce consensus even on a zone separating dangerous from innocuous probabilities. Although a thirty-one per cent market share has, for example, been found so perilously close to the line that a decision
against an attempt claim was rested on other grounds, 9 it has also
been found that a declining market position currently at fifty-one per
cent was not sufficient to create a dangerous probability. 40 A number
of decisions have found market shares of approximately twenty per
cent clearly insufficient. 41 Yet, a court that reluctantly concluded that
(civil); United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 246 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); United
States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 245 F. Supp. 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Becker v. Safelite Glass
Corp., 244 F. Supp. 625, 637-38 (D. Kan. 1965); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
231 F. Supp. 690, 699-701 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (criminal). One commentator has concluded succinctly that "the Lessig approach reeks of overkill." Hibner, Attempts To
Monopolize: A Concept in Search of Analysis, 34 A.B.A. AN'rmusT LJ. 165, 171 (1967).
See also 2 J. VoN KALINOWSKI, AnRusr LAWs AND TRADE REGULATIoN (16A BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS) § 9.01[2], at 9-10 (1963).
38. Substantially this argument has been made in urging that market definitions
should be broader in approaching merger cases than in approaching cases of singlefirm monopolization. See Steckler, Market Definitions and the Antitrust Laws, 9 AN iTRuST BuLL. 741 (1964). But cf. Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp.,
1973-2 TADE CAs.

74,774, at 95,439 (N.D. Okla. 1973): "Mhe precise boundaries of

relevant markets and the likelihood of success ... become less important in attempt to
monopolize cases as aggressive predatory intent and conduct emerge more clearly."
39. Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149, 162 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 42
U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S., Oct. 9, 1973).
40. Diamond Intl. Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289 F. Supp. 550, 576-78 (D. Md. 1968).
41. Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 973-75 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969); Cal Distrib. Co. v. Bay Distribs., Inc., 837 F. Supp. 1154
(M.D. Fla. 1971) (defendant was second in its market); Allen Ready Mix Concrete Co,
v. John A. Denie's Sons Co., 1972 Trade Cas.
73,955 (W.D. Tenn. 1972) (granting
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it was forced by the weight of authority to require a dangerous probability that monopoly power would be acquired found itself unable
to rule, on a summary judgment motion, that the requirement could
not be satisfied in a suit against a defendant that enjoyed some five
per cent of the relevant market.4 2 The lack of consensus reflected in
these cases is echoed in the despairing comment uttered by another
court, which was unable to find a dangerous approach to monopoly
power in a small market share: "[O]ne must be particularly wary of
the numbers game of market percentage when considering an 'at'43
tempt to monopolize' suit.
If the zone of dangerous probability may be encountered with a
market share as low as five per cent, the requirement is no longer one
of a probability of attaining monopoly power. Instead, it has been reduced to a requirement of probable approach to some other undesirable result-most likely, the elimination of a competitor or the curtailment of a competitor's ability to compete. Several cases, however,
have concluded that elimination of a competitor is not an attempt to
monopolize.44 These decisions may seem particularly surprising when
set against the common definition of monopoly power as the power to
exclude competition, since it would seem that actual exclusion is the
best proof that the power exists. For this very reason, the decisions
judgment notwithstanding the verdict to a defendant who was second largest in its

market); SCM Corp. v. RCA, 318 F. Supp. 433, 472-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Volasco
Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. ,Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 28, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 907 (1963); Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F.
Supp. 802, 313-14 (N.D. Ill.
1965).

42. Campbell Distrib. Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523, 529-80 (D.
Md. 1962).
43. Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 207 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969).
44. E.g., Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 286 F.2d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir.
1956); Keco Indus. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 34 F. Supp. 1240 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Kershaw
v. Kershaw Mfg. Co., 209 F. Supp. 447 (M.D. Ala. 1962), affd. per curiam, 327 F.2d 1002
(5th Cir. 1964) (it is confusingly concluded that a valid covenant not to compete is not
a violation because there is no exclusion of competition; more accurately, it would be
found that such an exclusion of competition is not undesirable in all of the circumstances); Evening News Publishing Co. v. Allied Newspaper Carriers, 160 F. Supp. 568,
578-79 (D.N.J. 1958), affd., 263 F.2d 715 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 US. 929 (1959);
Bender v. Hearst Corp., 152 F. Supp. 569, 578 (D. Conn. 1957), affd. on other grounds,
263 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1959) (elimination of competitor by acquisition).
Some of the cases adopting this conclusion are even more obviously correct than
the determination that not every covenant not to compete with a potential competitor,
or acquisition of a competitor, is an attempt to monopolize. E.g., South End Oil Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 650, 655-56 (N.D. IlM. 1965) (concluding that, even if a
relevant market could be limited to Texaco's own products, elimination of one of
several competing distributors could not be an attempt to monopolize).
A nice test is provided by the cases discussed in text accompanying notes 178-79
infra, involving elimination of a firm from a market in which the alleged offender
does not compete.
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represent an intriguing re-emphasis of the proposition that the diagnosis of monopoly power, and of dangerous approaches to it, is commonly focused on the inferences of price control drawn from impressively high shares of a judicially defined relevant market.
I Nonetheless, some recent opinions seek to give content to the dangerous probability element, while at the same time divorcing it from
a requirement of approach to attained monopoly power. One court
concluded that there need not be an evaluation of the actual likelihood that an attempt would lead to "monopoly status" if not frustrated, but that the dangerous probability requirement instead involves an appraisal of the offender's ability to achieve the "forbidden
result," of its intent, and of the nature of its conduct.4 r How these elements can be measured, and how the "forbidden result" differs from
"monopoly status," was not vouchsafed. Likewise, another court concluded that, although proof of a relevant market is relevant, it is not
indispensable to proof of a dangerous probability of success. 4
These opinions lead directly to the question whether the attempt
offense should be redefined into an independent wrong freed from
the constraining requirement of approach to the monopoly power
content of completed monopolization. An answer to this question
must await examination of two issues: the role played by the measurement of market power in assessing competitive conduct, 47 and the
ability of courts to improve the functioning of the market place by
regulating the conduct of firms possessing relatively low levels of market power.48 For the moment, it is sufficient to reteat that orthodox
attempt doctrine requires a substantial level of market power. In addition, the doctrine extends the analogy to completed monopolization by imposing the generally rigorous requirements of evil intent
and bad conduct to be examined next.
C. Conduct and Intent Bordering on Monopolization
It once appeared possible that the Supreme Court would conclude
that possession of monopoly power alone violates section 2 without
reference to the means of its acquisition or maintenance. 40 But more
45. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 598-99 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972).

46. Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 473 F.2d 828, 332 (9th Cir. 1972).
47. See Part I(')(3) infra.

48. See Part V infra.
49. In United States v. Griffith, 384 U.S. 100 (1948), the Court found it unlawful
for a group of theater owners to bargain simultaneously for exhibition rights for
theaters in towns where there were no competitive theaters and in towns where there
were competitive theaters. This combined bargaining approach was condemned on
the ground that the purchasing power derived from the towns where monopoly ex-
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recent decisions have ruled that power alone does not complete the
offense of monopolization. The added "plus" element of improper
conduct in the monopolization offense gives rise in the attempt offense to a cognate requirement of "specific intent"-which includes,
and is often shown by, improper conduct. Once again, a brief statement of prevailing monopolization doctrine is a helpful preface to
the corresponding attempt decisions.
1. Intent and Conduct in Monopolization
The most succinct recent statement by the Supreme Court is that
unlawful monopolization requires both the existence of monopoly
hibitor status was enjoyed might be misused to give an unfair advantage in competing
for exhibition rights in towns where competition was encountered. In the course of
the opinion, it was said that monopoly power alone, "whether lawfully or unlawfully
acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned under § 2 even though
it remains unexercised" and that "the existence of power to exclude competition when
it is desired to do so is itself a violation of § 2, provided it is coupled with the purpose
or intent to exercise that power .....
334 U.S. at 107.
It would be possible to read these statements to mean that, whenever a monopolist
engages in business on terms that do not automatically cause others to enter the market, there is an intent to use the power to exclude qompetition and a violation of
section 2. In the pithy phrase of Judge Learned Hand, "the power and its exercise
must needs coalesce." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428
(2d Cir. 1945). During the years immediately following the Griffith decision, many
commentators concluded that it and the surrounding opinions had indeed made the
possession of monopoly power alone an offense. E.g., Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust
Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MdH. L. REv. 1139,
1151, 1193 (1952); Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43

ILL. L. Rv. 745 (1949).
This literalistic reading of the phrases of decision is misleading. It would at least
invite the peculiar conclusion that liability may be avoided by doing business on terms
that do not exclude competition. If, for instance, a very efficient firm has the power to
eliminate all competition by selling at prices close to cost, it could avoid liability by
instead selling at prices high enough to shelter some number of less efficient "competitors." It would be strange indeed to prefer a monopolist who charged high prices
to one who charged low prices.
More important, the Court's opinion is simply not written as an opinion intended
to outlaw the simple possession of monopoly power. A direct statement was easily
available. Instead of making the direct statement, the Court apparently focused on
the intent to bargain for all towns simultaneously as the intent to engage in conduct
sufficiently injurious to competition to warrant prohibition. See text accompanying
notes 96-99 infra. Likewise, the use of the Griffith language in cases decided at the
same ,time involved situations in which the defendants had engaged in a wide range
of patently exclusionary activity. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 173 (1948); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 130

(1948).
The Court's explicit reliance in Griffith on American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781 (1946), moreover, strongly suggests that Griffith meant only that demonstrated exclusion of actual competitors is not required to complete the offense of
monopolization. The American Tobacco decision, indeed, turned on the precisely narrowed question whether actual exclusion of competitors is required when it is assumed
that large firms have acted together to control the prices of raw materials and of their
finished products for the purpose of restricting the effectiveness of lower-priced competition. The determination that actual exclusion need not be shown in such circumstances does not, of itself, carry far-reaching implications as to some more abstract
or refined notion of "intent" to exercise monopoly power.
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power and "the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."5 0
While this reference to "willful acquisition or maintenance" of
monopoly power might imply some independent element of wrongful intent, the contrary conclusion is in fact well settled. If a firm has
acquired or maintained a position of monopoly power by means that
are found to be unlawful, there is no defense that the firm lacked any
otherwise "wrongful" intent. The intent to engage in the undesirable
conduct that has supported the monopoly position is enough. 51
Definition of the conduct that will outlaw a position of monopoly
power is thus critical to understanding the reach of monopolization.
The longest reach is surely indicated by the conclusion in the famous
Alcoa decision that it is unlawfully exclusionary for a firm with monopoly power constantly to grow with the market, thereby depriving
2
would-be entrants of the tempting invitation of unfilled demands.6
Similar conduct by smaller competitors-expanding capacity in anticipation of market growth in order to supply increased demand
without inflated short-run prices or some nonprice system of rationing-would represent highly desirable behavior. It is accordingly possible to find in this decision support for the conclusion that the only
"conduct" needed to outlaw a position of monopoly power is the act
of retaining such power in a mature industry without support in subsisting valid patents, in clearly demonstrable economies of scale that
would be destroyed by dissolution, or (perhaps) in the efficiency provided by an indivisible and superior management team.5 3
Less far-reaching conceptions of the conduct element of the mo50. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 US. 563, 570-71 (1966). The Court did
leave open the possibility, urged by the district court, that, once monopoly power is
shown, the burden might be imposed on its possessor to show that the power is due
to skill, acumen, and the like. 384 U.S. at 576 n.7. Decisional authority for imposing
such a burden goes back it least as far as United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226
F. 62, 79-80 (W.D.N.Y. 1915), appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 578 (1921). This ploy, and,
indeed, the full range of possibilities still open under present decisions, is explored in
Kales, Good and Bad Trusts, 30 HA-v. L. Rnv. 830 (1917).
51. The definitive statement is recognized to be that in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945).
52. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
There is strong ground to find that Alcoa in fact did not grow progressively with the
market, as supposed by the court, but instead lagged behind developing demand. See
D. WALLACE, MARKEr CONTROL iN THE ALumINUM INDUSTRY 252, 259-60, 331, 352-53

(1937).
53. Two leading statements of this view are Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and
Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1207, 1212-25 (1969); Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations, 85
HARv. L. Rrv. 1512 (1972).

HeinOnline -- 72 Mich. L. Rev. 390 1973-1974

January 1974]

Attempts and Monopolization

nopolization offense may easily be developed. The common element
in these conceptions is a proscription against conduct that is "exclusionary" because it makes more difficult the competitive success of the
firm's rivals and that is not so clearly efficiency-promoting as to be
the kind of conduct "which a competitive society must foster." 54
The important difference between these conceptions relates to the
point at which a plaintiff must show the existence of such exclusionary conduct. 5 A plaintiff may be required to prove exclusionary conduct as part of its initial case. Or a plaintiff may only be required to
show that the defendant possesses monopoly power. To avoid an adverse judgment, the defendant would then be required to show that
its position is traceable to an initial accomplishment of economies of
scale, to occupation of a market not served by others, to innovative
activity, or the like, without regard to the continuing existence of
such originating factors. The burden of demonstrating that the continuing position is not due to the "historic accident" that others have
failed to perceive available opportunities, to some unknowable present superiority, or to similar factors, would then be returned to the
plaintiff, who would be required to show some "exclusionary" activity.50
Administration of any of these tests involves obvious dangers and
uncertainties.5 7 The important point for analysis of attempts is that
54. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 844 (D. Mass.
1953), affd. per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
55. Any effort to require a negative showing by the defendant that no exclusionary
practices had been employed would in practical effect require the defendant to demonstrate continuing justification for its monopoly position of the sort contemplated by
the most hostile approach to monopoly.
56. These various possibilities are explored in the authorities cited in note 50 supra.
57. The most obvious danger of judicial ignorance is encountered in determining
whether activity undertaken by a business firm is significantly more efficient than
whatever alternatives appear to be less exclusionary. The difficulties of evaluating
competitive behavior are suggested in Part V infra.
An added difficulty is presented by the question whether the undesirably exclusionary activity, once it has been found, has in fact had any impact at all. It seems
highly probable that the difficulties of determining whether the abstract exclusionary
tendency has actually bolstered the monopolist's position at all will lead to practical
reliance on the abstract tendency alone. That is, once the monopolist has engaged in
wrongful activities that make it impossible to be certain whether the monopoly position would have persisted in their absence, all doubts will be resolved in favor of
dissolution. Thus, many years after the initial decree in the United Shoe case, United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd. per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954), it was determined that dissolution was required, United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968). The need for dissolution was said to
depend on the presence of "appropriate findings of violation," 391 U.S. at 250, but at
no time was there any coherent determination of the measure of power that the
United Shoe Machinery Corporation would have had but for the violations found. Cf.
110 F. Supp. at 344: "United's control does not rest solely on its original constitution,

HeinOnline -- 72 Mich. L. Rev. 391 1973-1974

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:373

the offense of monopolization may be completed by conduct that
would be lawful, and perhaps highly desirable, if indulged in by a
firm lacking monopoly power. This aspect of monopolization doctrine creates the greatest difficulties for the process of analogy by
which courts undertake to fill out the specific intent and conduct elements of attempted monopolization.
2. Specific Intent Without Monopolization
a. Characterof the intent. Definition of the monopolization offense encounters the formidable obscurities just described when it
reaches nearly innocent behavior. Courts that have undertaken to define the attempt offense have instinctively resolved the problem of
analogizing to these obscurities by setting them aside. Analogy is
drawn not to the furthest possible extension of monopolization liability, but rather to an assumed model of monopoly achieved by evil behavior that corresponds to the predatory practices attributed-at
least in folklore-to the industrial barons of the late nineteenth century. This tendency is illustrated most clearly by statements in the
famous decisions dealing with the intent required to complete the
monopolization offense itself. These opinions, in ruling that the monopolization offense requires no intent beyond the intent to engage
in monopolizing activity, distinguish a supposedly different "specific
intent" required to impose liability for attempt when monopoly
power has not in fact been achieved.;
Most of the cases undertaking further definition of the required
specific intent refer, naturally enough, to a conscious desire to monopolize.5 9 The desire to monopolize is translated further into a deits ability, its research, or its economies of scale .... Much [how much?] of United's
market power is traceable to the magnetic ties inherent in its system of leasing, and
not selling, its more important machines."
58. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
236 F. Supp. 244, 248, 251 (D.R.I. 1964), affd. as to violation, 984 U.S. 563 (1966);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass. 1953), affd.
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).

The higher requirement of intent led one judge to conclude that it was proper to
convict a defendant of both attempt to monopolize and monopolization for the same
basic course of conduct. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1016

(S.D.N.Y. 1948). The more general tendency is to assume that conviction of attempt
merges into conviction for monopolization. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781, 783 (1946); United States v. Shapiro, 103 F.2d 775, 776 (2d Cir.
1939); United States v. Kansas City Star Co., 1955 Trade Cas.
affd., 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).

68,117 (W.D. Mo. 1955),

59. A lengthy exploration of the cases may be found in Hawk, Attempts To Monopolize-Specific Intent as Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1121,
1136-49 (1973).

HeinOnline -- 72 Mich. L. Rev. 392 1973-1974

January 1974]

Attempts and Monopolization

sire to achieve monopoly power,60 although the original formulation
was a more general reference to the desire to accomplish a forbidden
monopoly.01 (The distinction makes a difference only if, as explored
below, 62 it is decided that a forbidden monopoly can be found without a showing of something meeting the current concepts of monopoly power.) Alternative formulations commonly refer to an intent to
acquire power to control prices or to exclude competition;6 3 although
it would be possible to read such references as contemplating the
elimination of a competitor without the acquisition of monopoly
power, it seems most probable that they simply reflect the shorthand
definition of monopoly power noted above."
Although courts may find comfort in this reliance on a supposed
specific intent, it should be readily apparent that the general formulation cannot limit the attempt offense in any acceptable way.
An initial difficulty, implicit in all the cases, is that specific intent
alone is not sufficient to complete an attempt. In addition, a firm
must engage in questionable activity in a market setting such as
nearly to achieve completed monopolization, or at least to threaten
undue impairment of competition. 5
60. A highly explicit statement is that a mere intent to exclude a competitor from

part of the market is not sufficient-there must be a specific intent to acquire monopoly power. American Football League v. National Football League, 205 F. Supp.

60, 64-65 (D. Md. 1962), affd., 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963). See also Independent Iron
Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 332 F.2d 656, 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 922 (1963); Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas.
74,590 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Keco Indus., Inc., v. Borg-Warner Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1240 (M.D. Pa. 1971);
Crown Packers, Inc. v. Lapeyre Co., 260 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966) (instruction
to jury reported in ABA AN'rrusr SECrION, supra note 34, at 81).
61. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). See also United States v.
Chas. Pfizer & Co., 245 F. Supp. 737, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Smith, supra note 33, at 23233, 244.
62. See Parts I(D), H1(D), IV(B), IV(D), & VI infra.
63. E.g., Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 599 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972); Rawlins v. American Oil Co., Civ. No.
89-67, (D. Utah, Oct. 1, 1969), appeal dismissed, (10th Cir. 1970) (instruction to jury
reported in ABA ANTrrRusr SFacroN, supra note 34, at 81-82); Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v.
Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964), affd. per curiam, 401 F.2d
182 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969) (instruction to jury reported in
ABA Amrrausr SacrboN, supra, at 85).
64. See text accompanying note 19 supra. Both forms are combined in Bowl America Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1080, 1093 (D. Md. 1969), where the court refers both to the intent to destroy competition and to the intent to build monopoly or
to gain control over some relevant market sufficient to set prices in the market or to
exclude competitors.
65. E.g., Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8, 12 (9th Cir. 1973):
"[Sjpecific intent must be accompanied by predatory conduct directed to accomplishing
the unlawful purposes." The obscurity as to what sort of conduct must be shown is, of
course, the obscurity surrounding attempt doctrine as a whole. The questions of evaluation of conduct and the importance of market power are explored in several sections
below.
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The more fundamental difficiulty is that a specific intent to acquire monopoly power may often be entirely legitimate. Several cases
have explicitly ruled that an effort to become the sole firm in a market that can support only one firm-a "natural monopoly"--is not a
prohibited attempt to monopolize, even though the monopoly is currently being enjoyed by an incumbent. 6 More generally, a specific
intent to become the sole firm in the market by virtue of competitive
superiority alone does not satisfy the requirements of an attempt to
67
monopolize.
Finally, just as a specific intent to acquire monopoly power is not
in itself sufficient, so too the lack of any affirmative desire for monopoly power should not prevent the imposition of attempt liability.
Most of the cases establishing this point are concerned with inferring
a fictive "intent" from conduct that is found to be undesirable. 8 A
more bizarre illustration is provided by a case that involved a legitimate, regulated monopolist selling natural gas. In order to promote
gas sales, it sold gas appliances at prices that threatened to destroy independent dealers and recouped its expenses through gas sales. The
court apparently ruled that there could not be an attempt to monopolize when there was no purpose to monopolize the gas appliance
market. Reversing summary judgment for the defendant, it remanded
for trial solely on the question whether there had already been an unlawful monopolization of that market. 69
It seems highly likely that situations of this sort will occur only if
the firm already enjoys a position of monopoly power in some market and is in a position to misuse that power.70 Ample support exists
66. The leading opinion is Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc.,
284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), affg. in part 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959), cert. denied,
865 U.S. 833 (1961). See also Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506,
515 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972) (claims of conspiracy to monopolize and
restrain trade); Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 803-04 (7th Cir.), ccrt.
denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961); Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Harte-Hanks Newspapers, Inc, 170 F. Supp. 227 (N.D.
Tex. 1959).
67. DahI, Inc. v. Roy Cooper Co., 448 F.2d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1971). Cf. Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3352 (U.S., Dec. 10,
1973); Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705, 719 (D. Hawaii
1964), affd. per curiam, 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969).
68. See Part I(C)(2)(c) inIra.
69. Southern Blowpipe & Roofing Co. v. Chattanooga Gas Co., 360 F.2d 79 (6th Cir.

1966).

70. A roughly comparable situation was presented by Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v.
Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Mo. 1965), affd., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir.
1966), where both monopolization and attempt to monopolize were found. There, a milk
producers' cooperative with lawful monopoly power over the supply of raw milk in its
geographic market sought to extend control into the processing area, in order to maximize the percentage of locally produced milk devoted to the Class I use, which by virtue
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in present law for treating such conduct, the improper use of an
71
otherwise legitimate monopoly, as an unlawful "monopolization." '
If, however, some unnecessary difficulty is interposed to this solution,
there is no reason why attempt liability should not be imposed despite the lack of "specific intent." Although the firm does not affirmatively desire monopoly power in a second market and may even be
unaware of the possibility that it may arise, its conduct threatens
competition and lacks significant redeeming virtue. Courts should be
able to halt the conduct before it reaches the fruition of monopoly
and to provide a civil remedy to those injured by it.
Plainly, then, the "specific intent" required in attempt cases is
not simply a subjective intent to prevail in the market. Instead, it is
72
the intent to indulge in means that are in some sense untoward.
Whether the means must be untoward merely in the sense that, if
they were to establish a position of monopoly power, the power
would be unlawful, or whether they must be somehow more offensive,
will be explored below. 73
b. Extrinsicevidence of self-evaluation. Although the specific intent component of section 2 attempts is ordinarily no more than a
conclusion that objective conduct was undesirable, attention to direct
evidence of subjective intent has some value.
Most obviously, in many cases courts have accepted an explanation of legitimate business purpose for challenged behavior, thereby
finding that it did not constitute an attempt to monopolize. 74 While
of the peculiarities of federal milk price regulations returns higher prices for the same
milk than result from Class II uses.
It has been argued in more general terms that firms operating in a regulated monopoly market and in a competitive market may find it profitable to operate below cost in

the competitive market. See Noll & Rivlin, Regulating Prices in Competitive Markets,
82 YArE L.J. 1426, 1427 &n.6 (1978).
71. Primary reliance would be placed on United States v. Griffith, 834 U.S. 100
(1948). See Part I(C)(3)(c) infra.
72. See Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 975 (8th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 895 U.S. 961 (1969); Luria Bros., 62 F.T.C. 248, 603 (1968), enforced, 889 F.2d 847
(8d Cir.), cert. denied, 893 U.S. 829 (1968); Kales, The Sherman Act, 81 H v.L. Rv.
412 (1918); Rostow, supra note 49, at 770-71; Smith, supra note 33, at 231-82; Note, Attempt to Monopolize: The Offense Redefined, 1969 UTAH L. REv. 704, 714. Cl. Bergjans
Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476, 484-85 (E.D. Mo. 1965),
affd., 868 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966); Handler, IndustrialMergers and the Anti-Trust Laws,
82 CoLum. L. REv. 179, 254-55 (1932). Blecher, supra note 2, at 217-18, is characteristic of
a divergent strain of thought that recognizes that honest competition involves exclusionary intent but that argues that, nonetheless, conduct otherwise honestly industrial
can become unlawful simply because of predatory intent.
73. See Part I(C)(3)(b) infra.
74. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 845 U.S. 594, 626-27 (1958);
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 532-83 (1948); Six Twenty-Nine Prods.,
Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 865 F.2d 478, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1966) (establishing guides
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direct evidence of legitimate business purpose is, of course, subject to
serious credibility doubts, nonetheless it must be considered. Business conduct may be legitimately motivated by matters undreamed of
by judicial tribunals. More important, evaluation of business conduct
without reference to motivation increases the risk of incorrectly evaluating its desirability. The very fact that the court is prepared to believe testimony of motivations it would not have shared stands as a
strong caution against substituting judicial judgment for business
judgment. If it is accepted, as will be argued below,"a that courts
should intervene only in clear circumstances, direct evidence of actual motivation may be important in a surprisingly large number of
cases.
Far less common are situations in which a plaintiff affirmatively
shows a defendant's predatory intent by evidence extrinsic to the challenged conduct itself. An example might be the incredibly condemnatory memorandum set out in the Introduction, 7 in which a
board of directors deliberately recorded its purpose to eliminate a
competitor by predatory pricing. Such external documentation, when
available, can serve many purposes, without the credibility problems
encountered in evaluating self-serving evidence. Perhaps most important, such evidence eases tremendously the concern that legal sancdons may intrude on economically desirable behavior; if the actor
himself believes that he is seeking to prevail, not by means of greater
efficiency, but by means of brute financial power or worse, a court
may well accept that judgment. 77 In addition, extrinsic evidence of
for trial); Scott Publishing Co. v. Columbia Basin Publishers, Inc, 293 F.2d 15 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961); N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp.,
333 F. Supp. 493, 517 (D. Del. 1971); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F.
Supp. 545 (ED. Pa. 1960), afid. per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); United Fruit Co., [197020,209 (FTC. 1973).
1973 Transfer Binder] TPADE REG. RU.
75. See Parts V-VI infra.
76. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
77. A classic statement of this proposition is found in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964, 978, 1012-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1916),
appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919). Highly explicit and damning memoranda of purpose were made and preserved as business records. Such evidence of intent was found
important as a demonstration that the low prices charged were not intended to be perpetuated as a result of efficiencies achieved but were meant to be transient weapons em.
ployed to eliminate competition.
It is, nonetheless, difficult to place much confidence in the excited prose often
adopted by middle management in recommending action to fend off the inroads of
competition. Very often focus on competitors is helpful only if a court is prepared to
outlaw competitive actions that preserve or improve a market position on the ground
that intent to accomplish that result is, without more, unlawful. See, e.g., Telex Corp.
v. International Business Machs. Corp., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,774 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
There may, further, be situations in which even the explicitly predatory purpose of
the actor should not be enough to establish illegality, although these situations must be
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predatory intent may be useful in predicting the consequences of the
accompanying conduct, 78 both as a reflection of the presumably expert assessment of the actor who is immediately engaged in the market,79 and as a suggestion that if the means employed are not successful additional means may be adopted.
c. Intent as evaluation of conduct. Proof of the intent that outlaws any given conduct as an attempt to monopolize is most often derived from proof of the conduct itself. If the wrongful intent is the
intent to acquire monopoly power, or at least to restrain competition
by improper means, proof of the means employed most often stands
as proof of the intent as well. 0 In many ways, the conclusion of improper intent is simply used to express an independent conclusion
that, given a firm's level of market power, its behavior was sufficiently
undesirable to be held unlawful.81
very rare. The most obvious illustrations are those of the intending predator who lacks
any plausible means of accomplishing his wicked ends, and of the firm 'that mistakenly
believes that its clearly efficiency-promoting conduct is undesirable.
78. In the attempt area, the original statement is Swift & Co. v. United States, 196

U.S. 375, 396 (1905). See also, e.g., United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 370 (1912);
Boone, Single-CorporationCompetitive Torts and the Sherman Act: A Projection Based
Upon a Review of the Albert Pick, Atlantic Heel, and Perryton Cases, 2 GA. L. REV. 372,
375-76 (1968).
79. This expert judgment is implied both as to the power of the firm to accomplish
its intended results and as to the nature of those results. See Rea v. Ford Motor Co.,
1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,332 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Boone, supranote 78, at 376.

80. There is an abundance of authority stating explicitly that intent must be shown
by the acts of the defendant and the surrounding circumstances. One of the most carefully intentional statements is found in United States v. American Oil Co., 249 F. Supp.
799 (D.N.J. 1966), where the sufficiency of an indictment to charge the intent required
for an attempt is approached on the principle that the indictment must charge the acts
upon which the required intent may be found. See also, e.g., Independent Iron Works,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922
(1963); Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 650-51 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 923 (1957); McKeon Constr. Co. v. McClatchy Newspapers, 1970 Trade Cas.
73,212 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 804 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Tex. 1969), revd., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (instruction to jury quoted in ABA ANTrrrusr SECriON, supra
note 34, at 83); Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476
(E.D. Mo. 1965), affd., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966) (instruction to jury quoted in ABA
ANTITusr SECTION, supra, at 84); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp.
545,567-68 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd. per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); ABA ANmrrrusr SEctboN,
ANTrrRsusr DEvELOPMENTs 1955-1968, at 37 (1968); Johnston, Monopolize or Attempt to
Monopolize, in ABA ANTrrausr SECTION, PROCEMINGs 72, 77 (1953).
In addition, there are, of course, opinions reflecting the general rule that what is
required is not the intent to exclude competitors, but the intent to exclude them by
improper means-as shown by the use of improper means. E.g., United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32, 39-41 (D. Minn. 1945).
81. Cf. Judge Wyzanski's observation that "there is no sharp distinction between
(a) the existence of an intent to exclude and (b) the use of unfair means." Union Leader
Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125, 140 (D. Mass. 1959), affd.
in part, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 865 U.S. 833 (1961).
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In short, the conclusion that the forbidden specific intent has
been shown is often no more than an illustration of the common legal
tendency to camouflage an uncertain evaluation of circumstances in
epithetical words of improper motivation.
d. Summary evaluation of the specific intent requirement:Is it
really necessary? Swift and many subsequent cases have instinctively
adopted the specific intent requirement in an effort to confine attempts to behavior that closely approaches monopolizing behavior.
If attempts are to be so confined, the function can be performed as
effectively by the dangerous probability requirement. Dispensing
with the specific intent requirement would help to avoid the range
of practical and theoretical disadvantages that the requirement now
entails.
The primary practical disadvantage of the specific intent requirement results directly from its usually fictive character. There is always a danger that courts will lose sight of the conclusional and inferential nature of the intent element and fall into undisciplined,
though stimulating, speculation that, given the conduct and its market setting, legality should turn upon the fact-finding hunch as to motivation. 2 Further, the formula may undesirably divert attention
from the central task of assessing the legitimacy of the conduct involved within its market setting, rather than provoking a more
thoughtful evaluation.
The first theoretical disadvantage is almost aesthetic in character.
If unlawful monopolization can be accomplished by conduct that
lacks any specific intent of acquiring monopoly power, why should
not attempt doctrine be parallel? While very good reasons may exist
for not finding an attempt to monopolize in all conduct that approaches unlawful monopolization, 8s and while it may be convenient
to clothe those reasons in the robes of specific intent, the result is at
least an invitation to confusion.
The second disadvantage is more important. The contemporary
challenge to current doctrine rests on the belief that courts should
play an important role in evaluating the desirability of competitive
behavior by firms whose market positions fall considerably short of
individualized monopoly power.8 4 Courts should not answer this chal82. E.g., Alles Corp. v. Senco Prods., 329 F.2d 567, 572 (6th Cir. 1964): "The purpose
or intent to create or maintain a monopoly transforms what might otherwise be a legal
method of doing business into an illegal method under Section 2 . . ." (reliance on
section 2 is completely unnecessary to disposition of case); Blecher, supra note 2, at 217.
18.
83. See part I(C)(3)(b) infra.
84. See Parts I-rn infra.
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lenge by defaulting on the ground that any criminal attempt inherently requires specific intent. For instance, whatever may be said of
Goodyear and Firestone, who respectively enjoy twenty-eight and
twenty-five per cent shares of the replacement tire market, 5 it does
not seem at all probable that either of them can be charged with a
specific intent to acquire single-firm monopoly power. The very question to be answered is whether courts can improve the replacement
tire market by policing their behavior; the question is merely avoided
by reliance on intent.
On the other hand, several practical advantages may be found in
current specific intent formulations. All of these advantages, however,
could be achieved as well or better by other means.
The most obvious advantage of current doctrine is that it clearly
justifies reception of direct evidence of business motivation, whether
exculpatory or condemnatory. The same evidence should be admissible under any approach that attempts an honest evaluation of business conduct.
A second advantage of current doctrine is that the need to brand
business conduct with a derogatory conclusory label may operate as a
deterrent to improvident decision. Faced with the requirement that
conduct be found to be specifically aimed at improper acquisition of
monopoly power, a judge or jury may evaluate the defendant's conduct more carefully than if the question of desirability were put more
simply and directly. The same result could be reached with greater
consistency between different cases by explicitly announcing a deliberate policy of reticence rather than by relying on an ad hoc psychological reaction to the "specific intent" label.
The least rational advantage of the specific intent formulation
may be of considerable practical virtue. One of the great dangers of
antitrust law is that the fear of prosecution and treble-damage liability may deter desirable competitive activity. It is possible that businesspersons who know that their hearts are pure and who believe that
liability attaches only to wicked behavior will be more willing to engage in desirable behavior than if they believe that liability hinges on
an ex post facto judicial evaluation of its legitimacy. Although it is
difficult for a cautious lawyer to imagine any comfort in the obscurity
of present attempt doctrine, this possible virtue cannot be rejected
out of hand. Again, however, it seems likely that the same advantages
could be achieved by an open avowal that courts will intrude only in
very clear circumstances.
85. See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
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Finally, the greatest service of the specific intent requirement may
be that it stands as an awkward symbol of a conclusion that the attempt category simply should not be applied to establish an offense
by analogy to the most nearly innocent forms of unlawful monopolization. The same protection might be achieved more directly by
further development of the relationship between market power and
the conduct from which intent is normally inferred.
In sum, it would be desirable to relegate the role of intent to consideration of extrinsic evidence of actual motivation as one element
in assessing the conduct before the court. Any need for confining attempts to a close proximity to monopolization can be better served by
care in evaluating the combined elements of conduct and market
power.8 6
3. Conduct Without Monopolization
Examination of the specific intent requirement has revealed that
attempt analysis is basically centered on an evaluation of competitive
behavior. Most of the problems encountered by efforts at such evaluation will be explored by examining the expansive contention that it
should be undertaken and liability should often be found in situations where there is no dangerous probability of completing a monopolization offense.87 In evaluating competitive behavior, market
power plays a role that goes far beyond its obvious role in making the
dangerous probability determination.
a. Market power as a measure of conduct. Market power is a vitally important ingredient of any effort to assess the competitive desirability of business behavior. The implications of descriptively identical conduct may depend heavily on the actor's market position,
since market position affects the consequences of the behavior and
since it may also bear on the desirability of those consequences. For
example, a deliberate below-cost pricing policy, adopted to expand
the firm's market share, seems quite different when it is undertaken
by a pigmy facing giants than when it is undertaken by a giant facing pigmies.88
86. A rather different formulation of reasons for dispensing with current specific
intent formulations is found in Hawk, Attempts to Monopolize-specific Intent as
Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58 CoaRNu L. REv. 1121 (1973).

87. The problems encountered in evaluating competitive behavior are discussed in
Parts V-VI infra.
88. See, e.g., Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismark Tribune Co., 1972 Trade Cas. 1 74,169
(D.N.D. 1972) (conduct that might be permissible if indulged in by the weaker of two
rivals was so "heavy-handed" as to be an attempt to monopolize when indulged in by
the dominant firm); Cape Cod Food Prods., Inc. v. National Cranberry Assn., 119 F.
Supp. 900, 908 (D. Mass. 1954) (jury charged that an increasing market share "may
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In addition to this critical function, market power may make a
pair of useful negative contributions to judicial evaluation of competitive behavior. At the high power end of the spectrum, doubts
about the effects of the conduct in its market setting can be more
readily resolved against the suspect actor, simply because it is less
important to ensure a wide latitude of competitive tactics to firms
already enjoying considerable market power and competitive success.
At the low power end of the spectrum, on the other hand, it may be
possible to dispose easily of cases involving otherwise dubious conduct on the combined grounds that where evaluation is difficult courts
should intrude only if there is predatory intent and that predatory
intent is highly unlikely in a setting of low market power.8 9
b. High market power and innocent behavior. The relationship
of market conduct to market power suggests a continuum of offensive
invite much more careful scrutiny than a small" share); Levi, The Antitrust Laws and

Monopoly, 14 U. Cm. L. Rav. 153, 159-60 (1947).
A characteristically lucid statement is provided in Turner, supra note 25, at 314-15:
It is necessary to examine the economic context in which the conduct takes
place
to determine whether the restrictive effects outweigh the benefits. And typically
te restrictive effects will vary directly with the market power of the firm involved.
In short, in an attempt to determine the legality of monopoly power by assessing
conduct, one tends to end up again with questions of power, and an attendant
lack of dear standards.
More recently, however, a rather different statement has bein provided: "Exclusionary
behavior without adequate business justification may . . . be deemed an unlawful
'attempt' to monopolize under section 2. I will concede the possibility that market
power may be an essential ingredient in determining the propriety of some kinds of
conduct which may have a business justification." Turner, supra note 53, at 1228-29.
Earlier statements of the same idea can be found in Jones, HistoricalDevelopment
of the Law of Business Competition, 36 YALE L.J. 207, 225 (1926); Kales, supra note 50,
at 832.
89. E.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 205 F. Supp. 394, 431-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
revd. on other grounds, 374 U.S. 174 (1963); Blecher, Attempt To Monopolize Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act: "Dangerous Probability"of Monopolization Within the
"Relevant Market," 38 Gao. WASH. L. Rrv. 215 (1969); Note, Prosecutions for Attempts
to Monopolize: The Relevance of the Relevant Market, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 110, 119 (1967).
A highly similar notion is relied upon in United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,
187 F. Supp. 545, 567-68 (EMD. Pa. 1960), affd. per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), in concluding that it is unlikely that a small company would deliberately attempt to eliminate
financially far more powerful companies by predatory means. And even a court that
concluded that there is no need to demonstrate a dangerous probability of monopolization has thought it necessary to find a specific intent to acquire control of a relevant
market, apparently on the theory that, given the intent, it is dangerously probable
that some untoward consequences will result. See Bowl America Inc. v. Fair Ianes, Inc.,
299 F. Supp. 1080, 1093 (D. Md. 1969) (among the factors relied upon in concluding
that there was an intent to acquire a monopoly was that the defendant's market share
was increased by its acquisitions to a level of 67 per cent in the most prominent of the
markets considered).
A converse argument has also been advanced that attempt liability should be
imposed on firms with dangerous levels of "economic," rather than market, power.
See Note, Attempt to Monopolize Under the Sherman Act: Defendant's Market Power
as a Requisite to a Prima Facie Case, 73 CoLum. L. Rzv. 1451, 1474-75 (1973).
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behavior-conduct relationships. 90 But judicial opinions seem to imply
that courts will not distinguish between varying levels of monopoly
power in evaluating a firm's conduct. If a firm is found to have
monopoly power, that power must be outlawed if, for instance, the
firm has engaged in restrictive practices like those employed in the
United Shoe case, 91 or has committed the even more vaguely exclusionary Alcoa 92 sin of expanding with a growing market.
The logic of current attempt doctrine, set against this background
of monopolization law, suggests clearly that an attempt should be
found if a firm is rapidly approaching monopoly power and is utilizing any tactic that would outlaw achieved monopoly power.93 This
finding would be supported not only by the fact of a dangerous approach to monopolization but also by the demonstration that, even
in other circumstances, "specific intent" refers primarily to the intent
to engage in the conduct found unduly threatening to competition
on the merits.
The shortcomings of this conclusion, however, are manifest. One
way of emphasizing them is to consider the United Shoe opinion. The
leasing practices that were found to make unlawful the position of
attained monopoly power in the shoe machinery market were found
not to be an attempt to monopolize when used in the tanning equipment market, in which the company had what was assumed to be a
forty-three per cent share. 4 If the worst that can be said is that the
lease terms have an abstract tendency to make competitive entry and
success more difficult, and if it is entirely possible that they entail
significant benefits for the shoe-manufacturer lessees, how is a court
to justify intrusion at any point short of monopoly? And if, analogizing to Alcoa, one of the greatest benefits of competition is to
induce individual firms to risk expansion of capacity in anticipation
of expanded demand, how is a court to justify curtailment of expansion before monopoly power is attained? 9
90. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 1973-2 Trade
Cas.

74,774, at 95,439 (N.D. Okla. 1973): "[Tjhe precise boundaries of relevant markets

and the likelihood of success in and of themselves become less important in attempt to
monopolize cases as
91. United States
per curiam, 847 U.S.
92. United States

aggressive predatory intent and conduct emerge more clearly."
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd.
521 (1954).
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).

93. This problem is stated in poignant terms, by way of questions, in P. AaRnaA,
ANTITRUSr ANALYSIS, PROBLEMS, TExT, CASES 174-76 (1967).

94. See 110 F. Supp. at 338, 846.
95. This question is not meant to imply endorsement of the rationale for decision in

Alcoa. Indeed, the difficulty with understanding the conclusion that it is unlawfully
exclusionary to maintain a position of monopoly power by growing with the market
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One answer available under current attempt doctrine is suggested
above: The unwillingness of courts to interfere with the most nearly
innocent sorts of behavior until monopoly power has been achieved
may be expressed in the conclusion that the firm lacks a wrongful
"specific intent." The same protection might be achieved in other
ways, with a substantial saving in conceptual tidiness. Most promising
would be a direct avowal that the same forms of behavior that may
justify interference with a very high level of market power simply
cannot be extended backward by analogy to lesser levels of market
power. Measurement of market power is too uncertain to justify appraisal of such conduct in settings that seem, at most, to involve a
"dangerous probability" of monopoly power. Alternatively, courts
might simply recognize that their ability to forecast ripening of the
dangerous probability into monopoly power is not sufficient to justify
intervention when the conduct is potentially beneficial.
c. Misuse of monopoly power. The Supreme Court has occasionally characterized the use of established monopoly power to limit
competition as an attempt to monopolize. Brief examination of the
leading cases reveals that no independent force need be attached to
attempt analysis in such situations. The problem is one of misuse of
monopoly power; recognizing the problem in these terms would
make it possible to control the behavior of indissolvable monopoly
even when it does not threaten to limit competition.
The first case is United States v. Griflith.9 6 The defendants were
a group of affiliated corporations that owned motion picture theaters
in many towns; the theaters faced competition in some of the towns
but were without competition in sixty-two per cent of the towns at
the end of the period involved. The defendants had undertaken combined dealings with motion picture distributors so that the purchasing power derived from monopoly status in the "closed" towns could
be used to secure advantageous exhibition privileges in the towns
where they faced competition. The Supreme Court found this activity to be a conspiracy in violation of both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Despite sporadic references to attempt doctrine, 97 the more
interesting dicta characterized such use of buying power as "a misuse
is the primary justification for reading the opinion as support for the argument that
any persisting monopoly position should be found unlawful unless there are demonstrable losses in dissolving it. The effort to create an attempt offense cognate to that sort
of monopolization offense hardly seems worthwhile.
96. 354 U.S. 100 (1948).
97. 334 U.S. at 105-06.
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of monopoly power under the Sherman Act" 8 and stated that "the use
of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is
unlawful." 99
Several years later, Lorain Journal Co. v. United States'00 was explicitly decided in terms of attempt doctrine. In this case the defendant published the only daily newspaper in Lorain, Ohio, and
thereby enjoyed a "substantial monopoly in Lorain of the mass
dissemination of news and advertising, both of a local and national
character."' 101 After a radio station was established in nearby Elyria,
the Lorain Journal refused to accept advertising from any Lorain
merchant who advertised over the radio station. The deliberate
purpose of this refusal was to destroy the radio station completely;
the weapon chosen was highly dangerous, since many local merchants
felt that they had to advertise in the local newspaper. The legal conclusion was that "a single newspaper, already enjoying a substantial
monopoly in its area, violates the 'attempt to monopolize' clause of
10 2
§ 2 when it uses its monopoly to destroy threatened competition.
Although it is not clear, it seems apparent that the primary reason
for resorting to attempt terminology was that the radio station had
10 3
not yet been eliminated.
Much more recently, attempt language was used in Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States 04 Otter Tail enjoyed exclusive franchise
agreements for the retail distribution of electricity in many small
towns and, in addition, possessed the only subtransmission lines
available for carrying electricity to several of those towns. As the
franchises expired, some of the towns sought to create municipal
distribution systems; Otter Tail refused requests that it sell power
to them at wholesale or deliver, over its own subtransmission lines,
98. 334 U.S. at 108.
99. 334 U.S. at 107.
100. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
101. 342 U.S. at 147.
102. 342 U.S. at 154.
103. In part, at least, the Court may have created its own difficulty by defining the
market broadly as the mass dissemination of news and advertising. There would be
ample justification for treating the local newspaper sphere as a market unto itself,
thoroughly monopolized by the Journal.Even if the Journal could not be found to have
monopoly power in the broader market discussed by the Court, misuse of its newspaper
monopoly power to curtail competition in the broader market is ample basis for finding
a violation. This basis for decision would have the added advantage of supporting
intervention even where it could not be found that there was a dangerous probability
of attaining monopoly power in the broader market.
104. 410 U.S. 866 (1973).
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power to be purchased by the towns from other sources. 10 5 The
Court, drawing from both the Griffith and the Lorain Journal decisions and relying on the finding that the dominance in transmission
facilities had been used to foreclose competition in retail distribution,
concluded that the use of monopoly power to destroy threatened
competition is an unlawful attempt to monopolize. 0 6
Although attempt language figures in all three opinions, there is
no reason why courts should outlaw such uses of monopoly power
only in situations that involve a specific intent to monopolize and a
dangerous probability of success. At a minimum, unlawful monopolization should be found when a firm holding monopoly power in one
market uses that power to achieve a competitive advantage in another
market. 0 7 This formulation would cover all three cases and would
justify judicial intervention in many situations in which dissolution
of the monopoly power is thought undesirable. 08
These opinions could also support the broade conclusion that a
firm holding monopoly power in one market may not use that power
to distort competition in any market, whether or not it competes in
that market. The Lorain Journal case may provide a convincing
illustration of the advantages of this formulation. Suppose that the
Journalhad refused, for motives of spite, to accept advertising from
one of two competing department stores in town. 109 Although it may
be difficult to find an attempt to monopolize a department store
market in which the newspaper has no competitive interest,"10 a court
should not hesitate to find that the use of monopoly power held in
105. It was also charged that Otter Tail had resorted to litigation designed to
prevent the issuance of municipal bonds to finance local distribution systems. There
was a further charge, of only incidental significance, that it had relied on ambiguous

provisions in transmission contracts with several other power suppliers to "justify" its
refusal to transmit power from such suppliers to the municipalities.

106. 410 U.S. at 377.
107. For a cogent argument that the "Griffith misuse-of-monopoly" theory should
be recognized "as a unique offense under Section 2," see Hawk, supra note 86, at
1156-62.
108. The difficulties of dissolving the only newspaper in a small town or of requiring

the creation of duplicate electrical transmission facilities in sparsely settled areas are
apparent. It is much easier to dissolve common ownership of motion picture theater
monopolies in several towns; nonetheless, dissolution was found not warranted on
remand of the Griffith case. United States v. Griffith Amusement Co., 94 F. Supp. 747

(W.D. Okla. 1950).
109. Professor Areeda asks this question in terms of a refusal to accept advertising
from merchants in nearby towns. P. AREEA, supra note 93, at 119. If the motive were

local chauvinism, the case is no easier than the case of spite motivation. If there were
instead some element of self-service, as from a belief that loss of local business might

impair local advertising revenues more extensively than it might augment nonlocal
revenues, the case might seem closer to the existing law.
110. Cf. text accompanying notes 178-79 infra.
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one market to distort competition in another market is an unlawful
monopolization.
Section 2 might be used for an even broader regulation of monopolists' behavior. Courts may be able to identify and regulate some
undesirable uses of monopoly power without catapulting into the
unmanageable task of regulating monopoly pricing.
No effort will be made to define or even identify the situations
in which it may prove desirable to effect some added measure of
judicial control. But one possibility is suggested by a recent case involving a local major-league professional football monopolist."'
Regular-season ticket holders were required to purchase exhibitionseason tickets in order to preserve their seat preferences. The plaintiffs claimed that this practice involved an unlawful tie of exhibitionseason tickets to regular-season tickets. The court responded that
even if separate products are involved, tying is no more a violation
than any other means of monopoly pricing. It would have been better
to face the "two products" question squarely; if two products really
are involved, tying by a monopolist should be found unlawful precisely because it is often a more effective means of exploiting the
monopoly position than is simply manipulating the price of the more
112
desirable product.
Adopting the broadest formulation of misuse of monopoly power
has an incidental advantage. The two-market perspective suggests
that courts should seek to control refusals by a monopolist engaged
at one level of a productive stream to deal with distributors engaged
in distributive "markets" further down the stream by treating
the refusal as an attempt to monopolize the subsequent distributive
market.1 13 If courts should control such behavior in some situations,11 4
analysis in terms of misuse of monopoly power can readily achieve
that result. As compared to the two-market perspective, the advantage
would be that courts would not be trapped into an often artificial
pretense that once separate stages of distributing a single product
must always be identified as two markets.
The uncertainty of the choice between attempt and monopoliza111. Grossman Dev. Co. v. Detroit Lions, Inc., 1973-2 Trade Cas.
Mich. 1973).

74,790 (E.D.

112. See, e.g., Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J.
19 (1957); Burstein, A Theory of Full Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U. L. Rav. 62 (1960); Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 YAuE L.J. 1397 (1967); Markovits,
Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory Part II: Tie-ins, Leverage and the
American Antitrust Laws, 80 YALE L.J. 195 (1970).
113. See Hawk, supra note 86, at 1159-64.

114. See Parts V-VI infra.
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tion theories for these cases provides a small illustration of a final
concern with current attempt doctrine. For upon reflection, it may
be discovered that there is really no satisfactory line at all between
the concepts of monopolization and attempts to monopolize.
D. The Illusion of Attempts Cognate to a Judge-Made
Offense of Monopolization
There is nothing startling about the proposition that the specific
intent requirement often represents little more than a judicial
evaluation of the desirability of the challenged competitive conduct
in its entire market setting, including an evaluation of the actor's
power. This proposition suggests that courts are engaged in the
familiar task of determining whether conduct that does not quite
meet all the requirements of a completed offense has nonetheless
run sufficiently afoul of the policies and purposes underlying the
completed offense to warrant punishment as an attempt.
The peculiarity of assigning this role to attempt analysis under
section 2 of the Sherman Act, however, is that judges themselves have
developed the purposes and policies attributed to the prohibition of
monopolization and have translated those purposes and policies into
such definition as there may be of the completed monopolization
offense. 115 If it can be concluded that challenged conduct-in light
of its nature, the power of the actor, and the over-all market settingruns afoul of the policies of section 2, there is no intrinsic reason
why the conclusion may not be as readily formulated in terms of
monopolization as in terms of attempted monopolization.
One example may illustrate this premise. It was pointed out
earlier that courts have been unwilling to find that actual exclusion
of a competitor is, without more, an attempt to monopolize." 0 It was
further noted that this conclusion seems strangely at variance with
the traditional statements that monopoly power is the power to
control prices or eliminate competition. The same point may now be
recast differently. If actual exclusion of a competitor should be found
unlawful, for whatever reason, adopting the conclusory terminology
of attempt rather than the conclusory terminology of monopolization
117
offers no intrinsic advantage.
115. The lack of substantial Congressional guidance is briefly explored in Part
IV(C) infra.
116. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
117. It has already been urged that the exclusion of any competitor by undesirable
means is itself the offense of monopolization, demonstrating sufficient power to run
afoul of section 2. See Adelman & Brooks, The Integrity of the Administrative Process,
Sherman Section 2 and Per Se Rules-Lessons of Fraud on the Patent Office, 19 WAYNE
L. Ray. 1 (1972); Smith, supra note 33, at 237-38.
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The effort in most current decisions to retain a close relationship
between attempt and monopolization may represent an inarticulate
reaction to this perception. The statute contains a specific attempt
offense, so it is necessary to give some meaning to it; the natural ploy
is to assign to the attempt category the least troublesome conduct that
118
might, instead, have been characterized as monopolization.
Explicit recognition that attempts simply represent an arbitrarily
segregated category of single-firm behavior that runs afoul of the
basic purposes of the section 2 prohibition of monopolization would

have the advantage of demythifying the requirements of specific intent and dangerous probability. In addition, recognition that present
attempt doctrine is an essentially arbitrary appendage of monopolization would help in approaching the contemporary challenge that the
category of attempts should be expanded, for, in a real sense, the
challenge rests on a claim that the attempt offense should be redefined
in its own terms, independent of any relation to the concerns embraced by monopolization law. Attention can now be turned to that
claim.
II. NEED To EXPAND SECTION Two
Although not cast explicitly in such terms, the primary goal of
current efforts to expand the category of attempts to monopolize is
to create a self-contained competitive wrong independent of any direct
relationship to monopolization. The primary need for expansion is
found in an asserted need to extend the means of judicial control of
single-firm behavior; secondary needs are often seen in the call for a
stronger legal response to the problems of oligopoly and in the more
general defects of section 1. Some of these needs may be real; after
exploring them briefly, it will be suggested that monopolization doctrine can meet them better than attempt doctrine.
A.

Control of Single-Firm Behavior

It is not difficult to be offended, or even outraged, by single-firm
competitive behavior that does not present any probability, dangerous
or otherwise, that the actor will acquire monopoly power. Such behavior might be left to regulation by state unfair competition law,
supplemented by enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission
Act." 9 Many observers have felt that these controls are inadequate
and have suggested an expansion of antitrust remedies. Perhaps because its amorphous nature permits easy reshaping, a wide variety of
118. Cf. P. AREEDA, supra note 93, at 176.

119. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).
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arguments have been advanced that the attempt to monopolize offense
should be developed as a primary means of control.
Professor Turner is very much responsible for providing the
modem justification for this approach in his highly influential article
on monopolization and market definition. 12 0 Arguing that Supreme
Court precedent does not require or support any measurement of
market power in attempt cases, he concludes that "unreasonable
21
specific intent is itself" the offense of attempted monopolization:'
The kind of conduct that typically establishes the requisite "specific
intent" in attempt and conspiracy cases is dearly conduct which has
no social or economic justification. No benefits can be expected, at
least in the long run, from predatory pricecutting, coercive refusal
to sell, and similar abuses of economic power. If defendants are attempting to drive someone out of the market by foul means rather
than fair, there is ample warrant for not resorting to any refined
analysis as to whether the intent is to drive everyone out or whether,
having taken over all of the production of a particular commodity,
the defendants would still face effective competition from substitutes.
Coercive conduct is analogous to price fixing .... [In] the typical
attempt or conspiracy case,.. . one may readily infer that the principal goal is aggrandizement unmerited by superiority in product or
technique .... It is reasonable to discard any refined concept of
market in attempt and conspiracy cases because the conduct involved
122
is so egregious that it may be appropriately condemned per se.
More recent writers, 123 following this lead, have likewise concluded that vicious single-firm behavior requires a remedy and that,
at most, relevant market analysis is useful in determining the probable intent or competitive impact of an apparently vicious actor. This
120. Turner, supra note 25.
121. Id. at 294-95 n.44.
122. Id. at 305-07.
123. E.g., Blecher, supra note 89; Note, Prosecutions For Attempts To Monopolize:
The Relevance of the Relevant Market, 42 NY.U. L. REv, 110 (1967); Note, Attempt
to Monopolize: The Offense Redefined, 1969 UTAH L REV. 704.
A related suggestion is that the scope of the relevant market should be defined more

narrowly as the nature of the defendant's behavior becomes more vicious. See, e.g.,
Boone,supra note 78, at 375-76. Cf. the protest of this tendency in Hibner, supra note
37, at 168.
A final possibility is that the relevant market requirement will be retained in name
only. In Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), for instance, the market was
defined for purposes of monopolization claims as a single gas-producing field. There
was no hint of inquiry into whether control of production from that field would give
any trace of power in the market for selling its products; attention was instead directed

to the ability to control access by potential competitors to production in that particular
area. This approach amounts to a change of emphasis in the values to be protected by
section 2 closely akin to the changes that would result from ignoring market definition
matters entirely.
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view has also been adopted and asserted by the Antitrust Division of
24
the Department of Justice.
The critical assumption of these arguments is that courts are able
to identify the categories of "coercive conduct" that are "so egregious
that [they] may appropriately be condemned per se." This assumption
will be examined in Part V below.
B.

Control of Oligopoly

Whether courts ought to outlaw as such oligopoly structure and
its inevitable invitation to noncompetitive behavior continues to
present the single most important, and most difficult, of all antitrust
questions. Those who are anxious to find a means of attacking oligopoly structure have at times suggested that oligopoly is inherently
conspiratorial 25 or that firms in an oligopoly market are individually
guilty of monopolization. 2 In addition, it is sometimes urged that
firms in an oligopoly market should be held- for attempting to monopolize. 27 Presumably attempt doctrine is attractive because it
124. See Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Hiland Dairy,
Inc. v. Kroger Co., 395 U.S. 961 (1969), denying cert. to 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1968).
The Director of Policy Planning of the Antitrust Division dearly stated his views in 1972:
"To eliminate the 'dangerous probability' and 'market' requirements from Section 2
attempt to monopolize cases would make it a much more effective tool for dealing with
indefensible single firm conduct." Baker, Section 2 Enforcement-The View From the
Trench, 41 A.B.A. ANTrmsr L.J. 613, 620 (1972). In addition, see the recital of the
Government's argument in United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 245 F. Supp. 737
(E.D.N.Y. 1965).
There may be a touch of poetic justice in the fact that-one of the early antitrust
opinions of Judge McLaren, recently Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, continued the requirement that relevant market and dangerous
probability be shown. See Radzik v. Chicagoland Recreational Vehicle Dealers Assn.,
1972 Trade Cas. 74,167 (N.D. Ill. 1972). In rather strange contrast, Judge McLaren had
testified as Assistant Attorney General that predatory competition by a manufacturer
with its own distributors might be subject to challenge as an attempt to monopolize.
BNA ANrmusr & TRADE R.. REP., March 17, 1970, at X-1 to -3. Under this view courts
might well dispense with any relevant market/dangerous probability inquiry. Cf. In.
dustrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th Cir. 1971).
125. E.g., Levi, supra note 88, at 177; Rostow, supra note 49, at 783-84. The basic
argument that interdependent behavior intrinsically involves sufficient agreement to
fall within the antitrust laws is elaborated in Turner, The Definition of Agreement
Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelismand Refusals To Deal, 75 HARv. L. Rat'.
655 (1962). Cf. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969).
126. Bowman, Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U. PA. L. Rnv. 577 (1953); Levy, Some
Thoughts on "Antitrust Policy" and the Antitrust Community, 45 MINN. L. Rnv. 963,
980-82 (1961); Marcus, Antitrust Bugbears: Substitute Products-Oligopoly, 105 U. PA.
L. R v. 185 (1956); McConough & Winslow, The Motion Picture Industry: United States
v. Oligopoly, 1 STAN. L. Rnv. 385 (1949); Turner, supra note 53, at 1229-31. Cf. Note,
Oligopolies, Cereals,and Section Five of the FederalTrade Commission Act, 61 GEo. L.J.
1145, 1169 n.181 (1973).
127. E.g., Levi, supra note 88, at 177; Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable
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provides the easiest path around the doctrinal limitations that have
stalled any effort to use monopolization or conspiracy theories.
Although the challengers have offered persuasive arguments, it is
terribly difficult to be certain that their arguments justify the adoption of doctrines that would effectively outlaw the structure of much
of our industry.128 It may be much less dangerous to create a remedy
for some forms of oligopoly conduct (rather than for oligopoly structure), including conduct by a single firm that, because it is not imitated by others, cannot be reached through section 1 under any
definition of contract, combination, or conspiracy. The example of
externally documented predation by a small member of a tight
oligopoly, set out in the Introduction,129 is one that most observers
would agree justifies an antitrust remedy.
It is more important to determine carefully whether courts should
expand their control of oligopoly structure or behavior at all than
to choose carefully among available legal theories. If the decision to
expand control is reached, however, it will be suggested below that
monopolization doctrine is better suited to the task than attempt
doctrine.
C. Repair of Section One
Expansion of section 2 might be used to alleviate several problems
caused by the inadequacy of section 1 as a means of controlling what
is essentially single-firm behavior. "Conspiracy" and "combination"
doctrine have been used to prohibit intraenterprise conspiracy and to
punish firms coerced to participate in a conspiracy, at the cost of
announcing doctrine capable of prohibiting much desirable conduct.
Courts are only beginning to feel confident of their ability to extend
section 1 to protect victims injured by their own refusal to join a
conspiracy. And no doctrine is yet available to reach firms that solicit
others to join a conspiracy without apparent success.
Intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine purports to apply the full
sweep of the section 1 controls of agreements between competitors to
Competition, and Monopoly, 64

YALE

L.J. 1107, 1161 (1955); Turner, supra note 53, at

1229-31; Turner, supra note 125, at 682-83.

This possible use of attempt doctrine has also been rejected. See Johnston & Stevens,
Monopoly or Monopolization-A Reply to Professor Rostow, 44 ILL. L. Rny. 269, 290

(1949).
128. One possible method of limiting the sweep of an attack on oligopoly is to
develop a new statute. The model for much of the current discussion is the Concentrated
Industries Act proposed by the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy in 1968.
See Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy [The Neal Report],
1 J. R.EPmaNTs FoR ANzrrmusr L. 9: EcoN. 631, 649-72, 713-33 (1969).
129. See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
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agreements between technically separate entities, even though the
entities are as unified as a single corporation under any rational test
of realistic control and financial unity. This doctrine probably results
from a desire to prohibit single-firm behavior that courts have felt
unable to reach under section 2.130 Expansion of section 2 would free
courts to abandon the conspiracy doctrine. The result might be more
control of single-firm behavior; it might be less. Whichever result
occurs, it would at least be reached on defensible grounds rather than
on the accident of form. 13
It is frequently ruled that coercion to join a conspiracy is no
defense. 132 Accordingly, it is quite possible that liability could be
130. Present doctrine dearly creates the possibility that the legality of identical activity may turn on the choice of organizational forms. Organization of a single enterprise
along lines of divisions (or less formal groupings) within a single corporation precludes
the plurality needed to form a combination or conspiracy, while organization through
wholly owned subsidiaries makes combination and conspiracy possible. There is no
satisfactory explanation available to defend this possibility; the most that can be said
is that the doctrine is seldom invoked, and then primarily as a means of reaching
behavior that enforcers would prefer to reach as single-firm behavior. See, e.g., Interview,
supra note 11, at 122-23. Justification for a considerably more restricted application of
conspiracy doctrine to very closely related corporations is asserted in Willis & Pitofsky,
Antitrust Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 20 (1968),
where current doctrine is carefully examined.
For a brief time, it appeared that the senselessness of the distinction between different
forms of organization might lead to a rule that a corporation organized into divisions
may conspire with itself. This possibility has at least temporarily been put to rest. See
Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915 (D.
Hawaii 1967), revd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
131. The desire to substitute a coherent doctrine of single-firm behavior for artificial
conspiracy doctrine is not new. See RahI, Conspiracy and the Anti-trust Laws, 44 ILL.
L. REv. 743, 767-68 (1950). Cf. Boone, Single-Corporation Competitive Torts and the
Sherman Act: A Projection Based upon a Review of the Albert Pick, Atlantic Heel, and
Perryton Cases, 2 GA. L. REv. 372 (1968).
Expansion of attempt doctrine would doubtless augment the present tendency, see
text accompanying note 300 infra, to add an attempt claim to private litigation pursuing
claims that rest essentially on conduct meeting any test of combination or conspiracy.
Such ready reference to attempt doctrine may cause difficulties under current doctrine
because it opens up added issues of intent and market power; under an expanded doctrine, addition of attempt claims would likely make little difference either way in such
cases and might even help avoid some occasionally difficult problems of establishing
the combination or conspiracy.
132. E.g., Otto Milk Co. v. United Dairy Farmers Cooperative Assn., 388 F.2d 789,
797 (3d Cir. 1967); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 568, 375-76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 835 (1957); England v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 1970 Trade Cas. 73,205
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 245 F. Supp. 889,
892 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
The Supreme Court has expressly left the question open. See First Nat]. Bank v.
Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 280 n.16 (1968). However, in Webb v. Bladen, 480 F.2d
306 (4th Cir. 1973), the court, in order to find a union immune from antitrust liability
because of lack of conspiracy, found that it had acted alone, without conspiring with
general contractors, when it forced the general contractors to terminate dealings with
a masonry contractor against the generals' will. Very faint support for allowing a
coercion defense may be found in dictum in McHugh v. United States, 230 F.2d 252,
254 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 966 (1956).
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imposed on such hapless victims as the local merchants in the Lorain
Journal case, who were compelled to boycott a new radio station
because the established local newspaper monopolist refused to carry
advertising of any firm that advertised over the radio station. 33 If
there were greater confidence in single-firm control doctrine, some
further evolution might occur in the doctrines concerning firms
coerced to participate in collective activity against their own desires,
at least where they receive no benefit from participation.
Conversely, courts have long felt awkward about allowing a firm
to recover damages when its virtuous refusal to enter into an illegal
arrangement has prevented the creation of a combination or conspiracy. 8 4 Although they are increasingly ruling-despite the conceptual difficulties-that recovery should be available, 35 reliance on
an expanded section 2 could provide an easy alternate solution.
The difficulty of establishing combination or conspiracy may
counsel reliance on section 2 in another context as well. Whether or
not an offense should be found.in cases of clearly unsuccessful solicitation to join a conspiracy, it can be extremely difficult to establish
success or failure. Imagine, for instance, a suggestion by one firm to
its rival that they both raise prices from $9.00 to $10.00, met by an
immediate rejection; the next week, one firm sells at $10.05, and the
other at $9.95. Similar difficulties in demonstrating that any particular purchasing pattern has resulted from, or even been influenced
by, informal reciprocity invitations or formal reciprocity pressures
probably underlie the alternative reliance on attempt doctrine in the
Department of Justice attacks on reciprocity 386
Although real, these incidental benefits with respect to relieving
section I do not of themselves provide great independent support for
expanding section 2. If the case is to be made, it must rest primarily
on the need for greater regulation of single-firm competitive behavior
as such.
D. Expansion of Monopolization or of Attempts?
The primary advantage of expanding the reach of the attempt
offense is that the expansion can be accomplished without doing vio133. The case is Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). The
argument for finding agreement is detailed in Turner, supra note 125, at 702-03. Cf.
Otto Milk Co. v. United Dairy Farmers Cooperative Assn., 388 F.2d 789, 797 (3d Cir.

1967).
134. See, e.g., Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273 (Ist Cir. 1967). Cf. Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
135. E.g., Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825, 831-32 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566 (4th
Cir. 1963).
136. See text accompanying note 9 supra; text accompanying notes 296-97 infra.
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lence to any deeply entrenched doctrine. It will be shown below 87
that substantial authority from the early years of the Sherman Act
can be found for dispensing with any requirement of a close approach
to the levels of market power that are now called monopoly power.
On the other hand, elimination of the monopoly power requirement
that the Supreme Court has clearly and repeatedly read into the
monopolization offense would require the overruling of many decisions.
The ease of expanding the attempt category, paradoxically, affords
the primary disadvantage of choosing that route. Once the obligation
of close reference to monopolization doctrine has been put aside,
there is little to restrain the extension of judicial control. The significance of the danger depends on a determination whether triers of
fact may be misled into condemning as "unfair" or "coercive" some
of the harsh but necessary acts of competition, which provide the
benefits that supposedly result from survival of the competitively fit
and death of the competitively weak.
It will be suggested below that the dangers in open-ended judicial
evaluation of competitive behavior are indeed grave. 138 Nevertheless,
the room for further extension of judicial control over some forms
of untoward single-firm behavior must be recognized. Redefinition
of the monopolization offense may provide a suitable vehicle for a
restrained new outreach.
Attention has already been devoted to the proposition that courts
should be free to control market-distorting behavior indulged in by
firms with otherwise legitimate monopoly power.180 This behavior
could be described as monopolization or as an attempt. Either characterization would easily dispose of situations in which the monopolist
is threatening competition in a market in which it is directly engaged. 40 The monopolization characterization, however, can be applied much more readily to situations in which the monopolist is not
engaged in the threatened market. 141
Monopolization doctrine could also be used to control the behavior, or even the structure, of oligopolistic industries. It has been
urged rather frequently that each member of an oligopoly has monopoly power by virtue of its share in an industry so structured that
competition can be avoided. 142 Jf it is further determined that oli137. See .Part IV(B)(2) infra.
138. See Parts V-VI infra.
139. Part I(C)(3)(c) supra.

140. See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra; text accompanying notes 178-79 infra.
142. See, e.g., authorities cited in notes 125-27 supra.
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gopoly structures should nonetheless be allowed to continue, it is still
possible to use monopolization doctrine to control individual firm
behavior, since in any concentrated oligopoly, the leading firms collectively hold monopoly power.1 43 For example, in the hypothetical
example given at the beginning of this Article,' 44 documentary evidence showed conclusively that a firm with five per cent of the relevant market engaged in predatory pricing in order to eliminate a firm
with fifteen per cent, resulting in an industry structure in which the
firm with five per cent gained a ten per cent share, while the remaining two firms enjoyed thirty per cent and sixty per cent shares. Even
if the oligopoly structure is allowed to persist, it would be easy to conclude that the shared monopoly power of the firm with the ten per
cent share is distinctively outlawed by the tactics used in enlarging its
share. Whether or not an effort might be made to dissolve the firm on
that basis, a treble damage remedy for the victim could easily be
provided.
Similar analysis could be employed in the related introductory
example. 45 The twenty-eight and twenty-five per cent market shares
held by Goodyear and Firestone in the replacement tire market
might be dissolved or otherwise controlled if there is adequate basis
for concluding that the tactics of acquiring those market shares lack
any redeeming efficiency virtue.
The introductory example of fraudulent patent procurement
provides a useful further test of the possibilities of monopolization
doctrine. The Supreme Court has ruled that efforts to enforce a patent
procured by fraud on the Patent Office may violate section 2 as
monopolization or an attempt to monopolize.146 The opinion seems
to state that for either offense it would be necessary to appraise the
exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant
market for the product involved1 47 The opinion, however, affords
scant support for concluding that the Court has deliberately chosen
to continue the relevant-market requirement for attempts, in large
part because the Court suggested that it might be prepared to rule,
on a fully litigated record, that such conduct amounts to a per se
violation of section 2.148 At least to all appearances, this conclusion
143. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
146. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
147. 382 U.S. at 177-78. The conclusion that a relevant market is needed in such cases
has been applied by many subsequent decisions. E.g., Acme Precision Prods., Inc. v.
American Alloys Corp., 484 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1973); SCM Corp. v. RCA, 318 F. Supp.

433, 472-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
148. 382 U.S. at 178. In addition, it is clear from the opinion that attention was in no
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of per se illegality would entirely dispense with any market inquiry,
even for a monopolization offense. And the case for finding a per se
violation in cases of fraudulent patent procurement is indeed strong.
The basic arguments against finding a per se violation revolve
around the proposition that even a fraudulently procured patent may
have no significant exclusionary impact. Far too many patents are
held invalid for reasons that are quite independent of any fraud on
the Patent Office and that are knowable to anyone threatened with
infringement claims or offered the protection of a license. 14 Even
apart from invalidity, interpretation of the arcane language of patent
claims may limit the patent's apparent coverage to matters of trivial
inconsequence, particularly with the aid of such abstruse patent law
doctrines as "file wrapper estoppel. ' 50 Finally, even a valid patent
often covers only matters of little or no commercial significance.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the case for imposing liability on a firm that tries to enforce a patent known to have been
fraudulently procured verges on the overwhelming. It is extraordinarily hard to conjure up the competitive advantages of deliberate
fraud. The effort to enforce the patent in itself reflects the judgment
of the firm that some commercial gain can be reaped from the effort.
The impact of the patent on rivals in the marketplace may easily
reach far beyond the limits that a court would ultimately place on it;
ignorance, uncertainty as to eventual judicial interpretation, the
great cost of patent litigation, the ease of accepting license arrangements that have been accepted by most competing firms, and the disastrously broad effects frequently produced by threats against customers of the coerced firm all contribute to this result. Although the
brocard that a patent is a legally conferred monopoly ordinarily
carries precious little value, certainly an attempt to enforce a fraudulently obtained patent would justify taking the bad actor at the full
way focused on the question whether the relevant market must be shown for an attempt
offense. Thus, the Court's statement is, at most, simply the reflection of an easy assumption.
149. It has been stated that 72 per cent of the patents that have been litigated In
the courts of appeals since 1966 have been held invalid. Speech by Bruce B. Wilson,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to Philadelphia Patent L-w
Association, Nov. 30, 1972, in BNA Arirrrausr & TRADz Rira. R'., Dec. 5, 1972, at D-1,
D-2. 1966 is the year of the Supreme Court's most important recent pronouncement on
standards of patentability. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
150. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Exhibit Supply Co. v.
Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942); Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 483 F.2d 858,
870-71, 877 (5th Cir. 1973); Williams Bit & Tool Co. v. Christensen Diamond Prods.
Co., 399 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1968); Eastern Rotorcraft Corp. v. United States, 397 F.2d
978 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Thabet Mfg. Co. v. Kool Vent Metal Awning Corp. of America, 226

F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1955).
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value of its own judgment and imposing monopolization liability for
misuse of rights falling into an otherwise valid category of "monopoly."
Other examples of the need to expand single-firm control may be
found. The other two introductory examples, 15 which involve general practices of reciprocity and competition by a manufacturer with
1 52
its independent distributors, might conceivably be among them.

Insistence that any conclusion of illegality be couched in terms of monopolization rather than attempt may have the advantage of ensuring
that careful thought is devoted to the questions before answers are
given.
Expanding the reach of section 2 through the concept of monopolization has an incidental intellectual advantage in addition to the
pragmatic advantage of deterring over-eager action. Although it is
difficult to understand the role of attempts as a judicially defined offense cognate to the judicially defined monopolization offense, 53 it is
more than difficult to understand the character of an "attempt" offense that is not proximate to a completed offense. If monopolization
doctrine is used to reach those varieties of single-firm behavior that
should be judicially controlled, attempt doctrine can be expanded in
the traditional dependent fashion, if only to obey the statutory mandate that there be an attempt offense. Courts may continue to reserve
an arbitrarily selected bottom range of offensive conduct to be called
attempt rather than monopolization. Dangerous probability and conduct approaching monopolizing conduct would remain the watchwords.
Despite these advantages of expanding the monopolization offense, some minor advantages may be found in expanding the attempt
offense. As previously noted, 154 fewer doctrinal obstacles would be encountered. In addition, some cases now brought as monopolization
cases could be simplified. If conduct sufficient to meet the attempt requirements could be shown, and if measurement of market power
were relegated to a lesser role in assessing conduct, it might be possible to avoid the prolonged trials of relevant market issues now characteristic of monopolization cases. Suits would instead be brought for
the attempt, and the question of monopoly would be disregarded entirely. 55
151. See text between notes 8 & 11 supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 259, 296 infra.
153. See Part I(D) supra.

154. See text accompanying notes 187-88 supra.
155. There might be some concern that different relief should be given for monopoli-
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The relative ease with which the courts might be persuaded to expand attempts, in short, continues to exert a strong attraction. Attention may thus be turned to the recent opinions that have accepted the
invitation to expansion, and then to the older authority that supports
such action.
III.

CONTEMPORARY EXPANSIONS OF THE ATTEMPT OFFENSE

The critical purpose behind expanding the attempt offense is to
reach single-firm behavior that would otherwise lie beyond the reach
of the antitrust laws. A significant number of recent decisions have
undertaken such expansion by focusing primarily on the unreasonable intent or behavior of the accused firm and subordinating the
ordinarily required element of dangerous probability of monopolization. Some of these decisions dispense with the dangerous probability requirement by simply ignoring it;106 others deal with the

requirement ambiguously; and still others face the problem explicitly, either rejecting or at least discrediting the requirement. Most
of these opinions share an important attribute: Liability either is not
imposed at all or is rested alternatively on strongly supported traditional grounds.
The least adventurous approach in the decisions that expand the
attempt offense is found in the statement that the dangerous probability requirement does not demand an assessment of the actual
likelihood of success in attaining market power but, instead, requires
a combined evaluation of the actor's ability to achieve the forbidden
result, of its intent, and of its overt acts., 1 7 A bolder approach suggests that specific intent to monopolize is enough if the intent is inferred from conduct that itself is a sufficiently substantial restraint
of trade to create the dangerous probability.18 Another court, withzation than for a mere attempt. For example, the possibility that cellophane might be
found a part of trade or commerce with respect to an attempt charge, even though the
relevant market for the monopolization charge in Cellophane was found to include
all flexible packaging materials, led one writer to ask what sort of relief should be
available where only the attempt was found when in fact there was monopoly. Marcus,
supra note 126, at 185, 192 n.27. The answer, of course, is that the availability of any
form of relief is not to be determined by the legal label applied to the violation found.
See Turner, supra note 25, at 318. The only danger is that the restricted attempt label
may blind a court to the need for sweeping relief.
156. Support for this approach in earlier Supreme Court decisions is explored in Part

Iv(B) infra.
157. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 598 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972).
158. See Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 362 F. Supp. 54 (D. Ore. 1973). Some
support for this approach can be found in language appearing in Bushie v. Stenocord
Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 121 (9th Cir. 1972). The court made it explicit in Dobbins that a
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out expressly rejecting the dangerous probability requirement, has
stated that a violation must rest either on showings of achieved substantial market power or on acts df a clearly anticompetitive nature
from which a specific intent to monopolize can be inferred. 159
More adventurous opinions have expressly rejected any semblance
of the dangerous probability requirement. The foremost decision is
Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 60 an action brought by a former service
station operator against his supplier. Ordering- a new trial because
of erroneous jury instructions, the court found sufficient evidence to
support findings that Tidewater had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act' 6 ' by fixing retail gasoline.
prices, enforcing obligations that dealers purchase their full requirements of petroleum products, and tires, batteries, and accessories, from
the supplier, and tying an obligation to purchase the tires, batteries,
and accessories to the lease of the station and the sale of petroleum
products. The court further ruled that the same conduct should be
submitted to the jury with instructions on attempts to monopolize.
The opinion explicitly rejected any requirement that the plaintiff
show a dangerous probability of attaining monopoly power in a
relevant market. 62 Instead, relying on the reference to intent and
the "consequent" dangerous probability of success in the Swift
opinion, 163 the court concluded that specific intent is the only evidence of dangerous probability required by the statute. 64 Probability
of success was found to be simply one indication of intent. Statutory
warrant for the result was found in the prohibition against attempting to monopolize "any part" of trade or commerce, which was
equated with "an appreciable segment of interstate sales."''0 5
Reliance on attempt doctrine seems entirely unnecessary to the
disposition of a case such as Lessig, whether disposition be in favor
of the claimant or the defendant. The activity involved inherently
violation of section 1, standing alone, might not be sufficient to constitute a still required
dangerous probability of success.
159. See Huron Valley Publishing Co. v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 659,
662 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
160. 827 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), reh. denied per curiam, 327 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 877 U.S. 993 (1964).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
162. 827 F.2d at 474.
163. 827 F.2d at 474, citing 196 U.S. 875, 396 (1905). Only tangential footnote reliance
was placed on the far stronger support found in other early Supreme Court decisions
that will be examined in Part IV(B) infra. 827 F.2d at 474 n.26.
164. 827 F.2d at 474-75.
165. 327 F.2d at 474-75.
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includes the element of agreement or condition required to satisfy
section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act.'"0 If
those provisions have not been violated, it is difficult to determine
why the conduct should be outlawed on some theory of single-firm
behavior; if those provisions have been violated, no purpose is served
by finding additional violations. Yet it may be that the court meant
to limit its opinion to situations involving violation of the other
statutes, for, in denying a petition for rehearing that had earnestly
pressed the contention that the opinion had the effect of outlawing
all competition, the court warned that its discussion of attempts must
be read "in light of the anticompetitive purposes and conduct to
167
which the case relates."'
Whatever the court may have meant in denying the petition for
rehearing, the Lessig opinion has had a remarkably checkered career
even in the Ninth Circuit. It is surrounded by attempt decisions,
shortly before and shortly after, in which the relevant market inquiry
is made without any reference to the treatment of the issue in
Lessig. 68 Other opinions have undertaken to explain the Lessig
doctrines, either defensively or critically.160 At least one opinion was
initially published with an open question of the validity of Lessig;
the reference mysteriously disappeared by the time of permanent
publication in the Federal Reporter.7 0
166. Section 3 embraces sales on an unlawful "condition," as well as "agreement,
or understanding."
167. 327 F.2d at 478.
168, See Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449, 454-59 (9th Cir.
1966), revd. on other grounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967); Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. Wescoast
Broadcasting Co., 341 F.2d 653, 664 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 817 (1965); Walker
Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 9 (9th Cir. 1963); Independent
Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 668 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 922 (1963).
169. In Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 473 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1972), the court
relied upon Lessig for the propositions that proof of the relevant market is not required,
that proof that there is a dangerous probability of success is enough, and that proof of
relevant market may be relevant to the claim (the relevance of the relevant market is
apparently drawn from the explicit recognition in Lessig, 327 F.2d at 474, that present
power is relevant to the question of intent). In Industrial Building Materials, Inc. v.
Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir. 1970), the court stated explicitly that
proof of the relevant market is not in issue in an attempt to monopolize case and then,
without cross-reference, continued on to rule that if the plaintiff can show an intent to
monopolize the entire industry, it may still prevail on a theory of attempt. $ee also
Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 121 (9th Cir. 1972) (defensive). The most recent
pronouncement is Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8, 12 (9th Cir.
1973), where the court accepted the proposition that all that is required is "specific
intent to set prices or exclude competition in a portion of the market without legitimate
business purposes. This specific intent must be accompanied by predatory conduct
directed to accomplishing the unlawful purpose."
170. Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972). Fortunately, 1971 Trade Cas.
73,620, at 90,563 n.1,
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The other most significant rejections of the dangerous probability
requirement have occurred in a pair of cases brought by unsuccessful
automobile dealers against their manufacturer-suppliers. Each case
rested primarily on claims that competitive retailers subsidized by
the manufacturers engaged in predatory competition. 17 ' In each, the
court withdrew claims of monopolization from the jury's consideration; in one, for example, it found that competition from other
makes of cars would preclude a finding of monopolization even if
Chrysler became the sole Dodge dealer in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.1 7 2 Attempt claims were nonetheless submitted to the jury
on the ground that specific intent to monopolize is itself enough,
even without a possibility, let alone a dangerous probability, of
monopolization. The more remarkable opinion is the earlier one,
which is admiringly followed in the second. The apparent core of
the reasoning is an analogy to an automobile race: Only one driver
will win the Memorial Day 500, but all specifically intend to win
it.Y3 No heed is paid to the fact that, on the court's own decision,
the intent to "win" by becoming the sole Dodge dealer in Allegheny
County is as innocent as the intent to win the race; completion of
the intended conduct is no wrong. Some subsequent opinions have
rejected the result on precisely this ground; 174 the fact that the analogy fails and that the chosen explanation of decision is inadequate,
however, does not of itself provide a satisfactory answer to the challenge that some more direct route may justify reaching the same
result 75
preserves the statement that "[w]hile the principle of Lessig ... remains the law of this
circuit, its continuing vitality has been questioned." Although this note has been
deleted from the opinion in 446 F.2d, the court does state that to prove an offense the
plaintiff must prove a specific intent to monopolize and that the defendant "had
sufficient market power to come dangerously dose to success." 446 F.2d at 832.
Cases outside the Ninth Circuit rejecting the Lessig opinion are catalogued in
note 37 supra.
171. Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Rea v, Ford Motor Co.,
1972 Trade Cas. 74,015 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (excerpts from jury instructions); Mt. Lebanon
Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968), affd. on other grounds,
417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969).
172. 283 F. Supp. at 460-61.
173. 283 F. Supp. at 461-62.
174. None of the opinions discusses the text cases by name. The most explicit re,
74,590, at.
jection is found in Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas.
94,605 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), where the court treats such a situation as one of "legal ...
impossibility." See Madsen v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F. Supp. 488, 506-07 (N.D. Ill. 1966),
vacated as moot, 375 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 245
F. Supp. 737, 739 (E.D.N.Y. 1965): "Since the monopolization of citric acid does not
an attempted monopolization is
offend § 2 [because it is not the relevant market] ....
. I
!i
equally inoffensive... .
175. Ultimate disposition of the Mt. Lebanon case rested on a jury verdict finding
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A few other opinions have squarely dispensed with the dangerous
probability requirement, without particularly advancing the course
of analysis. 76 The requirement is implicitly rejected in the small
minority of opinions that have asserted that attempt violations may
be found with respect to the products of a single manufacturer without regard to competing products. 177 Finally, occasional suggestions
are made that a firm may be found guilty of attempting to monopolize a market in which it is not engaged. 78 Such a violation might
rest on finding a dangerous probability that the incumbent being
assisted will gain monopoly power, or might, instead, rest on dispensing with the requirement-the opinions are hardly enlightening.7

9

a violation and no damages. See Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 417 F.2d
622 (3d Cir. 1969). The trial court in Rea emphasized repeatedly that it believed that
the judgment entered for the plaintiff on the jury's verdict could be completely supported under section I claims; thus, its extended discussion of attempted monopolization
was simply added support for the result.
176. The most explicit opinion is Bowl America Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp.
1080, 1093 (D. Md. 1969). Since the defendant had advanced itself from a market position
of 33 per cent to one of 67 per cent by virtue of the challenged conduct, as measured
by the most important of the relevant markets, the elimination of the dangerous
probability requirement probably was not significant to the result. In addition, see
Sam S. Goldstein Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 728, 756 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); McCormack v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 158, 165 (D. Minn. 1968).
An impossibly confused opinion is provided in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1962). Defendants,
who had lost a jury verdict, complained on appeal about the lack of any statement of the
need for dangerous probability in the jury instructions. The court found that there
was no reversible error, although the requested instructions "may have been literally
correct statements," because the jury was correctly instructed that there must be a
specific intent to acquire market power and exclude others from competition. It is
difficult to unravel the confusion implicit in the suggestion that it may be literally
correct to require instruction on dangerous probability but is not reversibly erroneous
to instruct only on specific intent. The court also approved a failure to instruct the jury
on the relevant market, however, so in the end it seems safest to read the opinion as an
unexplained determination that specific intent to monopolize alone will suffice. See 800
F.2d at 584-86.
177. E.g., Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711, 715 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd. on other grounds, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969); Rawlins v. American Oil Co., Civ.
No. 89-67 (D. Utah, Oct. 1, 1969), appeal dismissed, (10th Cir. 1970) (instruction to jury
quoted in ABA ANzrrrausr SEcrIoN, supra note 34, at 81-82).
178. See Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 127 F. Supp. 286, 298
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), affd., 225 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1955) (exclusion of a single firm from a
market in which defendants were not engaged not an attempt); Cape Cod Food Prods.,
Inc. v. National Cranberry Assn., 119 F. Supp. 900, 909 (D. Mass. 1954) (jury instructions); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1946),
affd., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
179. Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1956), appeal dismissed
per stipulation, 355 U.S. 865 (1957), may shed some light. The plaintiff alleged that
Sears, Roebuck had deliberately attempted to drive him out of the manufacture of
nursery lamps-and various other products he thereafter attempted to make--in retaliation for his refusal to lower the price at which he supplied Sears. The court ruled that
no attempt to monopolize could be shown without proof of a dangerous probability that
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Conspiracy cases under section 2 offer a final strand to the pattern
of current expansionary decision. Although few cases focus on the
issue, it seems to be accepted that proof of relevant market or
market power is not required in a conspiracy to monopolize case.180
The contrast with the majority view requiring such proof in attempt
cases is underscored by a recent decision that expressly ruled that
failure to prove a dangerous probability of monopoly precluded finding an unlawful attempt to monopolize but did not interfere with
finding an unlawful conspiracy to monopolize.18 '
The superficially expansionary character of the conspiracy decisions is deceiving. As in the case of attempts, it may be earnestly
argued-that the lack of benefit from conspiratorial conduct justifies
its prohibition regardless of the distance separating the conspirators
from monopoly power. The argument makes sense; it makes so much
sense that it has been adopted in a wide array of decisions finding.
violations of section 1.182 The result is that all possibility of independent substance has been drained from the offense of conspiring to
monopolize. It is impossible to imagine a conspiracy to monopolize
that is not also a conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1; although some element of contemplation of monopoly power presumably remains to elevate only the most distinguished
violations of section 1 to the dignity of concomitant violation of section 2,183 the result simply allows courts to impose double criminal
penalties on substantially the same conduct. 84 In addition, a few cases
seem to recognize an almost bizarre doctrine of conspiracy to attempt
Sears would achieve a monopoly. It may well be that Sears was not engaged at all as a
manufacturer in competition with the plaintiff and came into competition only with
his customers. The court probably meant to focus on an attempt to monopolize the
retail sale of nursery lamps, a market in which the plaintiff was not engaged. In any
event, the reliance on dangerous probability concepts does not shed much light on the
approach the court might have taken if Sears had clearly been attempting to aid
someone who was engaged in a market not occupied by Sears at any level.
180. See United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 573 (2d Cir.
1961); United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 186 F.2d 562, 566-68, 573 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916 (1951). Cf. Reliable Volkswagen Sales &Serv. Co. v. World-Wide
Auto Corp., 182 F. Supp. 412, 420-21 (D.N.J. 1960); Part IV(A) infra.
181. Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,590 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
182. No market power is required to show some varieties of section 1 violations,
such as pricefixing. The comparison between the market power requirements of sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act as to pricefixing was cast in modem terms by one of the
most famous of the Supreme Court's footnotes. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). Some inquiry into market power is, of course, involved
in many species of section 1 violations, including some of the so-called "per se" offenses.
See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
183. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 1974 Trade Cas.
74,879 (E.D.
Mich. 1974).
184. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 788-89 (1946).
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to monopolize. 85 It does not seem possible that such a doctrine could
be used to create a meaningful new category of behavior; it seems far
more likely that such references are simply a special breed of the not
uncommon tendency to use the attempt phrase as a slightly sloppy,
nontechnical description of the tendencies of unreasonable concerted
activity. 186
The greatest shortcoming of the contemporary attempt opinions
that disregard the requirement of an approach to monopoly power
is the lack of any coherent theory to explain the creation of a criminal
attempt offense that is not closely related to the completed offense.
Cases far older can be found to remedy that lack in highly persuasive,
if not ultimately convincing, terms. Examination of the Supreme
Court decisions, and of the legislative materials from which they
draw, should serve to frame the argument.

IV. CLASSIC EXPANSIONS OF THE ATTEMPT OFFENSE
A.

Statutory Language

Section 2 prohibits monopolization or attempts or conspiracies to
monopolize "any part of... trade or commerce." As noted above, the
Lessig opinion, in dispensing with any inquiry into market power
in an attempt setting, treated this language as reaching any appreciable (and perhaps continuing) volume of sales. An effort to secure
control over a regularly identifiable grouping of sales by improper
means, in short, can be treated as an attempt to monopolize that
"part" of trade or commerce.
Support for this reading can be found in several Supreme Court
opinions. The strongest support can be found in United States v.
Lehigh Valley Railroad Co.,1sT where the Court concluded, without
anything approaching a relevant market investigation, that combination of corporations to control the supply of anthracite coal tributary to a single great railroad system is "an actual monopolization
of a part of... trade or commerce in anthracite coal." Comparable
support may be found in the decision on the pleadings in United
185. See United States v. American Oil Co., 249 F. Supp. 799, 808-09 (D.N.J. 1966);
Basle Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 168 F. Supp. 553, 561 (W.D.
Pa. 1958); Cape Cod Food Prods., Inc. v. National Cranberry Assn., 119 F. Supp. 900,
909, 912 (D. Mass. 1954).
186. It has been. noted that care must be taken to distinguish the use of the "at.
tempt" phrase to describe or characterize the purpose of concerted activity. Smith, supra
note 33, at 241. See, as typical illustrations, Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314
U.S. 488, 493 (1942); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466-67
(1941).
187. 254 U.S. 255, 269-70 (1920).
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States v. Yellow Cab Co.18 8 There the Court ruled that, on appropriate showing of intent, the deliberate acquisition by a taxicab
manufacturer of control of taxicab operating companies could be
found to be an unlawful conspiracy to monopolize a part of trade

or commerce regardless of the proportion of total national cab sales
involved; the Court's reference to the broad purpose of the Sherman
Act to sweep away all appreciable obstructions to commerce might
be found to extend this language to monopolization and attempts as
well as conspiracies. 89 Various other opinions supply derivative or
obscure support. 9 0
Surely the language of the statute can be read to reach
deliberate
acquisition of control over any continuing aggregation of sales opportunities, regardless of the relationship between that set of oppor188. 332 US. 218 (1947).
189. 332 U.S. at 225-26. The clouds surrounding the nature of the showings that
would complete the violation are examined in Kitch, The Yellow Cab Antitrust Case,
15 J. Lw & ECON. 327 (1972).
190. Leading status, of whatever sort, belongs to United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours 8: Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 n.23 (1956). In approaching the problem of market
definition, the Court there distinguished several earlier decisions either as "not concerned with the problem that is now before the Court" or "concerned only with the
question of whether there had been an attempt to monopolize." Of these cases, several
involved resort to claims of attempt to monopolize only as a superfluous addition to
challenges properly addressed to the concerted behavior of two or more firms. United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); Fashion Originators' Guild of America
v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (decided under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970)); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd., 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Others involved a selection or assumption of a
market that seems likely to satisfy current notions of market definition. E.g., TimesPicayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131
(1948). The remaining cases, in common with those just cited, do not reflect any coherent
thought or suggestion bearing on the possibility that market analysis might play a different role in monopolization cases than in cases of attempt or conspiracy to monopolize.
See Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S.
268 (1934); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 US. 555 (1931).
Pregnantly obscure, or obscurely pregnant, references to control of a part of trade or
commerce are found, however, in the Times-Picayune, Lorain Journal, Columbia Steel,
and ParamountPictures opinions. See also American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781, 809 (1946). The Indiana Farmer's Guide opinion has suffered the strange fate
of being quoted in subsequent opinions as if it had authored its quotation from the
gloriously obscure statement in' Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911),
that "It]he commerce referred to by the words 'any part' [in Section 2] •. • has both a
geographical and distributive significance, that is it includes any portion of the United
States and any one of the classes of things forming a part of interstate or foreign commerce."
Lower court opinions can also be found that, without clear explanation, assume
that it may be an offense to attempt to monopolize a "part" of trade or commerce that
rather clearly would not satisfy ordinary market definition concepts. See Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 63-69 (2d Cir. 1971), revd. on other grounds sub
nom. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Englander
Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11, 14 (6th Cir. 1959); United States v. Klearflax
Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32, 39-40 (D. Minn. 1945).
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tunities and an economist's notions of a "market." The difficulty
arises in explaining why a "part" of commerce should apparently
entail measurement of a relevant market in monopolization cases
but not in attempt or conspiracy cases. The explanation must be
that, even with respect to monopolization, any identifiable grouping
of sales does constitute a "part" of trade. Lack of market measurement with respect to attempts and conspiracies may then be justified
in either of two ways: by finding a persuasive reason to distinguish
such offenses from monopolization or by limiting the role of relevant
market analysis even with respect to monopolization.
As explored in Parts II and III above, it is commonly urged that
attempts and conspiracies be treated differently from monopolization
because they involve inherently undesirable conduct. On the other
hand, since unlawful monopolization may be found on the basis of
highly ambiguous and potentially desirable conduct, the relevant
market inquiry is needed to ensure that intervention occurs only in
cases of significant danger. Support for this approach can be found
in two highly ambiguous and unsatisfactory Supreme Court opinions
of middling age. The alternative approach, drawing from the difficulty of establishing a logical line between attempts and monopolization, would be to discard the relevant market inquiry from
monopolization doctrine as well as from attempt doctrine whenever
the court is satisfied that unredeemably bad conduct is involved.
Support for this approach can be found in the famous opinions of
antitrust's classic era.
B. Expansion in the Supreme Court
1. Middle-Aged Opinions
Two famous decisions of a quarter century ago lend considerable
support to those who wish to establish attempt violations on the
basis of wrongful intent and conduct without regard to any proximity
to monopoly power. Each failed to consider the question explicitly,
however, and each refused to impose attempt liability.
The first of the cases is United States v. Columbia Steel Co.101
United States Steel bought a rolled steel plant in Utah as surplus
property after the end of World War II; as part of the transaction,
the Attorney General had advised the War Assets Administration
that no antitrust violation was involved. Thereafter, United States
Steel acquired the assets of Consolidated Steel Corporation, a steel
fabricating concern that was both a customer for rolled steel products
191. 334 U.S. 495, 530-33 (1948).
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and a competitor in the sale of fabricated products. The acquisition
was challenged both as a violation of section 1 and as an attempt to
monopolize the market in fabricated steel products. The Court devoted most of its opinion, which approved the acquisition, to the
conclusion that there was no unreasonable restraint in violation of
section 1. The opinion concluded, however, with an examination
of the attempt charge on the express premise that "even though the
restraint effected may be reasonable under § 1, it may constitute an
attempt to monopolize forbidden by § 2 if a specific intent to monopolize may be shown."' 92 Although no violation was found, the premise of decision lends startlingly strong support to expansion of the
attempt offense: A wrongful intent alone may be the basis for outlawing activity that clearly involves contract, combination, and conspiracy, and that has nonetheless been found so innocuous in actual
impact as not to violate section 1.
In some ways, the opinion in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States'9 8 seems to lend even stronger support to the forces
of expansion. Section 1 and attempt to monopolize charges were both
advanced. The section 1 charge was based on imposition of a "unit
plan" that required that some types of advertising be placed in both
the morning and the evening newspapers published by a single
publisher. The attempt charges renewed the attack on the unit plan
and encompassed other varieties of conduct as well. The Court ruled
that the publisher had not violated section 1 because the government had not shown a demonstrably deleterious effect on competition and because legitimate business aims had predominantly motivated adoption of the program. Turning to the attempt charges, it
announced that section 2 required "a specific intent to destroy competition or build monopoly"'194 and rested judgment for the defendant solely on the ground of honorable intent already found.195 It
would be possible to explain reconsideration of the unit plan on the
ground that the Court was carried away by the force of its analysis
of the other conduct underlying the attempt charge. Nonetheless,
the opinion renews the implication in Columbia Steel that an attempt violation may be found in activity that is exonerated under
section 1 because of its essentially reasonable character. In addition,
the suggestion that the prohibited intent is the intent to destroy competition or build monopoly seems rather direct support for the argu192.
193.
194.
195.

334 U.S. at 531-32.
345 U.S. 594 (1953).
345 U.S. at 626.
345 U.S. at 619-27.
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ment that anticompetitive behavior alone should constitute an attempt to monopolize.
If either of these opinions had recognized the problems of relating attempt violations to monopolization violations and had dealt
with them explicitly, the current course of lower court authority
might have been changed avulsively. As the opinions stand, they
are generally disregarded and remain outside the main channels of
still-current attempt doctrine.
2. The Classic Era
The dangerous probability requirement of the Swift opinion""0
can easily be freed from any reference to monopoly power simply by
considering the opinion in its contemporary setting.
Justice White's masterful opinion 9 7 in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States'98 provides the primary justification for divorcing the
attempt to monopolize offense from any relationship to monopoly
power. The opinion begins with the proposition that the Sherman
Act uses the concepts of "monopoly" and "restraint of trade" in a
nontechnical way, freed of their original restrictive common law
meanings. To Justice White the words had come to embrace all
manner of acts that might produce the evil results attributed to
crown-granted monopolies or self-imposed restraints on competitive
freedom: elevation of price, restriction of output, and deterioration
of quality. Conduct was to be measured against a rule of reason, in
light of the surrounding circumstances and the moving intent. The
prohibitions in section 2 were meant simply to complement section
1, "to make the prohibitions of the act all the more complete and
perfect by embracing all attempts to reach the end prohibited by the
first section . . . even although the acts by which such results are
attempted to be brought about or are brought about be not embraced within the general enumeration [of "every contract, combination," etc.] of the first section."' 19 9 Standard Oil's offenses were
found to include not only monopolization, but also "a continued
attempt to monopolize." 200 Without quoting at more burdensome
196. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
197. An admiring view of the opinion is by no means universal. Some of the criticism
has been nearly vicious. See, e.g., Foulke, The Federal Anti-Trust Act of 1890, 62 U. PA.
L. REv. 241, 267 (1914); Jackson & Dumbauld, Monopolies and the Courts, 86 U. PA. L.
REv. 231, 247 (1938). For more appreciative views, see, e.g., Bork, Legislative Intent and
the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. LAW & ECON. 7 (1966); Hornblower, "Anti-Trust"
Legislation and Litigation, 11 COLUM. L. REv. 701 (1911).
198. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).

199. 221 U.S. at 61-62.
200. 221 U.S. at 77.
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length, it is clear that the opinion supports use of monopolization
and attempt offenses to reach any unreasonably anticompetitive behavior by a single firm.201 Two weeks later, in deciding United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 20 2 the Court used similar language and
addressed itself to the question whether the acts of the defendants
were "of such an unusual and wrongful character" as to bring them
within the statute.
This approach to section 2 did not spring full-blown from the
brow of Justice White. Attempt claims were included as a matter of
routine in most of the early cases, 20 3 quite probably as a reflection of
considerable uncertainty as to the meaning of the prohibition. The
very earliest opinions frequently responded to such claims by defining the outlawed attempt to monopolize as "an attempt to secure
or acquire an exclusive right.., by means which prevent or restrain
others," 204 and by permitting the quest for business at the expense
of others only by means that leave "competitors free to make successful endeavors of the same kind." 20 5 It would be easy indeed to draw
from such statements the proposition that to employ any means of
competition that in some sense unfairly impedes the opportunities
of others is an attempt to monopolize.
Reconciliation of this approach with the dangerous probability
language in Swift is readily possible. Shortly before writing the
Swift opinion, Justice Holmes wrote a dissent in Northern Securities
Co. v. United States20 6 that anticipated the core of the Standard Oil
approach. Restraint of trade was found to be the exclusion of
201. This expansive view of the opinion is stated most broadly in Jones, supra note
88, at 219-20.
202. 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922); United States
v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 254 U.S. 255 (1920); United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26
(1920); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912); United States v. Joint
Traffic Assn., 171 U.S. 505 (1898); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898); Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn.,
166 U.S. 290 (1897).
Uncertainty as to the meaning of the attempt offense may also be reflected in the
fact that examination of several of the antitrust treatises of the 1890's and the early
twentieth century has not uncovered any coherent treatment of the subject at all.
204. In re Greene, 52 F. 104, 116 (S.D. Ohio 1892). Like views, in collateral cases
growing out of the same indictment, are to be found. In re Terrell, 51 F. 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1892); In re Coming, 51 F. 205 (N.D. Ohio 1892).
205. Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454, 462-63 (8th Cir. 1903). See
also United States v. Whiting, 212 F. 466, 478 (D. Mass. 1914); United States v. American
Naval Stores Co., 172 F. 455, 457-58 (S.D. Ga. 1909). Echoes of the old phrases are still
occasionally heard. See instruction to jury quoted in ABA ANwrrnusr ScrioN, supra
note 34, at 82-83.
206. 193 U.S. 197, 400-11 (1904).
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others;20 7 the prohibitions of section 2 were found to be related to
the prohibitions of section 1 in establishing "that whatever is criminal when done by way of combination is equally criminal if done by
a single man. 208 It is possible to combine his two opinions into the
proposition that, to be unlawful, an attempt to monopolize must
approach dangerously near to monopolization but that monopolization itself is a behavioral offense that does not require any particular
measure of power in an economically defined market. Unfair acts
excluding competitors might alone constitute the offense.
Although the old language is still quoted on occasion, 20 9 it has not
yet been resurrected to establish any such expanded offense. Examination of the legislative history and contemporary thought, however, provides further support for any faithful believers who might
wish to bend their efforts to accomplish that end.
C.

Expansion in Legislative History

The nature of the expansionary arguments drawn from legislative
history is easily stated: Congress, in passing the Sherman Act, had
no clear notion of the legal doctrine it wanted; not even Senator
Sherman, whose bills stimulated the legislative process into action,
nor the draftsmen2 10 of the statute actually adopted wished to do
more than grant a charter to the federal courts to decide what needed
to be done. Particularly in the area of single-firm behavior, "The
Act is necessarily vague, because, in men's minds, the evil dreaded
is vague, and like words ... have been used to express it.' '211 If, in
the phrase of the 1930's, the statute is to be interpreted as a declaration of the principles of free enterprise constitutional in its majesty
and breadth, 212 it may easily be read in light of modem needs to
207. 193 U.S. at 404, 409.
208. 193 U.S. at 404.
209. E.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959); Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1951). The notion that "a monopoly
under § 2 is a species of restraint of trade under § 1" is attributed in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940), to the Standard Oil passage.
210. Although there was some initial uncertainty, it now seems to be agreed that
Senator Edmunds probably wrote most of the actual statute, including section 2. See W.
LErWIN, LAv AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 94 (1965); H. THORELLI, FEDERAL ANTI-

nTusr PoLIcY 210-14 (1955); Walker, Who Wrote the Sherman Law?, 73 CENT. L.J. 257
(1911).
211. Dana, "Monopoly" Under the National Antitrust Act, 7 HARV. L. RaY. 838, 355
(1894). Cf. Rahl, supra note 131, at 747: "Private monopoly, as distinguished from sovereign grant, had no distinct legal history, and Section 2 legislated upon an undefined
thing in a most uncertain manner."
212. E.g., Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936).
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authorize judicial control of untoward competitive behavior no
matter how far removed from a monopoly level of market power.
The most frequently noted feature of the legislative debates is
the repeated protests of the important movers that the statute was
213
simply designed to embody the principles of the common law.
The history is ordinarily continued with a demonstration that the
principles of common law had not developed into the general doctrines supposed in the debates. 214 It is not as common to note the explicit admissions that content would have to be given to the statute
by the courts. Such admissions came not only in despairing protests
against the generality of the statute2 5 but also in confessions by its
sponsors. 21 6 This willingness to throw the matter over to the courts
is undoubtedly the most important single source of justification for
the very free approach that courts have in fact taken in attempting
to apply the statute.
In addition, some small help may be found in a narrower approach to the legislative materials. Section 2 bears no resemblance to
213. E.g., 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (remarks of Senator Sherman), 3146 (Senator Hoar),
3152 (Senator Hoar) (1890).
214. E.g., H. THoRELLI, supra note 210, at 228-29; Bork, supra note 197, at 37; Dewey,
The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L. REv. 759 (1955); Letwin,
The English Common Law ConcerningMonopolies, 21 U. Cm. L. Rv. 355 (1954). Cf. H.
PACKER, THE STATE OF RESEARCH IN ANTfIUSr LA,.W 24-25 (1963); T. SPELLING, A TREATISE
ON TRUSTS AND MONOPOLIES 223-24 (1893); Pope, The Legal Aspect of Monopoly, 20
HARV. L. REV. 167, 182 (1907).
Some of the commentators of the period, however, urged vigorously that the principles of the common law did extend to at least most of the subjects that have now come
to be embraced by the Sherman Act. See Adler, Monopolizing at Common Law and
Under Section Two of the Sherman Act, 31 HARv. L. REv. 246, 251 (1917); Boisot, The
Legality of Trust Combinations, 30 (n.s.-39 os.) Am. L. REG. 751 (1891) (urging that
any corporation with undue power should be subject to charter forfeiture). Cf. Allen,
Criminal Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade at Common Law, 23 HARv. L. Rzv. 531,
543-44, 546-47 (1910) (urging that combinations to create monopoly might be reached).
Today, of course, some state courts announce that their common law embraces the
principles that have been developed under the Sherman Act. E.g., Collins v. Main Line
Board of Realtors, 452 Pa. 342, 304 A.2d 493, cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S., Oct.
23, 1973). Even if this sort of statement may be taken at face value, as seems highly
dubious, it is, of course, far from any reflection of what state law would have become
even in such states without the impetus provided by federal legislation and decisions.
In like fashion, it has been urged that there is sufficient support in common law to develop principles analogous to the Sherman Act for Australia. See Little, Monopolization
in Trade-A Kind of Intimidation, 6 MELDouRNE U. L. REv. 265 (1968).
215. See 21 CONG. REc. 4095 (remarks of Representative Wilson), 4099 (Representatives Cannon and Bland), 5953 (Representative Morse), 5957 (Representative Stewart)
(1890). Representative Bland's comment might be echoed in moments of frustration by
antitrust lawyers even today: "God knows, for no man in this House knows, what else
the bill will cover."
216. 21 CoNG. RFc. 2460 (remarks of Senator Sherman), 4089 (Representative Culberson) (1890). The Supreme Court has quoted an article in which Senator Edmunds stated
that every member of the Judiciary Committee agreed "'that it was quite impracticable
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anything contained in the original Sherman-sponsored bill referred
to the Judiciary Committee; 217 nothing in the legislative debates
following report of the committee bill218 that was finally enacted
without change as the Sherman Act touches in any useful way on
the attempt prohibition. During debate of the committee bill, however, a motion was made to limit section 2 to combinations and conspiracies to monopolize because the meaning of a direct monopoly
offense was obscure. Senator Hoar, one of the moving forces behind
the bill, responded with a definition of monopoly that included "the
sole engrossing to a man's self by means which prevent other men
from engaging in fair competition with him." 210 Senator Edmunds,
probably the draftsman of section 2,220 furthered the response with a
definition that included the exclusive right of trading in any place
or the control of the whole of some trade. He then stated that the
section had been drafted as it was because "if one person alone ...
did it, it was just as offensive and injurious to the public interest as
if two had combined to do it."221 Although the references to sole
control might be read to invoke a modern-day concept of high levels
of market power, these passages may also be read to support the
Standard Oil conclusion that section 2 is aimed primarily at supplementing section 1 by extending its prohibitions to any unfairly exclusionary activities undertaken by a single firm.
Traditional approaches to legislative history can also be used to
to include by specific description all the acts which should come within the meaning and
purpose of the words "trade" and "commerce" or "trust," or the words "restraint" or
"monopolize," by precise and all-indusive definitions; and that these were truly matters
for judicial consideration.'" Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 810 U.S. 469, 489 n.10 (1940),
quoting Edmunds, The Interstate Trust and Commerce Act of 1890, 194 N. Ams. Rav.
801, 813 (1911). Senator Hoar is likewise quoted as having advised clients in 1891 that
a proposed pricefixing scheme seemed to him lawful under the statute but that: "'The
opinion of courts, like the opinion of the rest of the community, may vary in different
generations as to what is reasonable. But the question of reasonableness will be a ques.
tion of law for the courts, to be determined upon all the facts and in light of the experiences, the business habits, and the public opinion of the present time.'" Washburn,
The History of a Statute, 8 BosTON U. L. R.v. 95, 99-100 (1928).
Certainly it wag commonly recognized from the outset that the statute was essentially
a delegation of law-making responsibility to the courts. E.g., Kales, supra note 72, at
433-34; Raymond, The FederalAnti-Trust Act, 23 HAy. L. REV., 353, 354 (1910).
217. Senator Sherman's bill was introduced on December 4, 1889, as S. 1, glst Cong.,
1st Sess. (1889) t21 CoNe. REC. 96 (1889)]. It went through many amendments before being referred to the Committee on the Judiciary on March 27, 1890. See S. Doc. No. 147,
57th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, 71, 89, 217, 277 (1903).
218. The bill reported by the Committee on the Judiciary was substituted in its entirety as an amendment to S. 1., 21 CoNc. RaE. 2901 (1890).
219. 21 CONG. REe. 3152 (1890).
220. See note 210 supra.
221. 21 CONG. REe. 3152 (1890).
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reach a much different view. Other bills introduced in the 50th and
51st Congresses unambiguously reached unfair competitive activity
of a single firm, divorced from any requirement resembling modem
notions of monopoly power.2 22 Failure to incorporate such provisions
223
in the Sherman Act may be given the usual implication.
Of far greater importance, the apparently casual origin of the
attempt prohibition may be urged as virtually forcing the conclusion
that the prohibition should not be given any vitally independent
significance. The committee was drafting a criminal statute. It was
clear that an attempt to commit a federal crime would not be punished unless the same statute created an attempt offense. 224 Contemporary doctrines of criminal law, as those of today, uniformly
regarded attempts in the light seen by the Court in the Swift deci222. E.g., H. 8054, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1888) ("[A]ny person... who shall prevent competition in the manufacture and sale of any article of merchandise with intent
');
to unduly enhance the price thereof... shall be known and designated as a trust ....
S. 6, 51st Cong., Ist Sess. 411 (1889) ("[A]ll acts done by any person with a view of preventing, or which tend to prevent, full and free competition... or which shall have the
effect of advancing the cost... to the consumer, are hereby declared to be unlawful to
the extent herein provided ....").These-and virtually all of the other antecedent
bills-are helpfully gathered in S. Doc. No. 147, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. (1903).
223. On the other hand, it may be argued that the simple language of section 2 was
intended to incorporate the full sweep of these provisions. For that matter, it has been
argued that if section 2 had not been adopted at all it would be easy to reach positions
of undue power simply by treating a single corporation-the only form of single entity
that has given pause in the expansion of "combination" and "conspiracy" concepts-as
a combination in restraint of trade. See Cox, Competition and Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 27 ABA ANTrrRausr SETION 72, 74-75 (1965). Compare the argument that the same

result could be reached as a matter of common law in Boisot, supra note 214.
224. Apparently the lack of a general attempt offense can be traced to the dogma
that there are no federal common law crimes, coupled with the fact that there has never
been a general federal statutory prohibition of criminal attempts. Illustrative cases indude Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434 (1899); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171
(3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Joe, 452 F.2d 653, 654 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Lucas, 6 F.2d 327 (W.D. Wash. 1925). The Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 9, 17 Stat. 198,
authorized conviction of an attempt to commit the offense charged in the indictment,
"Provided, That such attempt be itself a separate offence." This statute has been embodied in FED. P. CRaM. P. 31(c).
One of the earliest decisions that faced the question whether common law offenses
against the United States might be recognized involved an attempt charge, but the discussion focused entirely on the lack of statutory creation of the substantive offense. See
United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384 (D. Pa. 1798). Cf. Beale, Criminal Attempts,
16 HAv. L. REv. 491, 491 n.1 (1903): "In jurisdictions where 'the common law of crime
has been abolished,' i.e. where nothing is an offense unless made so by statute, an attempt to commit a certain crime may not be criminal because of the failure of any
statute to declare it so."
Currently proposed criminal law revision statutes include general attempt provisions. See S.1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-2A4 (1973); S.1400, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 1001
(1973); Green & Pochoda, Comment on CriminalAttempt and Criminal Solicitation: Sections 1001 and 1003 (1968), in NATIONAL COUMN. ON RE-ORM or FEoE4.L CRIIINAL LAws,
WOaING PAPERS 351, 352, 354 (1970).
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sion: They are creatures of the completed substantive offense, to
be defined and measured by the proximity of their approach to it.22
D. Expansion of Monopolization
Taken as a whole, the legislative history and classic decisions support use of section 2 as a means of outlawing single-firm behavior
without regard to monopoly power. But they do not support a
uniquely distinctive use of the attempt provision to reach this result.
If anything, they justify an interpretation of the monopolization
offense that would reach such conduct. The attempt provision would
then stand only as a means of reaching activity that almost, but not
quite, satisfied the requirements of monopolization.
In short, the argument returns to the idea of a continuum between monopolization and attempts to monopolize. If substantial
elements of market power are to be discarded, they can most appropriately be discarded from both-just as Standard Oil may be read to
do. If unambiguously bad conduct is involved, it would be condemned as monopolization without regard to market power. If the
conduct is ambiguous, market power might be used as one measure
of its desirability; illegality should depend on finding the high levels
of market power presently characterized as monopoly power only if
the conduct is subject to strong claims of justification. A court faced
with the task of determining what business conduct should be
outlawed must ask and answer the same questions whichever label
is to be used. Only an arbitrary dividing line can be adopted to give
content to the attempt prohibition as covering some more or less
narrow zone of offensive conduct at the bottom end of the spectrum
found to be undesirable.
At last, the question can be fully posed. It would be possible,
without violating any canons of judicial restraint or any clear Supreme Court authority, to discard limiting definitions of the attempt
offense found in the large majority of current lower court opinions.
At the same time, it would be conceptually cleaner to expand monopolization doctrine in parallel fashion. Whether courts should yield
to the seductive arguments of the contemporary challengers and give
birth to a new offense is all that remains to be examined.
225. Among the leading works prior to 1890, see I J. BisHoP, CRIMINAL LAWv §§ 723.
72a (7th ed. 1882); 1 F. WHARTON, A TREATsE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 177 (8th ed. 1880).
Slightly later works include 1 W. CLARK g: W. IARSH.ALL, Tim LAW OF CiumEs 279, 283
(1900).
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V.

THE HAZARDS OF REGULATING COMPETITION BY

JUDICIAL PROCESS

A desire to clean up the practices of the marketplace springs endemic in many breasts. Expanding section 2 into a pervasive remedy
for undesirable single-firm competitive behavior would satisfy this
desire. Grave dangers of mistaken judicial diagnosis, however, are
inseparably involved with any such expansion. These dangers arise
from the probability that judicial procedures, often resting on incomplete data adduced by opposing advocates and evaluated by
adversary experts, may provide too little understanding of the
efficiencies resulting from rivalrous behavior. The immediate consequence is that desirable conduct may be forbidden by judicial decree.
A less immediate, but more pervasive, danger is that the uncertainties surrounding the process and criteria of judicial evaluation may
deter much competitive activity that even courts would have found
desirable.
A.

Misevaluating Competitive Behavior

The dangers of mistakenly condemning desirable competitive
behavior may be illustrated first by a brief review of the most commonly feared tactic, predatory pricing. The recent resurgence of
attempt doctrine in refusal to deal cases may warrant the succeeding
sketch of that area. A large range of other business tactics, illustrative of those challenged in cases brought on some form of monopolization theory, will then be listed simply to suggest the difficulties
of discerning evaluation.
1. Predatory Pricing
Pricing below the levels set by rivals, the very heart of competition, has been unquestioningly accepted as a legitimate practice. 228
Price cutting to the point of predation, however, has as readily been
226. E.g.,Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 120-21 (1948);
Gold Fuel Serv., Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 306 F.2d 61, 64 (3d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); Allen Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. John A. Denie's Sons Co.,
1972 Trade Cas.
73,955 (W.D. Tenn. 1972); Centanni v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 216 F.
Supp. 330, 340 (E.D. La.), affd. per curiam, 323 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1963). But see Telex
74,774 (N.D. Okla.
Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 1973-2 Trade Cas.
1973), where the finding of unlawful monopolization seems to rest in large part on findings that IBM cut prices to levels below competitive prices. The findings that cost savings leading to some of the price reductions were smaller than the reductions do not involve any finding that prices were lower than IBM's costs. On the contrary, the court expressly found that "[t]here was no evidence that IBM reduced prices below cost and a
reasonable profit." 197-2 Trade Cas. at 95,409.
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condemned. Tradition has it that the robber barons of the nineteenth century expanded their monopolistic empires by such means.
Supposedly they destroyed small, local competitors by selling below
costs in competitive markets while recouping the expenses of the
campaign from monopoly profits earned elsewhere. 227 More recently,
it has become fashionable to doubt the rationality of such tactics on
theoretical grounds 22 8 and to demonstrate by study of historical materials that the actual use of predatory pricing was at least very much
less common than supposed. 229 The tide of opinion has not swung
completely, even among academics, 28 0 and many less detached observers continue to share the passionate belief of small businessmen
that they are regularly victimized by the predatory pricing policies
of larger rivals. 231 Such smoky clouds of belief may well be fed by
factual fires.2 32 Even if predatory pricing does occur, however, the
227. See, e.g., Cassady & Brown, Exclusionary Tactics in American Business Competition: An HistoricalAnalysis, 8 UCLA L. REv. 88 (1961); Raymond, A Statement of the
Trust Problem, 16 HARV. L. REv. 79, 91 (1902). This tradition may underlie a more contemporary suggestion that particularly severe limits should be placed on the competitive use of monopoly profits, even if they derive from an entirely lawful monopoly position. See Marcus, Monopoly Profits, Economic Impossibility, and Unfairness as AntiTrust Tests, 14 VAN. L. REv. 581 (1961).
228. E.g., Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J. LAw 8: EcoN. 259
(1966). Some of the discussion is concerned with the question whether it is possible for
a firm to engage in predation without itself being forced to bear the same or larger costs
as it is imposing on its victims. See, e.g., G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSrRY 113-

18 (1968); Bork ScBowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLum. L. Rv. 363, 367 (1965);
Director & Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. Rav. 281, 290
(1956). A meander along this path would carry discussion too far from present purposes;
suffice it to observe that there may be rational grounds to suppose that a predator may
be able, in a real world that includes antitrust laws operating more efficiently against
collusion and tighter forms of combination than against single-firm behavior, to engage
in activity at lower costs than must be borne by a smaller rival seeking to respond.
229. The movement was started by McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard
Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. LAw & ECON. 137 (1958). See Elzinga, Predatory Pricing: The Case
of the Gunpowder Trust, 13 J. LAW%& ECON. 223 (1970).
230. See Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15 J. LAiW & ECON.
129 (1972).
231. E.g., MacIntyre & Volhard, Predatory Pricing Legislation-Is It Necessary?, 14
B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 1 (1972). A Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the
Robinson-Patman Act recently reported: "While Professor Stigler may find predatory
pricing an unrealistic and nonexistent economic force, the subcommittee finds it an
often-used means employed by particularly large sellers to gain dominant positions in
local markets generally at the cost of viable small business enterprises actively engaged
in attempting to compete vigorously in a free economy." H.R. REP. No. 1617, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 40 (1970).
232. At obvious risk of dispute as to any one example, the following cases, among
others, seem to involve either clear or highly probable uses of below-cost pricing tactics
for purposes of disciplining or eliminating competition: Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread
Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966);
Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 35 F.2d 47 (Ist Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965) (related private recovery on an attempt to monopolize theory is reported in Farmington
Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 297 F. Supp. 924 (D. Me.), modified, 421 F.2d 61

HeinOnline -- 72 Mich. L. Rev. 436 1973-1974

January' 1974]

Attempts and Monopolization

question remains whether it is possible to distinguish it from desirable pricing behavior..At a minimum, the diagnosis would require
"a detailed and thorough understanding of the surrounding circumstances in all their complexity." 233 Just how great this complexity
may be deserves some reflection.
a. Legitimate "below cost" prices. Sales below a firm's average
total cost are often not predatory but compelled by competition
itself. Any sale that returns a margin above the added costs of making
that sale is unimpeachably sound business practice if it is the best
available opportunity. For instance, such sales may be forced by
cyclic fluctuations in the economy as a whole, by the greater efficiency
of rivals, by long- or short-run declines in industry demand, or by
fluctuations in demand between differentiated varieties of a single
product manufactured by different firms. Proof of the alternate opportunities open to the firm is, of course, highly difficult in itself.
Moreover, proof of better opportunities may not mean that "below
cost" pricing is predatory.
Sales made at prices below the best available price, and sales that
do not return the added costs they entail, may be entirely legitimate.
Justifiable reasons for such sales may include: temporarily low promotional prices to aid in entering a new market, in introducing a
new product, or in expanding sales in an existing market; permanently low prices designed to expand sales to a point that will reduce
costs below the initially losing price; 234 temporarily or permanently
low prices adopted to inform customers of the availability and qualities of a line of products, with low prices on the promotional goods
recouped by higher prices on other goods in the same line; 235 and
prices designed as an investment to maintain marketing channels

and a going organization in face of a market in which losses could
be minimized by temporary closing.
(1st Cir. 1969)); E.B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944); Porto Rico Am.
Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858
(1929); Bardahl Lubricants, Inc. v. Bardahl Oil Co., 1971 Trade Cas.
73,467 (D. Mass.
1971) (at least if the showings made in support of preliminary injunctive relief can be
accepted); Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476 (E.D.
Mo. 1965), afid., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234
F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919).
233. Yamey, supra note 230, at 135.
234. Something of this sort may very well have been involved in Continental Baking
Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W.
3246 (U.S., Oct. 23, 1973), where the defendant, Continental, opened a new bakery
and operated at a loss until sales had expanded sufficiently to utilize at least 75 per cent
of the new capacity. Judgment against Continental on a jury verdict was affirmed.
235. Telser, Abusive Trade Practices: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROS. 488, 495 (1965).
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Apart from such rational competitive motives, apparently predatory prices may result from ignorance rather than malice. Calculation of costs is less than precise; prices may be below costs simply
because the firm does not know its own costs. On the demand side,
a firm may mistakenly predict the responses of rivals to its own
pricing moves and the resulting over-all impact on sales. More simply, the firm may misestimate the nature of the demand for its own
products. Since price determines volume of output and volume affects unit costs, moreover, there is a germ of truth in the further
observation that prices determine costs, as well as being determined
by them. 238
b. Inferences of predation. The circumstances that have been
allowed to support an inference of predatory motivation aie detailed
largely in "primary line injury" cases arising under the Clayton Act,
as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.2 7 While it is tempting
2 8
simply to refer to the nearly absurd result in the famous Utah Pie
23 D
decision to illustrate the difficulties that have been encountered,
it seems appropriate to list some of the factors that bear on the
evaluation of pricing behavior. It should be no surprise that in the
process of evaluation the inference of "predation" is largely reduced
to a conclusional label expressing a value judgment that given pricing behavior was somehow inappropriate; the hypothetical illustration of self-confessed predatory motives set out in the Introduction24o is seldom matched by proof in the real world of litigation.
Drastic price cuts, themselves discriminatory, may, as noted by
the Court in its Utah Pie opinion, 241 offer grounds for question; any
sudden departure from prior practice, particularly in an isolated
situation, may call for explanation. If a showing of sales persistently
below cost can be added, confidence in the diagnosis is increasedbut the difficulty of measuring costs in any but the grossest fashion
suggests that the confidence is likely to be misplaced. 242 Sales below
236. See F. Rowa, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE RoBINSON PATnIAN AcT

31

(1962).

237. Clayton Act § 2,15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), formerly ch. 323, § 2, 88 Stat. 780 (1914).
238. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
239. A brief excoriation is Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The
Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967). A more generalized reaction is Sherwood, Robinson-Patman Act Primary Line Injury: Meanderings from Porto Rico to Utah--and Beyond, 16 UCLA L. REv. 304 (1969).
240. See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
241. 886 U.S. at 702-03 n.14.
242. The difficulties of establishing costs to the satisfaction of judicial tribunals are
well shown by experience with the "cost justification" defense to charges of price dis.
crimination. See, e.g., H. TAGGART, Cosr JusrmCATIoN (1959); Report of the Advisory

HeinOnline -- 72 Mich. L. Rev. 438 1973-1974

January 1974]

Attempts and Monopolization

the rival's costs may be some evidence that the firm is also selling
below its own costs, but apart from that possibility it is difficult to
be concerned that a more efficient firm may be hastening the demise
of a less efficient firm.
A pattern of consistently undercutting others' prices may also
offer some support. Examination of thb entire pricing history of the
market involved is necessary, however, to determine who initiated
the pricing pattern. Unless the supposed predator is quite clearly
responsible for initiating the price cuts, rather than responding to
the moves of others or to general conditions, accusations of predation
are apt to be misplaced. So, too, it seems necessary to examine patterns of price relationships between markets; unless prices in the
contested market are persistently below prices in other markets, it is
difficult to rely on temporary discriminations that are periodically
erased or reversed.
New entrants into a market and firms with small shares in it are
much less likely to be engaged in deliberate predation. Absolute size
may likewise be relevant; a firm facing rivals of much larger absolute
wealth is not likely to try to drive them out of the market. Measurement of entry barriers, if plausible, is of course vitally important;
although a predator may hope to raise the barriers by demonstrating
to potential competitors the costs of opposition, there is little likelihood that predatory tactics will be used to win a market whose easy
entry conditions invite prompt destruction of any compensating
243
monopoly profits.
This bare catalogue of relevant considerations should be sufficient to demonstrate the fantastic difficulties of attempting to assess
pricing behavior in any but the clearest cases. For the present, such
Committee on Cost Justification to the Federal Trade Commission (1956), in 1 J. REr L. &ECON. 423 (1969).
These inherent difficulties may be exacerbated by almost deliberately perverse legal
approaches. In evaluating a claim of predatory pricing, for instance, the Federal Trade
Commission has recently ruled that it would not consider the actual costs of operating
the over-all enterprise, where the owners had chosen to incorporate it into an operating
company and a real estate ownership company; since the operating company was experiencing losses, the loss nature of the pricing was thought to be made out even though
the enterprise as whole was making money. Fortunately, the pricing policy was found
justified nonetheless. See United Fruit Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. R P.
20,209 (ETC 1973).
PRINTS FOR ANIsT

243. Measured against these criteria, the Utah Pie claims of primary line violation,
with or without regard to inferences of predatory intent, seem hopelessly unfounded.
Much of the important factual detail is set out in the opinion remanding for a new
trial after remand from the Supreme Court. Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Co.,
396 F.2d 161 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 593 U.S. 860 (1968),
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difficulties are cheerfully faced or blissfully ignored in price discrimination cases. The availability of price discrimination doctrines,
indeed, suggests that predatory pricing in itself can be remedied
without expanding attempt or monopolization doctrine at all, since
price predation is unlikely to be accomplished without either discrimination or a position that can be controlled under present monopolization doctrine. 244 The lesson remains useful, however, against
the day when price discrimination doctrine may be reconsidered:
It would not be honest to argue for outright repeal of the price discrimination statutes on grounds of the availability of attempt doctrine, unless it is recognized that attempt doctrine may appropriately
be confined to very narrow circumstances.
Of far greater importance, the lesson suggested by the paradigm
of predatory pricing carries over to many other supposedly predatory
tactics as well. Judicial assessment of business practices more esoteric
than the simple fact of setting product prices is risky in the extreme.
Finally, it must be noted that the difficulties of diagnosing economic motives are not the only problems. So long as businesspersons
act for noneconomic as well as economic purposes, there will be
corresponding complications. For example, it was asserted in 1973
that major integrated refiners had not allowed retail prices to rise
as high as they should in response to gasoline shortages, thereby
creating a squeeze that made it difficult for independents to maintain their customary retail differentials below major brand prices. 245
Little imagination is needed to conjure up the purely political motivations that might prompt the major firms to exert pressure on
their own dealers (preferably short of vertical price-fixing violations)
to avoid the appearance of profiteering from shortage. If they also
find a certain pleasure in the difficulties of the independents, it
would doubtless take a highly trained psychoanalyst to tell the major
firms just what their collective motives really are.
2. Refusals To Deal
Efforts have frequently been made to find an antitrust violation
in the refusal by a single business firm to deal with another. The
failure to create any general obligation to deal-has rested on many
grounds. Judicial evaluation of a firm's determination of a customer's credit-worthiness, for instance, has obvious hazards. Even as to
244. Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1Sa (1970), is also available.
245. See PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 93D CONG.,

1sT.

SESS., INVESTIGATION OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTY

89

(Comm. Print 1973) (FTC Preliminary Staff Report).
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cash customers, refusals to deal may rest on sound business reasons.
A supplier (and perhaps a family of franchisees as well) may be concerned with maintaining the image of its product; with being exposed to litigation, whether for product liability or as a result of the
customer's general litigiousness; with rewarding customer loyalty,
when rationing is necessary; or with avoiding generally disruptive
relationships. There may be, as well, an abstract value simply in
preserving the freedom of businessmen not to deal with those they
do not like, subject to the tight limitations resulting from antidiscrimination legislation.
The general antitrust freedom to refuse to deal, however, is
qualified by requiring "the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly. ' 246 The immediate question is whether this qualification should be expanded, by means of monopolization or attempt
to monopolize doctrine, into a much broader duty of dealing than
has so far emerged.
The easiest cases for recognizing a duty to deal involve a combination of competitors who jointly control a means of competition
that is beyond independent duplication and that is essential or very
important to competitive survival. 247 In these circumstances, recognition of a general right of access to the joint facilities, even for those
who have not shared the costs and risks of initial formation 2 48 need
not break new ground. Decision could as easily be rested on section
1 as on section 2.
So, too, it is easy to accept decisions that a firm with an established monopoly position may not use its power to limit or exclude
competition by refusing to deal with customers who deal with its
rivals.249 Again, it would be possible to resort to combination or
246. United States v. Colgate &Co., 250 U.S. 300, 807 (1919). The Court's further ruling that, "of course," a firm may announce in advance the circumstances in which it will
refuse to deal has given way to a practical recognition that such art advance announcement is an effective means of bringing others into combination to pursue jointly a desired form of conduct. See generally Turner, supra: note 125, at 684-705.
247. E.g., United States v. Terminal RR.P Assn., 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Gamco, Inc. v.
Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 844 U.S. 817
(1952); United States v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas. 67,470
(N.D. Okla. 1953).
Associated Press v. United States, 826 U.S. 1 (1945), usually cited for this proposition,
actually affirmed a decree that made explicit provision for refusing access so long as
there was no discrimination against competitors of present members as such.
248. The Department of Justice has regularly reaffirmed the existence of such a duty
in broad terms. See, e.g., Speech of Donald I. Baker, Director of Policy Planning, Antitrust Division, in BNA Arcrrrusr & TRADE Rm. REP., Oct. 31, 1972, at A-7.
249. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 842 U.S. 143 (1951). The same principle extends to refusals to deal with customers who deal with rivals on unacceptable
terms. See North Texas Producers Assn. v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 848 F.2d 189 (5th Cir.
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conspiracy doctrine; in any event, such misuse of an established
monopoly position can be reached without the resort to attempt
doctrine occasionally found in such cases. 2 0 Likewise, use of refusals
to deal to distort competition in a second market may be reached
either as monopolization by improper use of monopoly power al25 1
ready possessed or as combination in restraint of trade.
Much greater difficulty is presented by some vertical integration
situations. Several courts have recognized what might be called the
right to refuse to disintegrate: A firm that has its own established
marketing channels is not generally compelled to sell its product
to others who would like to distribute the product. 25 2 Quite recently,
however, the Supreme Court has ruled that an electric power system
may not refuse to make its transmission facilities available, or refuse
to sell power at wholesale to municipalities who wish to substitute
for the system's prior local distribution their own local distribution
of electricity. 25 3 It is difficult to know whether the decision means
that any monopolist must now deal with would-be distributors who
wish to institute competitive sale of its products; the result may have
been unconsciously influenced by traditional attitudes toward public
utilities.25 4 Reliance was squarely placed on the great level of market power enjoyed by the established distribution system, but the
Court rested its decision more explicitly on attempt doctrine than
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966); Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d
643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 554 U.S. 923 (1957). Cf. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers
of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (Ist Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961),
where a boycott was organized in somewhat different terms.
250. The leading illustration is Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143
(1951), where reliance is placed on attempt doctrine rather than on a combination of attempt and monopolization doctrine, as ordinarily occurs.
251. See, e.g., TV Signal Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir.
1972); Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478 (5th
Cir. 1966); Packaged Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 255 F.2d 708
(3d Cir. 1958). The great source of authority for such concepts is United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
252. E.g., Best Advertising Corp. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.
1965) (it is not entirely clear whether the court meant to rule both on the merits and
on the commerce reach of the Sherman Act); A-1 Business Mach. Co. v. Underwood
Corp., 216 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Pa. 1963); La Rouche v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 166 F.
Supp. 633 (D. Mass. 1958).
253. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 US. 866 (1978). See text accompanying
notes 104-06 supra.
254. Much of the opinion is devoted to the bearing of the Federal Power Act on the
appropriate antitrust disposition. Cf. Denver Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F.
Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969).
Other cases have continued to rule that a firm controlling a facility uniquely
advantageous for some particular business endeavor may limit or deny access to it. See,
e.g., Export Liquor Sales, Inqc. v. Ammex Warehouse Co., 426 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971).
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on monopolization. Decision, however, should rest on the duty of a
monopolist to deal fairly255 and cannot derive any independent
strength from notions of attempt.
In theory, it is difficult to understand why a firm should enjoy
less freedom to terminate established independent dealers in favor
of its own integrated distribution efforts than to refuse to deal with
new distributors. Nonetheless, there is substantial authority suggesting at least that a firm that enjoys monopoly power in production cannot simply terminate its dealers. Termination is seen as a
means of destroying competition with the monopolist's own distributional efforts.2 50 Such cases are singularly silent on the duration of
the duty to continue dealing with the present distributors; nor do
they discuss the extent to which courts might control the terms of
dealing with distributors in order to prevent "unfair" competition
by their supplier. 257 The difficulties being invited hardly need comment.
255. See Parts I(C) (3)(c), I(D), H(D) & IV(D)supra.
256. The progenitor is Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273
U.S. 359 (1927), affirming a finding of liability under section 2 that rested on a refusal
to continue supplying a distributor who competed with the supplier and who had
refused an offer to purchase his business. It is not at all dear whether the ruling rests
on notions of attempt to monopolize the distribution business, monopolization of the
supply business, or misuse of a monopoly of the supply business. Cf. United States v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 226 F. 62, 75-77, 79-80 (W.D.N.Y. 1915), appeal dismissed, 255 U.S.
578 (1921), which may suggest that Kodak's dealings in distribution were found unlawful
as part of the scheme to monopolize manufacture.
More recent cases include Pollier v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464
(1962); United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945)
(effort to exclude established distributors from sales to a particular customer).
A very explicit rationale is advanced in Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv.'
Corp., 431 F.2d 334, 339 n.13 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401; U.S. 912 (1971): "It is
enough.., that National Screen had monopoly power at the manufacturing level and
used it to prevent competition at the distributor-jobber level." "Moreover," the court'
continued, 431 F.2d at 39, "the Supreme. Court has long ago' [in Eastman Kodak]
condemned a vertically integrated manufacturer-retailer from using its, power at one
level to drive out competition at another."
257. Some hint of the difficulties may be reflected in the concluding paragraphs of
an opinion that recently determined that, as a matter of common law, a "franchise"
relationship between a dominant and a subservient marketing party cannot be. termi-nated without good cause:
We are not called upon to decide whether the relationship is so personal it would
not survive Marinello's disability or death. We also reserve the question of the
particular remedy to which Marinello would be entitled (injunctive relief or compensatory damages) should Shell in good faith opt to operate the station [which it
owned] itself.
The lease and dealer agreement, of course, would be subject to revision to conform with current Shell dealer operational practices for the area. The good faith
of the parties and the reasonableness of their respective positions in the negotiations
would determine the existence of good cause should the negotiations fail and Shell
give notice of termination.
Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 411, 307 A.2d 598, 603 (1973), cert. denied, 42
U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S., Feb. 19, 1974).
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The problem of attempt analysis arises at this point. What should
be done if the supplier does not have monopoly power in its own
market? Should courts nonetheless decide to dispense with market
analysis and proceed to employ criteria of fairness to determine
whether refusals to deal, competition between supplier and distributors, or even the terms of dealing with distributors constitute
an attempt to monopolize distribution of the firm's own product?
Efforts to extend attempt analysis to refusals to deal by non2 8
monopolist suppliers are at least suggested in recent decisions, 6
but the limits of the decisions are unresolved. They might lead to
the conclusion that any firm producing a differentiated product is
required to retain its independent distributors unless it can demonstrate that efficiencies would be achieved by integrated, exclusive distribution. Even this conclusion threatens to interfere with desirable
efficiencies, however, since they might not be easily susceptible of
judicial proof. At the other extreme, such decisions might lead to
the conclusion that a producer may not enter into competition with
its current distributors, even if they are not terminated as distributors, for fear that the producer might so control the terms of its
dealings with them as to curtail or eliminate their competition.
The efficiency losses from any such rule would be obvious and severe.
In related fashion, courts may seek to regulate competitive behavior by an integrated supplier who is competing with independent
distributors of its own product. The automobile dealer cases used
as the fourth example in the Introduction 2 9 could represent the
start of a broad trend. The underlying concern is presumably a
vague fear of "predation" combined with an instinctive belief that
suppliers may be particularly prone and able to destroy the distributive competition of independent firms. Again, the" dangers of
judicial intervention are apparent. Integration by the supplier that
bypasses market transactions with independent distributors may
give rise to many efficiencies, but the difficulty of establishing the
efficiencies to judicial satisfaction may lead to untoward intrusion
in the name of fairness.
258. See Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1844
(9th Cir. 1970); Morton Bldgs. of Neb., Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 333 F. Supp. 187
(D. Neb. 1971). Cf. N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493,
517 (D. Del. 1971), where the court treats seriously, but rejects as a matter of fact, the
assertion that the defendant refused to purchase from the plaintiff remote control
cables for operating outboard motors of defendant's own manufacture, as part of an
attempt to monopolize the market for cables designed to operate motors made by the
defendant. Similar claims were involved, but not decided, in Deterjet Corp. v. United
Aircraft Corp., 211 F. Supp. 348 (D. Del. 1962).
259. See text between notes 7 & 8 supra.
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Regulation might even be expanded beyond supplier competition with distributors to reach the terms of dealing between the supplier and its distributors. So far, courts have generally resisted efforts
to invoke attempted monopolization analysis in cases of exclusive
261
dealing,260 of substitution of one exclusive dealer for another, of
change in dealer classification to a less-favored discount status21 2 or
of simple termination because of dissatisfaction with dealer practices. 263 But if substantial elements of market power are discarded
from the attempt offense, the result may be an invitation to judicial
evaluation of the fairness or wisdom of such distributional decisions.
Again, there is a real danger that sufficient proof of the efficiencies
gained may not be found to offset the sympathetic concern that an
established dealer should not lose its business without good reason.
In summary, it can easily seem unfair for a supplier to compete
with, or terminate, a distributor, while proof of the efficiency justifications for so doing may be hard to come by. Courts are simply not
equipped to weigh the competing concerns in the absence of a legislative policy conclusion that the interests of fairness outweigh the
20 4
possible costs of efficiency.
3. Other Monopolizing Tactics
The difficulties encountered in evaluating claims of predatory
pricing and anticompetitive refusals-to deal have been explored in
moderate detail because such conduct is commonly cited as "typical"
260. See cases cited in note 261 infra. An exception is Elder-Beerman Stores Corp.
v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 459 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1972), where a discount department
store complained of exclusive arrangements engineered by a rival department store
with a large number of suppliers.
261. E.g., Ace Beer Distribs., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283, 286-87 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); Eastcoast Equip. Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 354 F. Supp.
335 (ED. Pa. 1973); Moutoux v. Gulling Auto Elec., Inc., 1963 Trade Cas.
70,639
(S.D. Ind. 1962).
Like results are reached when a present distributor demands the elimination of
currently competing distributors. E.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car
Co., 243 F.2d 418, 420 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
262, E.g., E.A. Weinel Constr. Co. v. Mueller Co., 289 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Ill. 1968).
263. E.g., Carbon Steel Prods. Corp. v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 289 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); South End Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
264. State legislation regulating relationships of the many varieties encompassed
within the broad "franchise" label seems likely to place increasingly high values on
the "fairness" component of the equation.
It is possible that, in time, like concern may come to be focused on relationships
between "dominant" firms and their suppliers, as well as on relationships with their
distributors. An independent contractor who has long supplied upholstery fabric to an
automobile manufacturer, for instance, might challenge an effort to substitute internal
manufacture for external purchase. Cf. I. Haas Trucking Corp. v. New York Fruit
Auction Corp., 1973-2 Trade Cas.
74,735 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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monopolizing behavior. The details could be elaborated considerably. Similar difficulties, often compounded by the complexity of
the behavior involved, occur in evaluating the wide varieties of other
conduct that has been found or claimed to violate section 2. An
eclectic list 2 5 of such conduct includes: (1) physical violence-ad26
dressed to competitors, 266 their customers,2 67 or their products;
(2) predatory spending-to establish "fighting brands," 20 0 to threaten
or actually to establish new facilities 270 or new products,2 71 to advertise,272 to create "dummy independents," 27 or simply to expand with
a growing market;2 74 (3) price discrimination-in selling,275 or in
forcing suppliers to give special advantages;2 76 (4) acquisition of
265. The cases cited have been selected for purposes of illustration only. None of the
lists of reference is intended to be complete; generally, however, the cases selected provide
references to other important discussions of the same topics. Many of the cases are
intrinsically interesting or even fascinating; unfortunately, space does not allow, nor
inclination prompt, a detailed summary of each.
266. See United States v. International Fur Workers Union, 100 F.2d 541, 546-47
(2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 653 (1939); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 5
TaADE REG. REP. 45,072 (nos. 2271, 2272) (W.D. Mo., March 23, 1973).
267. See United States v. Dunham Concrete Prods., Inc., in Wall. St. J., June 23,
1969, at 9, col. 2 (summary of indictment). Cf. United States v. Dunham Concrete Prods.,
Inc., 475 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3195 (U.S., Oct. 9, 1973).
268. See Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599, 613 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S.
635 (1915).
269. See Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599, 612-13 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 238
U.S. 635 (1915); United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 F. 62, 73 (W.D.N.Y. 1915),
appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 578 (1921); United States v. Industrial Electronic Engrs., Inc.,
5 TRADE REG. REP. 45,073 (case no. 2329) (C.D. Cal., June 27, 1973). Cf. United States
v. Dairymen, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 45,073 (case no. 2312) (W.D. Ky., March 29, 1973)
(flooding the market). A "fighting brand" is essentially a product used to insulate the
predator's established brand from the rigors of predatory pricing.
270. See Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 119 (1948);
Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Hawaii 1972),
interlocutory appeal on other issues, 1973-2 Trade Cas.
74,821 (9th Cir. 1973).
271. See Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705, 720, 723
(D. Hawaii 1964), affd., 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969).
272. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946); Rea v.
Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
273. See L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 16, 18-19 (7th Cir. 1971).
274. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945);
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); American Football League v. National Football League, 205 F.
Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1962), affd., 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
275. See Marnell v. United Parcel Serv. of America, 1971 Trade Cas. 73,761 (N.D.
Cal. 1971); McKeon Constr. v. McClatchy Newspapers, 1970 Trade Cas.
73,212
(N.D. Cal. 1969); Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp.
125, 141-43 (D. Mass. 1959), affd. in part, 284 F.2d 582, 587 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 833 (1961).
276. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 401-02 (1905); United States V.
New York Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79, 83, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1949).
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more or less direct competitors,2 77 or an unsuccessful attempt to
acquire a competitor,278 vertical acquisitions of suppliers or customers,2 79 or acquisition of facilities to be closed down; 280 (5) practices in
exploiting, enforcing, or threatening to enforce patents2'1 or copyright or trademark rights, 28 2 misuse of other kinds of litigation, 288
or subversion of other governmental regulatory programs; 28 4 (6) interference with advantageous relations by direct means, 28 5 or by such
277. See United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922); United States v.
Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 US. 197 (1904);
United States v. Molasky, 5 TRADv RE. Rap.
45,073 (case no. 2345) (D. La., filed 1973)
(summary of indictment).
278. See Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125,
142 (D. Mass. 1959), affd. in part, 284 F.2d 582 (Ist Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 883
(1961). It has been argued that an at,tempt to monopolize should have been found. See
Marcus, supra note 227, at 588.
279. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949); United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 384 U.S. 495 (1948); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 173-74 (1948); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); United
States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 254 U.S. 255 (1920); United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S.
26 (1920); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 568 (E.D. Pa.
1960), affd. per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
280. See Bowl America Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1080 (D.. Md. 1969),
where the acquiring firm had the added purpose of leaving its hapless rival liable to pay
rent on unoperated facilities.
281. See Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prods. Co., 479 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3290 (U.S., Nov. 13, 1973); Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S., Oct. 9, 1973); Kearney & Trecker
Corp. v. Giddings, & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066
(1972); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
837 (1952); United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 804, 312 (E.D. Mich. 1951), affd.,

343 U.S. 444 (1952).
Cases dealing with royalty charges and discrimination are particularly interesting.
See LaSalle Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 445 F.2d 84 (7th Cir.
1971); Bela Seating Co. v. Poloron Prods., Inc., 438 F.2d 733 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 922 (1971); LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966); Peelers Co. v. Wendt,
260 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966); Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9
(D. Alas.), amended, 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D, Alas. 1965). See generally Hawk, supra note
86, at 1169-70.
282. See Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1972);
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 71 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1934); American TCP Corp. v.
Shell Oil Co., 127 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
283. See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972);
Forgett v. Scharf, 181 F.2d 754 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 825 (1950). Cf. United
States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated, 358 U.S. 915 (1958),
dismissed, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
284. See Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 868
U.S. 944 (1961).
285. See Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945); Patterson v. United States, 222 F.
599, 612-13 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915); Forest Cove Country Club, Inc.
v. National Club, Inc., BNA ANrrrRusr & TRADE Rae. REP. April 24, 1973, at A-11 (S.D.
Tex., filed April 6, 1973). Cf. Eastern Pre-Cast Corp. v. Giant Portland Cement Co., 311
F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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other means as misrepresentations, 2 6 disparagement, 28 7 "surveillance," 2ss or advance announcement of new products well before
their actual market availability; 28 9 and (7) preclusion of competitive
opportunities through exclusive dealing requirements imposed on
customers or suppliers, 290 tying, 291 designing separate products for
integral use, 29 2 influencing purchasers to adopt restrictive purchase
specifications,9 8 threatening to enter into competition with customers who purchase from rivals,2 94 or obtaining covenants against competition or revelation of competitive information. 2 5
Individualized exploration of each category of conduct would
require inordinate time. For present purposes, the illustrations provide a richer framework than predatory pricing and refusals to deal
286. See Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Hawaii

1972), interlocutory appeal on other issues, 1973-2 Trade Cas. 1 74,821 (9th Cir. 1973);
Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125, 141 (D. Mass.
1959), affd. in part, 284 F.2d 582 (Ist Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
287. See L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 17-18 (7th Cir. 1971); Bernard Foods
Indus. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970);
Keco Indus. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1240 (M.D. Pa. 1971). Cf. Household
Goods Carriers' Bureau v. Terrell, 417 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1969), reh. en banc, 452 F.2d
152 (5th Cir. 1971).
288. See Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599, 612 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S.
625 (1915); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 901 (D.N.J. 1949),
modified, 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
289. See Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas.
74,183 (D. Minn.), revd. per curiam, 464 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1972), as an illustration
of this now very popular claim.
290. See L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 14-16, 19-20 (7th Cir. 1971); Cherokee
Labs., Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Servs., Inc., 383 F.2d 97, 106-07 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 904 (1968); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley 8. Co., 365 F. Supp.
235 (N.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 362 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D. Cal.
1972), affd. per curiam, 412 U.S. 924 (1973); Marnell v. United Parcel Serv. of America,
Inc., 1971 Trade Cas. 73,761 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
291. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953):
Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993. (1964);
Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
923 (1957).
292. Cf. Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 1973-2 Trade Cas.
74,774 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
293. See Federal Sign & Signal Corp. v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 357 F. Supp.
1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
294. See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 568-69 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), affd. per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
295. See Schine Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 119 (1948); Board of
Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905); Alders v. AFA Corp., 353 F.
Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Miller v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 339 F. Supp.
1296 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Michigan Bar Review Center, Inc. v. Nexus Corp., 1971 Trade Cas.
73,700 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 315 F. Supp.
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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for suggesting the more important general questions that must be
asked in assessing competitive behavior.
Most important, attention must focus on the similarity of the
challenged behavior to the general descriptive qualities of ordinary
business behavior. If, as usually happens, the challenged conduct is
similar, attention must be diverted to the magnitude of the behavior
in relationship to the patterns established by other firms. All firms
may engage in promotional campaigns, for instance, but a campaign
of free goods to all comers for a year would be highly suspicious.
Internally consistent patterns of behavior over time and between
geographic or product markets may be as important as consistency
with patterns of behavior established by other firms. A firm that has
followed a challenged practice for many years may be viewed differently than a firm that has suddenly altered its tactics, particularly if
the new practice seems to be addressed to a particular adversary
rather than to the market as a whole. So, too, a firm engaged in many
markets may quite legitimately introduce new patterns of behavior
from one market to another.
All of the factors previously detailed must also be examined
from the perspective of the firm charged with anticompetitive behavior. Evaluation of its market power, and even its over-all wealth,
helps to assess the probable impact, duration, and motivation of its
conduct. Evaluation of its intent helps to predict impact, to assess
assertions of economic justification, and to reexamine the estimate
of market power. Since direct evidence of subjective motives and
expectations is at best treacherous, the evaluation of intent itself
must often depend heavily on the objective circumstances of conduct
and market setting; in many cases, circumstantial evidence of intent
will prove helpful only when there are strong indications of some
particular motivating factor, whether of justification or aggravation.
When several items of conduct are challenged, moreover, it is necessary to undertake a global view of their relationship to each other,
as well as to the balance of the firm's conduct and its circumstances.
Finally, there remains the vitally important inquiry whether the
challenged conduct has any arguable tendency to promote economic
efficiency. The excruciating difficulty of this inquiry may be underscored by returning to the question of reciprocity. Reciprocity practices have been attacked as attempts to monopolize in circumstances
that dearly have not involved any approach to monopoly power.298
296. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
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Presumably the justification lies in a belief that such practices are
without efficiency-redeeming virtue. The unfortunate difficulty is
that efficiencies are possible, basically by reducing dependency on
uncertain and unpredictable market operations. Without undertaking a review of the expansive literature, 2 7 it should suffice to
state that the possibilities of efficiency have not been so dearly debunked as to justify casual outlawry. Easy resort to attempt doctrine
in this area would provide one further demonstration of the dangers
of being misled by the obvious tendency of reciprocity practices to
foreclose access to customers into a conclusion that illegality can be
found without additional painstaking inquiry.
B.

Other Dangers of Judicial Regulation
1. DeterringDesirable Conduct
A significant expansion of monopolization and attempt concepts
may deter desirable competitive behavior for reasons other than the
immediate danger of mistaken judicial evaluation. As courts become
willing to evaluate competitive behavior across a broad array of
market settings, business firms must become increasingly wary of
disruptive competitive behavior. The more frequent the occasions
for requiring judicially satisfactory demonstration of the justification for new ways of doing business and the greater the uncertainty
as to the permissible limits of behavior, the less attractive business
innovation will be.
The danger of deterring desirable behavior is accentuated by the
nature of antitrust penalties. Even if business managers believe that
the self-restraint of government officials will preclude criminal prosecutions of any but the most heinous behavior, it is intrinsically unsatisfactory to expand the categories of crime by judicial decision.2 08
This difficulty has led to arguments that only civil sanctions should
apply to an expanded monopolization offense. Criminal penalties
would be avoided by imputing to the statute a requirement of specifically wrongful "intent. 29 9 Although there is no real judicial support for this approach, there is no clearly contrary authority either.
If accepted, the same process could be used for attempts; the "specific
intent" requirement could be resurrected as a means of at least
297. An excellent discussion is found in chapter 9 of a forthcoming work of Professor
Peter Steiner, tentatively titled MERGERs: Morsvrs, ErraCrs, Poucres (University of
Michigan Press).
298. A brief personal statement of these dangers is set out in the Appendix.
299. Eg., Turner, supra note 53, at 1221-23 (treble damage actions are also ruled out
with less explanation of reasoned evasion of the statutory remedy).
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theoretically curtailing the dangers implicit in judicial expansion
of criminal prohibitions.
Fear of private litigation might suffice to chill desirable competitive activity more effectively than the threat of government litigation. Private litigants are already adding attempt charges to
antitrust complaints as a matter of routine3 0 ° Treble damage sanctions would remain, even if it were possible somehow to separate out
a category of noncriminal monopolization and attempts to monopolize. This easy resort to litigation might be curtailed if, by some feat
of judicial force, private litigants were confined to single damages
or even to injunctive relief alone. Nonetheless, it would seem hard to
rely on the self-restraint of litigants to ensure that only well-founded
suits are brought.
2. Competitors' Misuse of Antitrust
Beyond these obvious concerns with the deterrent effects of uncertain substantive doctrine and harsh penalties lie a different, but
equally troubling, variety of doubts. Private litigants have already
asserted attempt claims in efforts transparently designed to shield
against desirable, effective competition. Although the defendants
have so far prevailed, the very ability to impose on competitors the
heavy burden of antitrust litigation over claims that cannot be dismissed at the outset is dangerously anticompetitive in itself. A few
illustrations should demonstrate the perils that may result.
The most extreme example is a case in which a firm that enjoyed
more than 70 per cent of the California baby food market asserted attempt to monopolize claims, among others, against a rival who, at its
peak, had gathered 6.6 per cent of the market. The defendant's
wicked stratagem, in an effort to halt a declining market share, had"
been the sale of baby food in glass containers at the same price as the
plaintiff was charging for baby food in metal containers. 0 1 In another case, a bank that had bid unsuccessfully for a checkless payroll
arrangement with local school boards sued the successful bidder on a
claim that the arrangement itself constituted an attempt to monopolize.80 2 In a third case, small dairy processors sued to halt construc300. See Hibner, supra note 37, at 167.
301. Gerber Prods. Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) (suit was later voluntarily dismissed). Cf. H.J. Heinz Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers,
Inc., 181 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203
(5th Cir. 1969), is similar in principle although not in drama; so too is Allen Ready Mix

Concrete Co. v. John A. Denie's Sons Co., 1972 Trade Cas.

73,955 (W.). Tenn. 1972).

302. Bank of Utah v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 269 F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
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tion by a big grocery chain of a large new processing facility in the
apparent fear that they could not compete successfully if it were completed; the court affirmed dismissal of their complaint with the tart
observation that "Plaintiffs' market shares are not protected by the
anti-trust laws and they have no legal basis for precluding competi'' 3
tion of Kroger in their field."
Pathological cases such as these are important in themselves. In
addition, they underscore a more fundamental point. In such clear
situations, it is relatively easy to be confident that the plaintiffs were
trying to use the antitrust laws as a shield against efficient, socially desirable competition. The danger is that in less clear cases a decision
will be made to interfere with private behavior that is equally desirable. The broader the invitation that is extended to competitors to
use the judicial process, the greater the opportunity, and inevitably
the occurrence, of severely anticompetitive judicial decisions.
3. Jury Trial
Finally, any honest discussion of judicial competence to evaluate
the competitive system must consider the fact that the resolution of
such disupted matters as "intent"--and therewith the entire evalua304
tion of the desirability of competitive conduct-lies with the jury.
Others have noted the risks involved in this procedure;3 05 it is sufficient now to note that jury trial must aggravate the burdens of uncertainty imposed on business planning and result in arbitrary differences in deciding cases.
S
386 U.S. 1018 (1967). See also Clark v. United Bank of Denver Natl. Assn., 480 F.2d 235

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3270 (U.S., Nov. 6, 1973). It is not entirely uncommon for plaintiffs to attack practices in which they themselves have indulged, perhaps
with less success than the defendants. E.g., Federal Sign & Signal Corp. v. Bangor Punta

Operations, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 1222 ($.D.N.Y. 1973).
303. Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 977 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 961 (1969).

Senator Stewart, whose other views on the pending antitrust legislation were hardly
elegant, observed that, under Senator Sherman's bill, "It would be the accumulated
capital that would prosecute the new concerns that are starting. This bill would be an
engine of oppression to break down all competition . . . ." 51 CONG. REc. 2606 (1890).
Perhaps, in time, he may yet be proved right.
304. Illustration of the issues left to the jury is provided by the expansive opinion
in Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
305. E.g., Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act Generally: Developments at Large
and Portents of Things to Come, A Panel Discussion, 37 Arwrrrusr LJ. 657, 680.81
(1968). Still others, of course, accept jury determination of such matters with equanimity.
E.g., Blecher, supra note 2, at 217-18.
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VI.

RESOLUTION AND CONCLUSION

Substantial advantages may be achieved by expanding section 2 to
reach the behavior of a single firm whose market power does not approach the present legal concept of monopoly power. In terms of the
examples in the Introduction, courts seem fully capable of controlling at least some forms of market-entrenching behavior by oligopoly
firms, of imposing sanctions on conduct that is revealed to be predatory by self-confession, and of prohibiting efforts to enforce fraudulently procured patents. As time goes on, it may be possible to add
other categories of conduct to the catalogue of single-firm behavior
that is so threatening to the competitive values attributed to the Sherman Act, and that can be so clearly evaluated by the courts, as to justify similar treatment.
Expanded control of single-firm behavior, however, would be better undertaken by redefining the role of market power in the monopolization offense than by expanding the attempt offense. Misbehavior
of an oligopolist would be measured against its share of collective monopoly power, even though it lacked distinctive monopoly power of
its own. Clearly outrageous conduct, such as enforcement of a fraudulently procured patent, could be reached without measuring market
power at all. This path of expansion would have many advantages:
As a purely pragmatic matter, it might instill a commendable desire
to act only after reaching a thorough understanding of the activity
involved in its full market setting; as a matter of legal doctrine, it
would draw strong support from the classic definitions of monopolization as single-firm conduct that threatens to produce the same evils
as concerted action unlawful under section 1; and as a matter of intellectual honesty, it would have the great advantage of not creating
the sorry spectacle of a criminal attempt offense that did not embody
any elements of approach to the completed offense.
If monopolization doctrine were thus expanded, it would be even
more difficult to understand the awkward residual role played by
present attempt doctrine. The requirements that there be a specific
intent to monopolize and a dangerous probability of success, without
monopolizing, could not be meaningfully distinguished from monopolization itself. The best course would be to repeal the attempt provision with an explicit statement that courts should condemn as monopolization all varieties of single-firm conduct found to warrant
control after appraising all available proof of subjective intent, objective conduct, and market power. Although repeal has been proposed
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as part of general revision of the criminal code,80 6 the simultaneous
creation of a general attempt offense would probably renew the old
problems. Repeal in any other manner seems highly unlikely.
Absent repeal, courts will be left with the obligation to define the
attempt offense as'well as they can. They should accord no more than
perfunctory content to the statutory phrase by characterizing the least
offensive varieties of conduct found unlawful as attempts rather than
monopolization. So long as the true character of this process is understood, there seems little harm in continuing to use "dangerous probability" terminology as a token explanation. The "specific intent" requirement, on the other hand, should be redefined. Courts should
recognize explicitly that the central task is an evaluation of the conduct involved in its full market setting. Direct evidence of subjective
motivations is always relevant in evaluating conduct, but inferences
of motivation are ordinarily too dangerous to be accorded substantial weight.
Expansion of the attempt offense beyond this arbitrary and essentially subsidiary role is not warranted. Current arguments for expansion amount to an effort to create a federal common law of unfair
competition. In the past, courts have repeatedly refused to use the
Sherman Act in this way,807 instinctively recognizing that efforts to
control the "fairness" of competition must encounter immense difficulties. In addition to the difficulties of evaluating any but the most
flagrant forms of conduct sketched above, the expansion of regula206. The proposed Criminal Justice Codification, Revision and Reform Act of 1973
would delete the attempt to monopolize offense from section 2 and replace it with a
general criminal attempt provision. S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-2A4, 316(a)(2) (1973).
By way of contrast, section 3 of the recently approved Uniform State Antitrust Act
prohibits: "The establishment, maintenance, or use of a monopoly, or an attempt to
establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in a relevant market by any person, for the
purpose of excluding competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices." 4
TRADE REG. REP.
20,101. So long as the Sherman Act is cast in its present form, it
may make good sense to cast uniform state legislation in terms that partly draw from
the familiar federal model.
307. E.g., Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
US. 469, 483, 497-500, 512-13 (1940); Harrison v. Prather, 435 F.2d 1168, 1176-77 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1970); Ace Beer Distribs., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d
283 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963) (typical of cases expressly foregoing
determination of the existence of unfair competition claim in finding a lack of antitrust
violations); B S-B Oil & Chem. Co. v. Franklin Oil Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Mich.
1968).
Commentators commonly approve this approach. E.g., 2 J. voN KALINOwIr, supra
note 37, § 9.01 [2], at 9-10 to -11 n.32; Hibner, supra note 37, at 171. A statement of
the need to avoid confusing the law by making a dear, intentional choice whether to
pursue such a course is found in Director & Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 281 (1956).
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tion might well force courts to undertake detailed administration of
continuing business behavior. 0 8 A great- need to contain a rampaging economy of cutthroat competition would have to be shown to justify such sweeping involvement with the intractable problems of competition. The remaining introductory examples of reciprocity and
competition by a supplier with its own distributors are not persuasive. No more persuasive examples have yet been offered.
The direct costs of mistaken evaluation of competitive behavior
are supplemented by the indirect costs of deterring desirable behavior. The greater the uncertainty created by expansive judicial evaluation, the greater the dangers of deterrence. How far such dangers are
realized depends very much on the extent to which business managers
believe that their decisions will be subject to antitrust scrutiny. It
seems likely that a very broad expansion would be required to influence many business decisions in more than marginal or cosmetic ways.
To the extent that business conduct is left unaffected, however, the
result may be a not uncommon antitrust phenomenon: a wide variety
of conduct that is theoretically unlawful flourishes unchecked, with
antitrust sanctions imposed arbitrarily on a very small segment of the
forbidden behavior. In such circumstances, it is difficult to believe
that any good is accomplished by sporadic findings of violation.
The difficulty of evaluating competitive behavior is not substantially affected by the source of authority to undertake the regulation.
If unfair competition doctrines are nonetheless to be expanded, section 2 of the Sherman Act is an inappropriate vehicle. Criminal penalties are simply inappropriate to the lesser sins of unfair competition,
but there is little assurance that such penalties could be avoided entirely. Treble damage penalties are likewise inappropriate, but there
is virtually no hope that they could be eliminated for the least offensive wrongs. The obvious alternative is further development of state
law. If state law is thought too faltering, 0 9 however, there are alterna308. Detailed regulation of competitive practices ordinarily left to unfettered business
judgment is seen in Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 780
(S.D. Tex. 1971), affd., 476 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1973). Comparable regulation may be
achieved by consent decree. See United States v. Times Printing Co., 1970 Trade Cas.
73,090 (E.D. Tenn. 1970). At times, it may prove possible to pass the problems back
to an administrative agency. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973).
309. It seems likely that in many areas the lag in development of thorough-going
principles of unfair competition is attributable to the reluctance of common law
courts. In areas involving the imitation of such commercial values created by a
competitor as formulas, designs, collections of information, and the like, overhanging
shadows of federal preemption may have chilled further development. Even as to
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tive courses available for federal action apart from expansive interpretation of section 2.
One possibility is to develop the provisions of the Lanham Trademark Act 810 into a generalized body of unfair competition doctrine.
The case against this form of interpretation is strong; 1 1 it is not as
strong as the case against achieving comparable results under the
Sherman Act, because of the absence of criminal or treble damages
liability.
A second possibility is to develop a private remedy for violation
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Courts have, so
far, uniformly rejected this proposal; 312 the statute seems so clearly
designed for administrative application that any such step surely can
only be effected through new legislation.3 13
The third possibility is to authorize, by statute, creation of a federal common law of unfair competition. It seems virtually impossible
to justify creation of such a body of common law without an enabling
jurisdictional statute; there is little force in the argument that competitive conditions are so far touched by the federal antitrust, unfair
competition, patent, copyright, and trademark statutes, as well as
treaties with other countries, as to require exclusive or concurrent
14
federal occupation of the field.
Other possibilities might be conjured up. Whatever theory is ofimitation, however, there is perhaps more room for state law than had been thought.
See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
310. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1970). Particular reliance is placed on section 43(a),
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970), which clearly creates a private remedy for practices far narrower than the entire field of unfair competition, and on the intricate relationship
between subsections (b), (g), (h), and (i) of section 44, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1126(b), (g), (h),
(i) (1970).
811. See Derenberg, FederalUnfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade
of the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 1029 (1957).
312. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carlson
v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973). Arguments that such a remedy should be
created are set out in Bunn, The NationalLaw of Unfair Competition, 62 -ARV. L. REv.
987 (1949), and in the dissenting opinion in the Carlson case, 483 F.2d at 281-83 (Solomon,
J., dissenting).
313. The subtle intricacies of administrative reasoning lead, at times, to results
beyond the probable sophisticated application of many legal minds. A paltry recent
illustration of an honorable tradition is provided by Sunshine Art Studios, Inc. v. FTC,
481 F.2d 1171 (1st Cir. 1973). One of the acts of unfair competition there found was
advertising that "free" imprinting was available with greeting cards. Cards sold
without imprinting were indeed sold for the same price as cards with imprinting. But
there had never been a separate and lower charge for nonimprinted cards. Accordingly,
it was concluded that the purchasers of imprinted cards were not getting something
free; instead, they were paying the regular price, while customers for nonimprinted
cards were simply receiving merchandise of lesser value.
314. Cf. Cooper, State Law of Patent Exploitation, 56 MINN. L. Rav. 313 (1972).
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fered, the formidable dangers of undue intrusion should preclude
courts from imposing their own notions of orderliness on the disarray
of the marketplace. The mainstream of current attempt doctrine, although difficult to comprehend intellectually, represents a healthy
perception of these dangers. Little reform is needed; the most important step would be to recognize the artificiality of most "specific intent" statements. This step would bring attempts closer to monopolization, with primary attention focused on evaluation of conduct in its
market setting. The alternative path of expanding attempts in an independent direction away from monopolization might lead to undue
extension of judicial control over misunderstood competitive practices. Courts should not walk these paths without greater legislative
guidance.
APPENDIX: ATTEMPTS AS JUDICIAL CRIMEMAKING
Efforts to expand the prohibition against attempts to monopolize
have invariably focused upon the treble damage or injunctive remedy. Indeed, it hardly seems proper to intrude into polite antitrust
discourse the reminder that section 2 defines criminal offenses. Nonetheless, the criminal sanctions remain; they deserve serious consideration as long as judges show no inclination to create separate civil and
criminal violations of section 2.
As noted briefly in the body of this article,3 15 there is no reason to
believe that the draftsmen of section 2 intended that the attempt offense be used in any way other than the ordinary criminal law method
of analogy and close approach to the cognate completed offense. Old
statutes, however, are not uncommonly put to entirely unexpected
uses; it is not enough to respond to a plea of contemporary need with
an assertion that the need was not contemplated by the drafters. If
development of the attempt concept into an offense completely independent of monopolization is thought desirable, the development
is apt to occur. The purpose of this Appendix is to suggest that the
potential availability of criminal sanctions should be weighed in determining whether "attempts to monopolize" should be expanded.
To some extent, development of monopolization doctrine should also
proceed slowly. No one of the arguments is compelling in isolation;
together, they may add considerable force to a plea for judicial circumspection.
I.

CIuMEmAKING BY ANALOGY

31 6

The general purpose of attempt doctrine in criminal law is to fill
the gaps that inevitably appear in defining a completed crime. The
315. See Part IV(C) supra.
316. Greatest reliance for the ideas sketched in this section has been placed on
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judicial task is one of extending the crime, through attempt doctrine,
by a process of analogy to the completed offense. The process must
work by reference to the legislative interests effectuated by the completed offense317 and their bearing on the conduct before the court.315
The requirements of specific intent and of dangerous probability of
attaining monopoly power in a relevant market are imposed on attempted monopolization by the dominant line of current authority
in clear response to the belief that attempts should be defined by this
process of analogy to the completed offense. Even this process of analogy to completed monopolization involves substantial difficulties.
Without examining the many varieties of potentially undesirable behavior catalogued earlier, a homely illustration may illuminate the
difficulties.
Some extreme forms of conduct are readily found criminal. Deliberately shooting a person is murder; shooting and missing may easily
be found to be attempted murder in many circumstances. Deliberately destroying a sole competitor's plant by dynamite is, among other
things, monopolization; seeking to destroy the plant by dynamite that
is defused at the last minute might be found to be an attempt to monopolize. At the other- extreme, driving an automobile, although inherently dangerous, is not attempted murder nor even attempted
vehicular homicide; competing, although inherently dangerous to
rivals, is not attempted monopolization. In between such extremes of
conduct the difficulties of analogy may become enormous.
Specific statutory offenses have been created to impose sanctions
on unduly dangerous driving. The creation of such offenses has
worked tolerably well because there is a consensus as to the acceptable
limits of behavior, which can be used to warn drivers in advance and
to guide courts in applying the law. Any effort to make attempts to
monopolize into an offense of reckless competition, on the other hand,
must collide immediately with the difficulty of providing standards of
legitimate conduct. References to intent are not helpful, since the intent to injure a rival by depriving him of business is the wholly innocent and laudable intent of good competition; reliance on evaluation
of competitive conduct invites the vast confusions sketched earlier.
Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE LJ. 53
(1930), and on Enker, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts-Legality and the Legal
Process, 53 MNN. L. REv. 665 (1969).
317. E.g., Arnold, supra note 316, at 76; Perkins, Criminal Attempt and Related
Problems, 2 UCLA L. REv. 319, 324-25 (1955).
318. E.g., Ryu, Contemporary Problems of Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1170, 1175 (1957). An illustration of just how badly the interest identification approach
can go astray is provided by some of the examples of application offered in Strahorn,
The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. PA. L. REy. 962, 970, 975-77,

984-85 (1930).
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In terms of creating criminal liability, the problem is simply that the
courts are entering an area in which it is highly difficult to define in
advance the limits of legality or even to distinguish the lines in retrospect.
Courts seem to have reacted instinctively to these dangers in their
apparent unwillingness to expand attempts to reach a near monopolist who engages in potentially beneficial conduct that would be forbidden to a monopolist. 319 The dangers are equally present, however,
in reacting to seemingly less justifiable conduct.
These problems result primarily from the fact that section 2
creates common law crimes for economic regulation.3 2 0 Whether conduct that has been found unlawful is called monopolization or attempted monopolization is immaterial. In either case, conviction is
the result of judical definition. The very lack of criminal enforcement
is itself implicit recognition of 'the unsuitability of imposing criminal
sanctions through such a common law process.
Developing criminal definitions in this fashion runs head-long
3 21
into the values embedded in the so-called principle of legality.
Most simply, this principle means that retrospective government intervention into private affairs, particularly where penal sanctions are
imposed, cannot serve the purposes of law unless it is according to
rules that the actors have an opportunity to know in advance. The
Supreme Court, in overturning a vagrancy law, has inveighed against
the grave dangers of crime by analogy. 322 Persons engaged in business
are no more anxious (or deserving) to be clapped in jail or to be overcome by a plague of treble damage suits for crimes of analogy to an
abstract judicial model of fair competitive behavior. The dangers are
not reduced by recasting the conclusion into one of monopolization
rather than one of attempt by analogy to monopolization.
The problems of judicial crimemaking, moreover, would only be
exacerbated by entirely discarding the process of analogy, as suggested
by the contemporary argument for expansion of the attempt offense.
Two cases noted earlier3 23 illustrate the problem clearly. In each, the
court ruled that an unfair effort by an automobile manufacturer to
become the sole retail seller of its own products could be found to be
an attempt to monopolize, even though success would not be monopolization. For the reasons sketched earlier,324 it does not seem appropriate for courts to undertake to control such relationships under any
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See Part I(C)(3)(b) supra.
See Part IV(C) supra.
E.g., J. H=AL, GENERL PINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 575-76 (2d ed. 1960).
See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1972).
See text accompanying notes 8, 171-75 supra.
See Part V(A)(2) supra.
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conclusional label. A requirement that there be a close analogy to
something that the court is prepared to characterize as completed monopolization is apt to restrain judicial willingness to condemn. Once
that restraint is put aside, the dangers of mistaken regulation are proliferated by the very fact that courts would be defining an offense of
unfair competition for which criminal sanctions are at least theoretically available.
II.

PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT

Quite apart from problems of fairness, little purpose is served by
attaching to sins of unfair competition the criminal penalties available for attempts to monopolize. A brief review of the commonly recognized purposes of criminal attempt doctrine should serve to test the
point.325
Among the purposes of punishing attempts may be those of relieving a community sense of fear and outrage over the conduct involved and of expressing a community sense of superiority and righteousness. The dangers of such retributive motives are always great;
with respect to the sins of unfair competition that could be embraced
by an open-armed attempt offense, the dangers are very great that
punishment would depend simply on the sensibilities of the particular tribunal. As the offense expands toward conduct that can be found
with only imperceptible variations in a wide variety of ordinary and
legitimate business ploys, the dangers of decision drawn from the bias
of the individual judge or jurors are multipled.
In addition, attempts may be punished because of a feeling that
the actor is a person sufficiently dangerous to warrant some form of
incapacitation from committing further crimes and some measure of
rehabilitative effort. The actual record of antitrust law in these respects is at least as dismal as that of criminal law generally. More fundamentally, if there is grave doubt about the capacity of judicial
tribunals to identify conduct that warrants even prospective prohibition, there can be no question of their incapacity to identify dangerous competitive actors who require such therapy as our penal systems may have to offer.
Another goal of attempt doctrine is to treat actors who are apparently as "guilty" as those who have completed an offense, but whose
conduct, by some fortuity, has fallen short of the completed crime, in
820
the same way as those who have completed an offense are treated.
At most, this purpose would justify reaching only those who have
825. Cf. Elkind, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts: A Theorist's Headache, 54 VA.
L. REv. 20, 29-80 (1968).
826. E.g., Wechsler, Jones S. Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model
Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 571, 572-73 (1961).
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very narrowly missed the combination of power and conduct required
for monopolization. More realistically, it must be wondered -whether
this purpose has any meaningful application to situations -as complicated as those necessarily found in the precincts of section 2.
Attempt doctrine also responds to a perceived need to permit
official intervention to thwart undesirable results before they are completed without losing the opportunity to invoke the criminal process. 27 This purpose may be served if it is possible to identify situations of competitive behavior analogous to pointing a loaded gun at
another person. Identification continues to be the question.
Finally, many writers are reluctant to suppose that punishment
for attempt can very often serve a deterrent function above that provided by punishing the completed crime.32s Independent significance
is so seldom given to attempt to monopolize doctrine that deterrence
may seem particularly unlikely. Nonetheless, the purpose of deterrence may be served by punishing attempts to monopolize, at least if
business managers are able to identify in advance the-kinds of conduct that constitute an attempt to monopolize. Most obviously, expanding the reach of attempts to include reduced combinations of
power and conduct is apt to warn people to remain further away from
the core violation; since the conduct involved ordinarily continues
over time, approaching gradually toward the prohibited zone, ample
opportunity exists for reflection on the dangers of persistence. In addition, if deliberate predation is used as a model, it is possible to
build a decisional theory that would be strongly influenced by punishment for mere attempt. In determining whether to monopolize,
the would-be monopolist must consider the probability of acquiring
monopoly, the costs of acquisition, and the profits that would be obtained if it were acquired. The calculation must include the possibility that judicial intervention will reduce the profits and increase the
costs. If a mere attempt is subject to intervention and punishment,
the calculation must include the decreased probability of ever attaining monopoly and the increased risk that costs will be imposed by
judicial action without ever enjoying offsetting profits.
III.

CRIMINAL NONENFORCEMENT

To be sure, these observations are subject to the retort that no
one is proposing the use of criminal penalties to enforce the expanded
portion of the attempt offense. This disclaimer of criminal enforce327. E.g., Enker, supra note 316, at 696.
328. E.g., W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTt, JP., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 427-28 (1972);
Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 326, at 572. In contrast, it is often urged that
allowing a defense of voluntary withdrawal is desirable in order to encourage voluntary
cessation that might not occur if the actor had already incurred the full penalty. E.g.,
W. IAFAvE & A. SCOTT, JR., supra, at 450.
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ment itself supports the proposition that this criminal statute should
not be used to expand judicial control over single-firm competitive
behavior. The only justifications for reliance on section 2 must be
that there is no other means for creating a federal common law tort of
unfair competition and that there is no realistic hope that Congress
will create such a tort. These arguments of themselves demonstrate
that courts should not seize upon section 2 as a contrived justification
for action.
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